

JPRS 74441

24 October 1979

West Europe Report

No. 1489

Activist Groups of Eastern Turkey



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.

Current JPRS publications are announced in Government Reports Announcements issued semi-monthly by the National Technical Information Service, and are listed in the Monthly Catalog of U.S. Government Publications issued by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402.

Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available from Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		1. REPORT NO. JPRS 74441	2.	3. Recipient's Accession No.
4. Title and Subtitle WEST EUROPE REPORT, No. 1489 Activist Groups of Eastern Turkey			5. Report Date 24 October 1979	
7. Author(s)			6.	
9. Performing Organization Name and Address Joint Publications Research Service 1000 North Glebe Road Arlington, Virginia 22201			8. Performing Organization Rept. No.	
12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address As above			10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.	
			11. Contract(C) or Grant(G) No. (C) (G)	
15. Supplementary Notes			13. Type of Report & Period Covered	
			14.	
16. Abstract (Limit: 200 words) This serial report contains political/economic information on West European energy, finance and trade policy matters as well as developments and trends in the doctrine, programs and problems of the major communist parties, including their relations with communist parties outside the West European area. The report also contains information on Theater Nuclear Forces and elections to the European Parliament.				
17. Document Analysis a. Descriptors				
Political Science	International Affairs	Iceland		
Sociology	Austria	Italy		
Propaganda	Belgium	Luxembourg		
Economics	Canada	Netherlands		
Energy	Cyprus	Norway		
Industry	Denmark	Portugal		
Trade	Federal Republic of	Spain		
Finance	Germany	Sweden		
Theater Nuclear Forces	Finland	Switzerland		
	France	X Turkey		
	Greece	United Kingdom		
b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms				
c. COSATI Field/Group 5C, 5D, 10				
19. Availability Statement Unlimited Availability Sold by NTIS Springfield, Virginia 22161		19. Security Class (This Report) UNCLASSIFIED	21. No. of Pages 110	
		20. Security Class (This Page) UNCLASSIFIED	22. Price	

24 October 1979

WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 1489

ACTIVIST GROUPS OF EASTERN TURKEY

Istanbul AYDINLIK in Turkish 18 Jan-17 Jul 79

CONTENTS	PAGE
Introduction	1
Chart: Origins of the Groups in the East	4
Shivanists (Talabanists)	6
Apoists (National Liberation Army)	42
The Freedom Road (Roja Welat)	65
Rizgari (Komal)	73
Ala Rizgari (Red Liberation)	77
Five-Sectionists	79
Tekoshinists	81
The Turkish KDP (Kurdistan Democratic Party)	82
The Iraqi KDP	82
Kurdistan National Liberationists	95
Kawa	99
Rejectionist Kawa	100
Denge Kawa	104
Guide to Abbreviations	106

Introduction

[Article: "Fifteen Groups in the East With Documents and Incidents"]

[18 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] As we begin the series . . .

We are living in critical days. Repeated attempts to create public confusion, turmoil are taking their toll on Turkey. Everyone with some commonsense, or with some concern about Turkey's welfare wants to see the country united and yearns for peace and tranquility to replace the pervasive feelings of hostility, the endless arguments, killings, massacres. . . . How will unity be achieved? Who are the people blocking the road to unity? Who wants and instigates turmoil? Formulation, and then, resolute implementation of policies aimed at uniting the country will depend, primarily, on the discovery of the answers to these questions.

What Is Happening in the East?

The eastern question recently became the focal point of public attention. The public has been seeing unfamiliar names in the press and reading about what may well be for some unheard of incidents: "Apoists Kill Their Friends and Burry Them in a Cave"; "Talabani Demands Release of Friends Held Captive in Turkey by the Kurdistan Democratic Party"; "Shivanists and People's Liberationists Clash at Diyarbakir Educational Institute, Shivanists Kill One"; "Liberationists and Shivanists Clash at TOB-DER [Turkish Teachers' Unity and Solidarity Organization] Congress"; "Sheik Khevkes' Ouster From Country Halted at Last Moment"; "Mardin Caves Yield 447 Russian-Made Rockets," etc..

Go to any province or county in the /east/ [in boldface], wallwritings will sound like code words: DDKD, DHKD, Kiyade, KDP, KUK, Rizgari, Ala Rizgari, DENG KAWA, UKO, etc., etc..

[See page 106 Guide to Abbreviations]

When the eastern question became a major topic of discussion, the [Turkish] National Security Council, in a public statement, talked of "threats in the east" and described those threats as "of external origin." At a later date, a government statement used a similar description. The question of "threats in the east" touched off a widespread debate in the press, and then, in the parliament. Everyone was saying something is going on in the east, and everyone also had a policy proposal. When a number of parliamentarians announced that they were Kurdish, but not separatist, the debate grew louder with several opposition members pointing a finger at their Kurdish colleagues as the real source of the threat. "You either call yourselves Turkish, or you get out," they shouted, and followed their ultimatum with a graphic description of anyone who calls himself a Kurd. These words were spoken in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. According to this line of reasoning, the threat in the east originated with the people living there, people who called themselves Kurds. They--and that meant everyone who lived in the east--were "the source of divisionism." The solution was to oppress the region's people further, to subject them to heavier pressure.

Calls for Unity Stem From Acknowledgement of Realities

This strong-arm mentality is no longer viable in Turkey. Ask anyone in the east, he'll tell you, "I am a Kurd." There is nothing odd about it. Go to any western Anatolia village, tell the peasants there that Kurds are living in Diyarbakir. They will not think it is strange, they will not be shocked. It is a fact of life in Turkey, and it is a publicly acknowledged fact. It is also a fact recognized and acknowledged by the top administrators of the country. The prime minister said, "There are ethnic groups in Turkey," but he added, according to his concept of nationalism, everyone living within Turkey's national borders is a citizen of the Turkish Republic. Similarly, the major opposition party leader rejected the policy of intimidation and suggested, "We must use a gentle approach in our dealings with the people of the east." The deputy secretary general of the RPP [Republican People's Party] warned "our ethnic Kurdish citizens" against "external dangers." Many of our nationally known writers, whose comments appear in high-circulation papers, have underlined the necessity to recognize this fact.

Every concerned citizen who wants Turkey's independence and integrity safeguarded and is waging a struggle for this purpose must face realities. They are our realities. These problems are our problems. They are the problems of 45 million people living in Turkey. We, the people of this land, will settle these problems among ourselves. If we close our eyes to our realities, the policies we follow, whatever they may be, cannot be the right ones. That is why, in these critical days, many people, from the top administrators and leading writers to workers and peasants, who are concerned about Turkey, are studying the facts and publicly discussing them. This is the right attitude. This is the attitude that will lead us to the urgently needed unity.

Our Goal Is To Serve Unity and Democracy


In the course of the public debate on the eastern question, people naturally began to wonder about the nature of the "danger." What is this threat from abroad that top officials are talking about? Who are these forces they refer to? What do these forces do? What do they want? What are they doing in the east? What are these groups whose names have not been heard of before? What do they want? Finally, what do we do to avert the danger and to preserve the nation's integrity?

To provide satisfactory answers to all these questions was our objective in the preparation of this series of articles. Learning all there is to learn about these groups will help us recognize the source of the danger in the east and the forces behind the divisive current.

Our position is principled and aboveboard. We will not leave alone the people who are intentionally collaborating with external forces committed to dividing Turkey, enslaving our people, and destroying our independence. We will not stop our struggle against killers who, under the guise of "revolutionary," attack our people and commit murder. We are not after individuals. The important thing is to convict the idea, and the proponents of that idea, of serving the imperialists who want to strangle Turkey. We believe, as we always have, that most of these people who think of themselves as "revolutionaries," and defenders of the people, and under this self-delusion become involved in destructive activities, will one day recognize the truth.

By publishing this series of articles, we hope to contribute to the strengthening of unity among our people, to the preservation of our country's independence and integrity, and to the protection of democracy and freedom. We call on everyone who is concerned about Turkey, who is for the people and yearns for unity, to continue the public debate, so that the facts will be known. We begin the series with the hope that one day ours will be a country where 45 million people are closely united against external dangers.

DOĞUDAKİ GRUPLARIN KÖKENLERİ



Origins of the Groups in the East

The chart traces the origin and emergence of the groups in the east. We will talk about each of these groups in the course of this series. The chart also shows the relationship and intercation between the groups in Turkey and in Iraq.

Key:

[The same number is used when name appears more than once]

1. A group that separated from the TLP [Turkish Labor Party] in 1968
 2. Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey [Turkish KDP]
 3. Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths [RECH]
 4. Prior to 12 March 1971
 5. The Turkish KDP under Sait Elci's leadership
 6. Shivanists of Sait Kirmizitoprak, alias Shivan
 7. Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association [RDCA]
 8. Kurdistan National Liberationists [KNL]
 9. Kawa
 10. Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq [Iraqi KDP] Provisional Committee
 11. Shivanists--Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Association
 12. Turkish Labor Party Group
 13. Freedom Road--Revolutionary People's Cultural Associations [FR-RPCA]
 14. Rizgari [Liberation]
 15. Kawa Rejectionists
 16. Denge Kawa [Voice of Kawa]
 17. Turkish Worker-Peasant Party [TWPP]
 18. Ala Rizgari [Red Liberation]
 19. Opposition
 20. Kurdish Patriotic Union [KPU]
 21. Talabanists in Turkey
 22. Independents
 23. The Diyarbakir Group
 24. The Agri Group
 25. Other groups
 26. Apoists--National Liberation Army [NLA]
 27. Tekoshinists [Strugglers]
 28. Five-Sectionists
 29. Turkish Communist Party [TCP]
 30. The Revolutionary Youth Confederation--Ankara Higher-Education Assoc.
 31. Liberation
 32. People's Liberation [PL]
- a. Broken lines indicate association among groups.
- b. Dotted lines indicate where splinter groups transferred.

[19 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] Shivanists (Talabanists)

Name : Shivanists

Origin: Formed after 1975 within the RDCA [Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Associations] by Sait Kirmizitoprak who gained prominence in the Turkish KDP [Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey] in 1968.

Pro-Shivanist Press Organs:

DEVIRIMCI DEMOKRATIK GENCLIK
[Revolutionary Democratic Youth], a periodical published fortnightly.

Pro-Shivanist Organizations:

Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Associations,
Revolutionary Democratic Women's Associations [RDWA],
Several TOB-DER branches in the east

The most frequently talked about group in the east is the one that goes under the name of "Shivanists." Shivanists have close ties with the Syrian-based Talabani group. In fact, Shivanists operate as Talabanists' Turkish arm.

Pro-Shivanist Organizations

Shivanists overtly organize within the RDCA which, in addition to major cities as Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir, has local branches in virtually every eastern province and county. The membership in the association's eastern branches largely consists of young people. The Shivanist influence is particularly discernable in Diyarbakir, which also serves as a center from where instructions are issued for the group's regionwide operations. The Shivanists' sphere of influence covers Kiziltepe, Derik, Mazidag, Cizre, Hakkari, Van and Yukseleva.

Another Shivanist organization is the RDWA which, as its name indicates, organizes activities oriented at women.

The DEVIRIMCI DEMOKRATIK GENCLIK, a periodical published fortnightly, supports Shivanists and Jalal Talabani. It ceased publication after the proclamation of martial law.

There is one other group which supports Shivanists, and that is the Revolutionary Democratic Teachers, set up within TOB-DER. Some of the TOB-DER branches in eastern Anatolia are run by Shivanists.

Shivanists have cultivated close ties with the mayors of a number of towns in the east. They also have supporters among government employees in administrative positions in various agencies of the state.

Who Is Shivan?

"Shivan" is Dr Sait Kirmizitoprak's alias. Dr Kirmizitoprak worked in the Turkish KDP for many years and made a name for himself during that period. He had a sizable group of followers around him in the KDP long before the 12 March era. Some of the Shivanist leaders of today were among the group of young people around Kirmizitoprak.

The Turkish KDP's secretary general was Sait Elci when Shivan became active in the party. The Turkish KDP was an enthusiastic supporter of the Barzani movement in Iraq, but it had no operations to speak of in Turkey. The party had members from all walks of life--members of the intelligentsia, young people, shopkeepers, religious officials and many others. The party attracted the interest of the region's influential personages as the movement in Iraq gathered momentum. Powerful and influential feudal circles of the east formed ties with the KDP. These individuals, by the virtue of their connections with the region's powerful institutions of large land-ownership, tribal leadership and sheikdom, gained influential positions in the movement.

Kirmizitoprak was an educated man and a skilfull, effective propagandist. He advocated basically nationalist ideas, supported the movement in Iraq and openly pledged allegiance to Barzani. In the meanwhile, he was forming ties with progressive and socialist circles which brought him under the influence of the ideas in those circles. Be that as it may, he never turned away from nationalist principles. He occasionally published articles in several periodicals. His arrest, along with Said Elci, and the subsequent trial popularized his name. He, then, widened his circle and enhanced his influence in the Turkish KDP.

In 1969, a group of young people from the east, who had dropped out of the Turkish Labor Party [TLP] and the Intellectual Clubs, formed a new association--the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths [RECH], which rapidly organized in the east. Every major city and town in eastern provinces soon had a hearth. Meanwhile, the struggle in Iraq had reached its hottest stage. The fighting next door naturally affected Turkey and created a climate highly conducive to a diffusion of nationalist ideas. Youthful members of the RECH, deeply affected by the developments [presumably in Iraq], became fervent propagators of nationalism in the east. The RECH had under its umbrella people of a variety of views. There never was a single dominant outlook in the hearths. Most of the members called themselves "revolutionary," or "socialist," but their ideas were basically nationalist. There were also some who advocated strictly nationalist views. Among the so-called socialists, some leaned toward the TLP's ideology and some were impressed by truly revolutionary ideas. There were, nevertheless, none who

could be called pro-Russian. Even those influenced by revisionist ideas were aware of, and consequently disgusted by, the Soviet Union's provocative role in the annihilation of the Iraqi Kurds with bombs and tanks.

Sait Kirmizitoprak, impressed by the RECH, which by then had grown into an influential force in the east, formed ties with some of the youthful members in the hearths. That was the period when the nucleus of what later will be known as Shivanists was formed. The group was critical of Said Elci and the Turkish KDP. The group members thought of themselves as representatives of "more progressive" ideas. RECH's revolutionary circles, which called for a struggle against feudalism and condemned the narrow nationalist outlook, were successfully purged by Kirmizitoprak supporters. Revolutionary youths in the administrative cadre of the Istanbul RECH were ousted from the organization. A controversy erupted in the Turkish KDP over Shivan's activities, particularly his virtually total independence [presumably from party leaders] in the conduct of his activities, and strained Shivan's relations with Sait Elci.

Kirmizitoprak, alias Shivan, went abroad before 12 March. He spent many years in Canada. He already had a following in Turkey, and when in Canada, he got in touch with the Kurdish organizations in Europe, and then, set up connections with Iraq and Iran. He was, by then, acting on his own, totally independent of the Turkish KDP, and was conducting activities in Turkey through some of his people.

With the advent of the 12 March era, some of his supporters fled to Europe and eventually ended up in East Germany where they came under the influence of revisionist ideas. (They became outspoken proponents of cooperation with the Soviet Union when they returned home.) Sait Kirmizitoprak took refuge by Barzani in Iraq. Sait Elci, secretary general of the Turkish KDP, having become the object of a hunt, also escaped to Iraq.

The relations between the two men deteriorated further during their stay in Iraq. Kirmizitoprak, seeing a potential threat to himself in Elci's newly established ties with the Iraqi KDP, decided to eliminate Elci and assigned two of his men--Cheko and Brusk--to the job. These two men killed Elci, but in the course of carrying out the assassination plan, they also killed Mehmet Bege, a friend of Elci's and one of his influential supporters in the Turkish KDP.

When the news of the assassination reached Barzani, he had Kirmizitoprak and his two confederates arrested. They were put to trial and sentenced to death, and one morning, Kirmizitoprak and the two men who had carried out the assassination were executed by a firing squad. Thus, two men, both named Sait, who on the outset worked together in the Turkish KDP, shared a common fate.

The Elci-Kirmizitoprak dispute did not die out by the death of the principal protagonists, if anything, it grew fiercer. Two opposing groups in the

Turkish KDP went at each other tooth and nail. Arrests and disbanding of groups during the 12 March era were the only reason why the struggle in the party did not develop into an out-and-out battle. The Shivanist forces in Turkey remained dispersed for some time. The Turkish KDP kept everyone informed of developments by issuing communiques. The revulsion that Elci's murder created more or less erased whatever influence Shivanists had in the KDP.

In those days, Shivanists had no clearly defined policy. They did not have the courage to come out against Barzani, even though he had Kirmizitoprak executed. It wasn't until Barzani's defeat and loss of prestige that they dared to speak out against him and emerged as a separate group. With the return of their leaders from a self-imposed exile in East Germany, they evolved into a movement staunchly pro-Soviet, and in time they joined Talabani who Shivan had once condemned as a traitor.

What Is a Shivanist?

The word "Shivanist" comes from "Shivan," Dr Sait Kirmizitoprak's adopted name. Kirmizitoprak used to work in the Turkish KDP, but he occasionally traveled abroad to form or renew contacts with Kurdish organizations in Iraq and Iran, and also in Europe.

Soon after Kirmizitoprak became active in the KDP, his relations with Sait Elci, secretary general of the party, turned sour. Kirmizitoprak criticized Elci for refusing to follow a more active policy, while Elci objected Kirmizitoprak's independent activities. They may have differed on many points, but they firmly agreed on Barzani, they both supported him.

Kirmizitoprak quickly gained prominence in the Turkish KDP and attracted a following in the RECH, which had been formed by a group of dissidents in the TLP after leaving the party in 1961. Ever since those days, Kirmizitoprak's supporters in the KDP and RECH have been known as "Shivanists." Some of the youths who worked with Kirmizitoprak in the RECH emerged after 12 March as leaders of the "Shivanist" group.

Shivan Called Talabani 'Traitor'

[During Kirmizitoprak's Turkish KDP days] a serious dispute erupted in the Iraqi KDP between Barzani and Jalal Talabani. Later on in the series, we will talk extensively about this dispute which resulted in Talabani's ouster from the KDP. Shivanists, who will join Talabani in 1977, took Barzani's side in those days.

At the time, Kirmizitoprak talked of Barzani as a man of "infinite will-power, iron resolve, and a vast capacity for resistance," and praised him as "a leader who knows well his people's dreams and characteristics." For Kirmizitoprak, Talabani, who called Barzani "feudal," and criticized him for "compromising with the Iraqi Ba'th," was guilty of "petty schemes, commonplace maneuvers, and what is worse, methodical planning an act of

treachery." On Talabani's support of the Iraqi Ba'th [Party] in 1966 and betrayal of Barzani, Kirmizitoprak said, "There have been many acts of treachery in the histories of nations and revolutions. Of all the incidents we can think of, however, we cannot find another as deliberate, perfidious and revolting as the treachery committed by Jalal and his friends."

Elci's and Kirmizitoprak's support of Barzani in the Barzani-Talabani dispute kept the fighting from spreading to Turkey. Neither Talabani, nor the Soviets had any supporters in Turkey then. Around 12 March though, when Elci and Kirmizitoprak had a falling out, the Turkish KDP broke apart and Shivanists emerged as an independent group.

After the 12 March coup, Kirmizitoprak crossed to Iraq and took refuge in the KDP there. Sait Elci, who had become a wanted man, also went to Iraq. Relations between the two men strained further as they fought over which one of them should form what type of ties with the Iraqi KDP. Kirmizitoprak had two of his men--known as Cheko and Brusk--kill Sait Elci. When Barzani learned of the assassination, he had Kirmizitoprak and his men shot. That left the Turkish KDP without a leader, and also marked the beginning of a "blood feud" between the Shivanists and the [Iraqi?] KDP. The aftermath of the Iraqi incidents also saw the end of the KDP's long-lasting status as "the only organization," and the beginning of factionalism in the east.

Shivanists in 12 March Era

Closing of the associations in the east in the 12 March era, a large number of arrests, and the tightening control over the people brought the activities of the groups to a halt. Some of the Shivanist leaders escaped to Europe and found refuge in East Germany where they formed ties with various Kurdish organizations. They heard revisionist ideas and were swayed by them. With the closing of the 12 March era, they returned to Turkey and reorganized Shivanists. The leaders who came back from Europe were instrumental in the emergence of Shivanists as a pro-Soviet group.

Shivanists' blood feud with Barzani over the killing of Sait Kirmizitoprak did not abate. However, Barzani had just launched a new campaign in Iraq and was popular with the masses; and therefore, Shivanists were hesitant to attack him. Their attitude was a perfect example of hypocrisy because, in public, they voiced staunch support for Barzani and fierce opposition to Talabani.

The year 1975 was a turning point for the groups in the east. In 1975, following the close of the 12 March era, youths from the east living in Ankara formed the RDCA. The new organization included a number of people from the former RECH, and also several groups with no particular ideology. Every leading member had a small cluster of supporters around him. These numerous groups, though, remained together for a long time and conducted operations jointly.

Defeat and Turning Point

The decisive defeat of the Barzani forces in Iraq in 1975 changed the situation in the entire region. Barzani's taking refuge in the United States stirred up a tide against his policy of collaboration with U.S. imperialism. The Iraqi KDP was accused of "compromising with feudal elements and the United States."

That is when Talabani went into action. There was a very strong feeling against Talabani on account of his collaboration with the Iraqi Ba'th Party and his stance against Barzani and the Kurds. He was referred to as the "cahsh," the traitor. When the Iraqi Ba'th and KDP made a cease-fire agreement in 1971, Talabani could not remain in Iraq and took refuge in Syria. The Syrian Ba'th Party saw in Talabani a man it can use to carry out its regionwide schemes. On the basis of this line of reasoning, and also because of its close ties to Moscow, the Syrian Ba'th Party gave Talabani permission to remain in Syria.

Talabani Forms KPU

During his stay in Syria, which lasted until 1975, Talabani accomplished nothing with the exception of establishing contact with small Kurdish groups, all based in Europe and almost all pro-Moscow. The 1975 defeat of Barzani, and the erosion of his and America's influence in the area in the aftermath of that defeat, supplied the opportunity Talabani needed to go into action. On 21 May 1975, he announced the formation of a front which incorporated several small groups from Europe. The front, based primarily in Syria, was named the Kurdistan Patriotic Union [KPU].

Subsequently, several more groups joined the front. They were the Kurdistan Socialist Movement [KSM], Kurdish Marxist-Leninist Organization [KMLO] and Kurdistan Peasants' Organization [KPO]. The KSM fragmented when the decision to join the front was taken. The group which opposed joining the front argued that the front was, in fact, under the control of the pro-Moscow KMLO. Despite the presence of words like "Marxist-Leninist" or "socialist" in their names, these groups were fundamentally nationalist and pro-Moscow.

Ali Askheri, secretary general of the KSM, became a politburo member and Talabani's right arm. The KMLO was, then, under Shirvan Emin's leadership. The Central Committee of Talabani's KPU was made up of the following: Ibrahim Ahmed, a former secretary general of the KDP; Ali Askheri, secretary general of the KSM; Shirvan Emin, secretary general of the KMLO; Dr Halil Said, KSM Politburo member; Tahir Ali Vali, KSM Politburo member and a former Iraqi army officer; Sayid Kake, KSM Central Committee member; Sheik Hussein, a Yazidi tribal chieftain; Sheik Ali Mulla Adil and Omer Abdullah, the latter was also the commander of the military forces.

Meanwhile, Dr Mahmoud Osman, who earlier had quit the KDP and formed a small group which he called the Preparedness Committee, joined Talabani's front and was given a post in the Central Executive Committee. Later on, another small group joined the front. It was nationalist and also pro-Enver Hoxha.

That was the revisionist, nationalist organization Talabani was referring to when he denied having cooperated with the Soviets and asserted that his front encompassed a wide variety of views, even Maoists," as he put it.

Meanwhile, in Turkey, with the return of Shivanists from East Germany, major changes were taking place in the RDCA and the Shivanist group.

[20 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] While Talabani was forming his KPD in Syria, developments in Turkey were laying the groundwork for soon to follow splintering in the RDCA.

A controversy that had been brewing in the RDCA came to a head in 1976. At the center of the arguments was the policy to be followed towards the Soviet Union. A group of dissidents, who eventually formed the KAWA, broke away. Revisionist ideas were becoming prevalent among the groups in the RDCA and in its administrative cadre. Despite the revisionist tide, several RDCA members, who later became the leaders of the Shivanist group, insisted that the Soviet Union was revisionist, the TCP [Turkish Communist Party] social chauvinist, and Talabani a traitor.

Shivanists Organize, Independents Separate

A number of Shivanists, whose association with Kirmizitoprak went as far back as 1976 when Kirmizitoprak adopted his alias Shivan, and who had fled to East Germany in the 12 March period, returned home. Their homecoming marked the beginning of a shift in the RDCA's posture towards the Soviet Union. Small groups and veteran members of the RDCA joined the Shivanists. By 1977, the RDCA was under the control of Shivanists.

New members of the Shivanist group included the son of a large landowner in the Diyarbakir region. The support of this individual, who was a former RDCA member, opened the region to Shivanist influence. Several former KDP elements in the Silvan area also joined the group, but at about the same time, a number of Shivanists announced that they had decided to follow an independent line, which gave the group its name: Independent RDCA. Essentially, there was nothing new in the splinter group's thesis and it failed to attract many people into its fold. The independents are still active in Mardin, Kiziltepe and Nusaybin. They collaborated with the KNL [Kurdistan National Liberationists] and the Freedom Road group in Nusaybin in several operations.

Shivanists Become Soviet Satellite, Grow Aggressive

Shivanists, since the early days of 1977, had been advocating cooperation with the Soviet Union which they called a socialist country. The dispute in the RDCA, though, was not limited to what the Soviet policy should be, it also involved the attitude towards the pro-Moscow TCP. The number of people who saw the TCP as a "social chauvinist" party became smaller as the argument continued--in fact, there is still a small number of people in the RDCA who oppose the association's Soviet and TCP policies--and the association came under

the control of the proponents of cooperation with the TCP and the PYA [Progressive Youths' Association]. Soon, the RDCA and the pro-Moscow TCP were collaborating in every field.

In fact, the TCP-affiliated Progressive Women's Association, in a message to the RDCA's first congress, urged "unification of forces," stressing that "the need for unity is more urgent now than at any other time in the past." The women's association expressed hope that "the congress will mark the beginning of progress toward a unity of forces and action." As for the PYA, it said, "Today, the PYA and RDCA have a major mission," and called for "enhancement and furtherance of the existing unity in action." The primary target of this united action, the PYA urged, should be the "Maoists." The RDCA did not need any prompting from the PYA, it had already declared the revolutionists, in their words, the "Maoists," as the archenemy.

Shivanist Murders

When the RDCA fell under Shivanists' domination, the TCP-RDCA cooperation flourished, and in the meanwhile, the RDCA became the most aggressive group in the east.

Shivanist activities were directed primarily at the youth and intelligentsia sectors. In the youth sector, Shivanists exploited nationalist feelings. Using "socialism" and "revolutionarism" as a lure, they widened their circle. They entered schools of all levels. In schools, they intimidated students; outside the schools, they launched frequent attacks on other groups. Here are some of the murders they committed this year alone:

After the defeat of Shivanist candidates in the student representative elections at the Diyarbakir Science Faculty in the early days of 1979, Shivanists laid in wait near the school and fired on students from other groups as the latter emerged from the school building. One student, identified as Halil Suman, was killed, another seriously hurt.

In Siverek, Ramazan Can, a member of the TWPLA [Worker-Peasant Liberation Army], was also killed by Shivanists.

Diyarbakir Educational Institute and Aktokat Incidents

Shivanists, who are in control of the Diyarbakir Educational Institute, are tyrannizing the student body. They are chauvinistic and anti-Turkish. In the Nationalist Front era, when the academic life in educational institutes became paralyzed with the invasion of these institutes of learning by National Action Party-affiliated students, many youths of those schools transferred to the Diyarbakir institute. Shivanists, who controlled the Diyarbakir school, bullied the new students, even though all the transfers were revolutionaries. Any student who refused to acknowledge that the east was a colony was threatened or attacked by Shivanist ringleaders who patrolled the buildings fully, and conspicuously, armed. Some revolutionaries were threatened with physical harm until they shouted, "Down with colonialism."

Some students were mistreated only because they were of Turkish lineage. They were coerced into shouting racist slogans. Using blatantly racist and chauvinist methods, they extorted money from students. To ensure that only students who supported Shivanists entered the Educational Institute and the Science Faculty, they barred anti-Shivanists from registering. When the dean of the faculty refused to adjust the point level [that determined whether a student passed or failed], they branded him "counterrevolutionary."

The Shivanist domination at the two schools led to frequent clashes between pro- and anti-Shivanists. One such clash resulted in the death of a Diyarbakir Educational Institute student, Sehabettin Aktokat.

The incident at the institute in March of this year began with a Shivanist attack on People's Liberationists who had scrawled their slogans on the school walls. Two liberationists were hurt in the melee. The following day, Shivanists brought all their armed members into the school. The People's Liberation, meanwhile, had its armed members cut off the roads leading to the school. There was every indication that a major clash was about to erupt, and yet, security forces took no preventive measures, made no move. The clash occurred on the school grounds. It lasted about one-half hour and left one dead--Sehabettin Aktokat--and three seriously wounded. A search of the school grounds after the clash yielded 11 handguns. Academic activity was suspended indefinitely.

Activities in Mass Organizations

In mass organizations, Shivanists practice the very same methods they use in schools. Anyone they consider anti-Shivanist is barred from the organizations they control, and the ban also applies to true revolutionaries whom they call "counterrevolutionary" and "Maoist." To establish control over mass organizations, they collaborate with the PYA and provoke fights with other groups. In 1977, when they lost the Diyarbakir TOB-DER elections, they started a fight with the Freedom Road group right there in the building. Five were hurt, and the building, with the furniture in it, were destroyed. The following year, Shivanists formed an alliance with PYA and took control of the Diyarbakir TOB-DER.

Shivanists have extended their influence to state agencies also. They use the personnel in administrative positions to reach the employees and workers. Some of these administrators are Shivanist and some others are too intimidated to put up a resistance. Shivanists have been trying to have TCP-controlled labor unions infiltrate state facilities. The effort is conducted through the 10th Regional Representative of the DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Labor Unions]. Any worker who tries to frustrate their effort is fired on the spot by RDCA-affiliated administrators and replaced by a pro-Shivanist.

The Shivanist involvement in attacks and provocations coincides with the group's shift to a pro-Soviet line and its entrance into an alliance with the TCP. That is why, 1977 was a turning point for Shivanists.

[AYDINLIK OF 21 June 1979 could not be found. According to a note in the 20 June installment, the next article was to cover the period when Shivan-ists joined the Talabani forces. The missing issue apparently also contained the first part of a two-part sketch of Talabani. The concluding chapters of the sketch from the 22 June issue and the 22 June installment follow.]

[22 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] Who Is Talabani?

The dispute between Talabani and Barzani soon escalated into armed battle. Talabani took refuge in Iran. After a 2-month sojourn in the Hamadan area, he went back to Iraq with his forces and launched an attack on Barzani. The operation did not last long. Once again, Talabani fled to Iran. The Shah of Iran had him settled near Tehran. He was given a villa, chauffeurs and cooks. Years later, when Talabani criticized Barzani's collaboration with the United States through Iran, KDP people reminded him of his days in Iran.

When he was in Iran, he vowed that he would not hesitate to join forces with Barzani if the Baghdad government one day broke the ceasefire. That day came in 1966 when the Iraqi government refused to recognize [presumably the Kurdish] autonomy, and fighting resumed. Talabani sent word to Barzani, and then, arrived in Iraq with his men. Shivan doubted that Talabani's return was motivated by a sincere desire to help and charged that it was part of a petty scheme, a maneuver, a phase of an insidious plot of infamy. Talabani, no more than 2 days after his arrival in Iraq, dispatched two of his men to Baghdad for secret talks with the government. Some time later, he quietly left Barzani and settled in Baghdad. Now, Barzani had not only the Baghdad government, but also Talabani as his adversaries. From then on, Talabani and his men were referred to as "the traitors of 1966" (chashen shesht u shesh) [obviously the Kurdish version of same].

Talabani's men joined the Iraqi army units in their drive against the KDP forces. Talabani, with the help of his tribe, established control in the Sulaymaniyah area. Later, on 2 September 1966, a conference was arranged under the protection of the Iraqi army. Talabani also had the support of the pro-Moscow communist party in Iraq. It is apparent that Talabani was following a pro-Moscow line as far back as 1966.

In 1971, when Barzani and the Iraqi government reached another ceasefire agreement, Talabani's usefulness, hence his influence, began to wane. He went to Syria. The Syrian Ba'th Party, partly in response to Moscow's urging, and partly because of its belief that Talabani could be used as a trump card in dealings with other countries in the region, allowed him to operate in Syria, but Talabani virtually dropped out of sight until 1975. During that period, he was forming ties with the Kurdish movements in Europe, most of which were nationalist under the influence of Moscow, hence, revisionist ideas.



[Photo reproduced from AYDINLIK 19 June 1979, p 8]

CAPTION

Jalal Talabani. Shivanists joined Talabani's Syrian-based KPU in 1973. Talabani's objective is to stir up trouble in Iran, Iraq and Turkey. In his operations directed at this objective, he receives aid from the Soviets in the form of weapons and money. Furthermore, Soviet and Bulgarian military experts work as guerrilla warfare instructors at Talabani's military training camps in Syria. Talabani launched his operations in Turkey in 1977 by sending two of his trained guerrillas to Turkey.

Barzani's defeat in 1975 was a turning point for Talabani also. Soon after the defeat, Talabani sprung to action and announced the formation of a new party based in Syria. The initiative received the approval of the Soviets whose relations with Iraq were considerably strained at the time. A strong and active Talabani fitted nicely in Moscow's plans. Moscow, which had been urging the Kurds against the Iraqi Ba'th until recently, saw Talabani as an effective weapon that can be used against the nations in the region, including Iraq which had shifted to a policy of defiance against the Soviets. Moscow shipped arms and advisors to Talabani's camps on Syrian territory, thereby greatly improving its relations with him. In time, Talabani will go into action in Iraq, Iran and Turkey, stirring up trouble with his Soviet-supplied arms.

Talabani had no leverage in Turkey until 1976, but in 1976, when Shivanists joined him, he became an influential figure in Turkey also.

Talabani insists that he does not work with the Soviet Union. The weapons he uses, his military camps run by Soviet experts, and his close ties to pro-Moscow revisionist parties everywhere he operates, including Turkey, belie his denials. Moreover, the turmoil he tries to instigate in the countries of the region serves the interests of no one else but Moscow. That is why, Moscow supports him. Talabani's is the most dangerous group among those helping Moscow implement its policies and carry out its efforts to instigate turmoil in the region. [End of Talabani sketch]

Talabani, Relying on Shivanists, Moves Into Turkey

A news item which, we believe, appeared only in the pages of AYDINLIK and in no other paper may have escaped the attention of many. It said that Mazhar Ghailani, also known as Sheik Khevkes, was ousted from Turkey.

Sheik Khevkes is described as a major figure in the incidents and the factionalist movement in the east. It appears that Khevkes' ouster, the final episode in the Khevkes story, has been hushed up as the earlier ones were.

Who is Sheik Khevkes? What was he doing in Turkey? There has been no official public statement about the sheik, but the file on him must be opened, if we are to gain insight into the developments in the east.

Who Is Sheik Khevkes?

His name was first heard in connection with the Nehri uprising at the Hakkari region during the years of the [Turkish] War of Liberation. The sheik, who took part in the rebellion, escaped to Iraq and obtained Iraqi citizenship. Khevkes comes from a long line of sheiks who had nearly absolute religious authority in the Hakkari region. The family's influence extends all the way to Bingol. Khevkes himself is the sheik of 117 villages in the Cukurca and Semdinli areas of Hakkari.

He is said to have formed ties with the Iraqi intelligence during his stay in Iraq. He was active in northern Iraq, but took refuge in Turkey after Barzani's defeat.

For a long time, his presence in Turkey was known only to government authorities. Last year, however, during the clashes at Hakkari's Semdinli and Cukurova areas, the public became aware of him, and he emerged as a major figure in the developments.

It is said that Khevkes, after taking refuge in Turkey in 1975, contacted Talabani who had gone into action with the arms and financial assistance supplied by the Soviet Union. Khevkes, reportedly, became the strongest supporter of the Shivanists' and Talabani's operations in Turkey.

Exile From Turkey

Sheik Khevkes's presence in Turkey was known to authorities all along, and yet, he was by and large free to operate as he wished.

Who gave him this immunity? Thousands of Kurdish peasants and pesheergas [Kurdish fighters], who took refuge in Turkey in 1975 upon Barzani's defeat, were promptly returned to Iraq. How is it possible for Sheik Khevkes to remain in Turkey? More important than that, how was he able to continue his activities before the eyes of the authorities?

Even his deportation was shrouded in mystery. After an extended study of the situation, the Office of the Chief of the General Staff, reportedly, decided that the sheik's presence within Turkey's national boundaries was unacceptable. On 19 May, he was taken to Mardin's Silopi County for deportation, but at the last minute, the process was halted by a telegram from Ankara. The Mardin Governor's Office kept him at Silopi for 2 weeks, and finally, he was deported. Prime Minister Ecevit, whose telegraphed message halted the sheik's deportation, offered the following explanation in an attempt to justify his action: "What can we do?" he said, "This has become bigger than the government."

Bargain with JP and RPP

When Sheik Khevkes fled to Turkey, certain forces, hoping to take advantage of his feudal power over the region, mobilized to secure permission for his stay. Sheiks and large landholders [called "land aghas" in Turkish] carry considerable weight in their areas during election time. In the east, the outcome of an election has but little to do with the political parties. It is determined by the type of alliances sheiks and landowners form.

A governmental decree was drafted in the Nationalist Front era to grant Turkish citizenship to Sheik Khevkes, but President Koruturk rejected it.

Sheik Khevkes, appreciative of the JP's intervention on his behalf, reciprocated by using his influence in the 1977 elections to have [JP candidate] Ahmed Zeydan elected deputy from Hakkari.

After the fall of the Nationalist Front and formation of the RPP government, Hakkari Deputy Ahmed Zeydan pressed on to have the Sheik remain in Turkey. Zeydan contacted the RPP government. Following those contacts, he resigned from the JP [Justice Party] and joined the RPP.

Zeydan's resignation was accompanied by a development rarely seen in Turkey. The JP Provincial Administrative Board of Hakkari resigned as a body from the party and joined the RPP. The series of events did not end there either. The RPP Provincial Administrative Board of Hakkari was dismissed and replaced by the recently resigned JP board. The chain of events left the JP without a shred of influence in Hakkari. The Zeydan tribe and Sheik Khevkes threw their full support behind the RPP.

Ecevit, 'This Is Bigger Than the Government'

One of the demands Ahmed Zeydan made during his negotiations with the RPP was the transfer of the provincial administrative board to his tribe. The RPP met the demand. Another condition he set was permission for Sheik Khevkes to remain in Turkey. That was what Ecevit was talking about when he said the issue was bigger than the government, which implied that it had become an affair of the state.

The RPP made no move to grant citizenship to the sheik, but it did not bother him either, at least, not until recently.

The incidents in which Sheik Khevkes was involved during the Hakkari clashes were reported by several newspapers, including AYDINLIK and MILLIYET--in MILLIYET, Orsan Oymen made the sheik's role in the events public. It was a year ago. The government made no statements on Khevkes's activities during the year. However, when the general staff became interested in Khevkes, and upon investigation, decided that his presence was not in Turkey's interests, the government offered Khevkes three alternatives. He was given the choice of going to either Iran, Iraq, or the Turkish sector of Cyprus. He, reportedly, believed that he can continue his Turkish operations from Cyprus and return to Turkey when circumstances made it feasible.

The order to deport him from Turkey arrived as he was preparing [presumably, to inform the government of his choice]. He was taken under custody and sent to Silopi. After a 2-week postponement, during which time the government made a final, but apparently futile, effort to have the decision reversed, he was deported. The curtain of secrecy which shrouded the incident was never raised.

Talabani Goes Into Action in Turkey

Meanwhile, Talabani was busy recruiting men through the front he had formed. His armed force was slowly taking shape. The Syrian Ba'th Party, complying with Soviet requests, and also because Talabani fit in its own little schemes, provided the right conditions for Talabani to go about his business unhindered. Syrian cooperation with Talabani was total, so much so that Hafiz al-Assad's

brother joined Talabani's organization as an honorary member. Men recruited by Talabani were trained in guerrilla warfare by Bulgarian and Soviet military experts at the camps in Syria.

Having formed a trained military force of sorts, Talabani launched his operations. He had, meanwhile, also regrouped his followers in Iraq under the Kurdistan Democratic Party Provisional Committee and had declared an armed struggle.

Talabani's major bases were in Syria. In Iraq, particularly in the northern part of the country along the Turkish border, the KDP retained its influence. Talabani's influence was limited to the Sulaymaniyah area near Baghdad and to the Talabani tribe. His headquarters in Iraq was at Soran, situated at the juncture of Turkish, Iraqi and Iranian borders. He had a small force in Iran also. Talabani was having a hard time setting up bases in Iraq, and forming ties in Iran was not proving easy either. Turkey, therefore, was beginning to look more and more significant to his plans. If he could establish influence in the southeastern border areas of Turkey, he reasoned, he would be able to surround the Iraqi KDP territory from his Turkish bases, and also he would establish a continuous line between Soran and his bases in Iran and Syria. That was Talabani's ultimate objective when he launched his activities in Turkey, but the immediate objective was to gain the leadership of the regional Kurdish movement and to eliminate the KDP, which he saw as an impediment to success.

The Soviet Union gave its full support to Talabani's activities. Moscow believed that if Talabani assumed the leadership of the Kurdish movement and eventually formed a reliable power base that Moscow can use when needed, the Soviet objective of establishing regionwide hegemony would be very favorably served.

The Talabani group, meanwhile, having won the allegiance of Shivanists, was growing from total anonymity to the status of a major force in the region. The feudal power of Sheik Khaykes and the opportunities supplied by the RDCA provided Talabani with exactly what he needed to expand his operations in Turkey.

[23 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] Shivanists and Talabani tried to form a military force in eastern Turkey in 1977 by distributing the money and weapons supplied by the Soviet Union. The objective was to create a strong base area in Turkey from where operations can be launched against the KDP forces in Iraq. The Soviets reasoned that, through Talabani, they can exert influence over the Kurdish movement and use the movement as a weapon against the nations in the region. Moscow's first step in the direction of its ultimate goal was to set up the Kurds against one another.



CAPTION:

Ozo and Mulla Arif, two military commanders sent to the Sulaymaniyah region in Iraq after training at the bases in Syria.

Sheiks Hassan and Malef Secretly Enter Turkey from Syria

Talabani's initial activities in Turkey were conducted by Sheik Hassan and Sheik Malef who came to Turkey from Syria.

Taking advantage of the contacts and influence Sheik Khevakas had established, the two men entered Turkey in the spring of 1977 and settled in the Rupin region of the Uludere County in Makkari. The two sheiks quickly gained the allegiance of a religious leader (called "melle" in the east), and with his help, began a tour of the area, widening their contacts.

The sheiks promised money and arms to the people they contacted. Anyone who joined the Talabani group was to receive a Klashnikov rifle, a Chardehvar (meaning unknown) and 3,000 liras a month. The area where the sheiks were operating is one of the most poverty-stricken regions of eastern Anatolia. The per-capita income in the region does not reach 3,000 liras in a year, let alone in a month. Consequently, a 3,000-lira monthly salary is a very high income indeed by the area's standards. Talabani was forming an army by doling out cash.

First Shipment of Klashnikovs

The sheiks, Hassan and Malef, continued their tour of the area until the summer months of 1977 and, satisfied with the size of the force they had gathered, they decided to go into action. They contacted Syria and secretly brought in 200 Klashnikov rifles, then, gave them to a Shivanist for distribution as planned. The Shivanist distributed most of the rifles, but he kept 30 which, along with 85,000 liras' worth of ammunition, he sold to a large landholder. The deal brought him 1 million liras which he also kept. This was how Talabanists and Shivanists began to arm.

Soon after the weapons and money were distributed, orders came from Syria to dispatch the armed unit to Rupin, an area in the Uludere County [of Makkari]. Although a large number of rifles had been distributed, only 121 men, 50 of them Syrians, showed up at Rupin. The rest, already armed and paid, ignored the order. The 121-man unit at Rupin was also given smuggled bazookas, which in the area are known as "arbici." Armed with rifles and bazookas, the unit set off for an area called Bilikan in Silopi.

The 121-Man Unit

Talabani ordered the heavily armed unit to go into action. The commander was Ismet Dino, a pro-Talabani officer, sent from Iraq.

When Dino received his orders to go to Turkey, he was told that he would be fighting against the Iraqi Ba'thists. When he arrived in Silopi, though, he realized that he was to lead the unit to a battle with the KDP at Bandinan. He refused to obey the orders and surrendered to the Iraqi government. Nine of the Syrians in the unit followed Dino. Then, some of the

men who had joined the unit in Turkey decided they did not want to be used for Talabani's schemes and left. Thus, Talabani's first operation fizzled out before it ever got off the ground.

The 'Gocere' Camp

All that was left of the armed unit was a group of Talabanists. They stayed in Bilikan about 16 days, at the end of which time, their provisions and morale at rock bottom, they dispersed. To avert a complete breakdown, Talabani sent the sheiks, Hassan and Halef, the original organizers of the armed unit, back to Turkey. The sheiks, with the assistance of a Syrian called Mustafa Hohe, sought out the Talabanists who had gone their ways at Bilikan. Those still loyal to Talabani were brought together at Gocere, an area at Uludere. They set up a camp at Gocere, but soon it was winter and they had to move elsewhere. They crossed to Syria.

Talabani's provocations in the Uludere area failed to produce the results he had expected. He decided to try his luck somewhere else. He stepped up his activities at Semdinli and Cukurca. These two areas offered Talabani two advantages. First of all, they were in Sheik Khevkes's sphere of influence, and second, they were close to Iran where a large part of his forces was sequestered, and also close to Soran, his headquarters in Iraq. Talabani's decision to shift his activities to Semdinli and Cukurca provided Sheik Khevkes with the opportunity to influence the course of events.

Melle Yahya Becomes Regional Officer

Talabani replaced the Shivanist officer who had sold part of the weapons shipment and kept the money. The new man, who later will be caught during the clashes, was Melle Yahya.

Yahya was from the village of Derehan in Beytussebab. He was from the Jirki tribe, an opponent of the Talabani tribe. The Jirki tribe resented Yahya's alliance with Talabani. Talabani made Melle Yahya, a man of shadowy associations, his regional supervisor. The next item on Talabani's agenda was formation of another force. He used the same method he had used earlier. He hired a taxicab and traveled from one village to another, offering guns and money. This time Talabanists gathered and set up base at Semdinli, in the Mezargedigi Mountains near the Iraqi and Iranian borders.

Hakkari Meeting of 12 August 1977

Talabanists carried out their activities in full public view. Everyone in the area, including the local authorities, knew of Talabanists and were fully aware of their activities. In fact, many peasants from the area villages submitted to authorities formal written complaints that Talabanists had extorted food from them and had damaged their properties. The authorities, however, instead of doing something about the complaints, preferred to observe the goings-on.



[Photo from AYDINLIK of 20 June 1979; please see bottom of next page for caption]

Meanwhile, Sheik Khevkes had become actively involved in Talabanist affairs. His activities mainly consisted of holding talks with various authorities.

One of those talks took place over a weekend in August 1977 at Hacibey in Sendinli near the Iraqi border. The person he met was the MIT [National Intelligence Organization of Turkey] officer in Hakkari, the commander of the Mobile Gendarme Battalion.

Now, we are asking the authorities to disclose what was discussed at that meeting. Our next question is whether Talabani was also present at the meeting.

There was another meeting shortly after the first. The second meeting took place on 12 August 1977 at the Hakkari Provincial [Administrative?] Center among [presumably local administrative] officials, Sheik Khevkes and leading local Talabanists. What was discussed at the meeting?

Did the Talabanists spend the 1977-78 winter at their Mezargecidi mountain camp? Who armed them, and how?

Talabanists and Shivanists increased their stockpile of weapons and ammunition during 1977 and early 1978. Talabani, judging by the amount of weapons and money he had distributed in Turkey, must have felt that he had a large enough force to launch his operations. In reality, most of the weapons had been sold by Shivanists who, then, had kept the money they had made by the sale. Moreover, some of the Shivanists had exaggerated the number of men they had in order to obtain more rifles and money.

Talabani and His Men Enter Turkey

On the night of 22 May 1977, the soldiers Talabani had recruited in Iraq and Iran entered Turkey near Marune. The 721-man Talabani force had 30 animals and was armed with klashnikovs, Mausers, bazookas and hand grenades.

Talabani said later, in a letter to Ecevit, that he "entered Turkey by mistake while trying to cross to Syria." The pro-Talabani KPU, in a communique, claimed that the operation was carried out to frustrate Iraqi efforts to clear the border areas of inhabitants. Shivanists, however, argued that Talabani's forces took refuge in Turkey when colonialist powers cornered them.

[Caption of picture on previous page]

Sheik Hussein Baba (back row, standing, third from left), a leading Talabanist, is seen here with his column of men. Hussein, chieftain of the Yazidi tribe, is a member of Talabani's Central Committee. He is one of the military commanders trained by Soviet experts. He led part of the Talabani forces which entered Turkey in 1978. He is now a prisoner of the KDP. All the guns and the wireless equipment seen in the picture are Soviet made.



[Photo from AYDILIK of 22 June 1979; please see following page for caption]

The government, meanwhile, gave its version of the incident in a statement that said, "Several clashes that took place in Iraq spilled over into Turkey by accident."

Were Shivanist activities of the past 18 months to enlarge their stockpile of weapons incidents that took place outside Turkey? Did Talabani enter Turkey by accident, or was he cornered?

Talabani's letter to Shivanists

The facts bear out neither the Shivanist, nor the government version of events. Talabani, in a letter he wrote on 12 March 1978, 1 month before the incident, to a Shivanist in Turkey, said, "We will send an armed unit in spring to the Behdinan area to clean up the [KDP] Provisional Committee's remnants." At a meeting of the KPU on 21 March 1978, commanders were issued orders to eliminate the committee in their areas.

[24 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] The 800-man Talabanist force entered Turkey on the night of 22 June and proceeded in a thoroughly military order. Talabanists marched in squads of 20 men, sending out advance units and moving forward when the advance units took the hills and established control over the area.

Two Thousand Take Part in Battle

On the second day, Talabani's units were spotted near the village of Cevre as they were advancing in the direction of Semdinli and Canakli. Authorities were alerted. On the same day, a gendarme unit which ran into a group of Talabanists near the village of Bembo was taken prisoner by Talabanists, but released some time later when the Talabanists heard that soldiers from the headquarters were on their way. The central government [in Ankara], upon hearing about the developments, dispatched the minister of interior to Hakkari. Talabanists were kept under observation and precautions were taken to prevent them from moving further in, but that was all, nothing else was done. When the minister of interior was still in Hakkari, studying the situation, Talabani's soldiers were passing through just below the city.

[Caption of picture on opposite page]

A Talabani soldier holding a Russian light machine gun. Most of the people recruited by Talabani for his armed force are young men. These youths, motivated by nationalist goals and attracted by the idea of becoming a revolutionary, make easy preys. The 800-man military force Talabani formed with recruits from Iraq, Iran and Turkey and sent into action in the Hakkari region was, in most part, made up of young men. However, it also included members of the tribes that supported Talabani.

[illegible]

- [The map is from AYDINLIK of 24 June 1979; key provided on following page]

The Route Talabani Followed in May and June of 1978 and the Areas Where the Clashes Occured

Key:

- a. The route followed by Talabani forces
- b. Directions in which Talabani forces fled after defeat
- c. Movement of KDP forces and anti-Talabani tribes
- 1. Site of the village of Bembo where gendarmes ran into Talabanists.
- 2. Site of the incident where a 6-man KDP group, headed by Mulla Emin, were shot and killed by bazooka-toting Talabanists.
- 3. Site of the 31 May-1 June clash
- 4. The route Talabani took to flee to the Soviet Union
[The phrase by the broken line is "To Van and Russia"]
- 5. The Iraqi Air Force bombs Talabanists
- 6. The 18 June clash [site] where Talabanists were routed
- 7. The Talabani headquarters in Iraq
[The words "k8y" and "k8yü" in place names mean village.]

The KDP Provisional Committee, upon hearing of Talabani's presence in Turkey, sent him a letter on 24 May 1978 and offered to work out an agreement to avoid a clash. Talabanists did not answer the letter, but continued their drive.

Minister of Interior Ozaydinli had not yet left Hakkari when the first clash occurred between Talabanists and the members of the KDP and anti-Talabani tribes. It was not a clash on a small scale, but a battle. More than 2,000 people were involved. By the time it ended, the death toll had climbed over 100.

Talabani's Allegations and Facts

According to the Talabani side, the fighting broke out because the KDP, in cahoots with the MIT, paid to some of the tribes in the region to stop Talabani's drive to Iraq and to cut off his route through Turkey. In the ensuing battle, they said, 29 KDP members, including Mulla Emin Barzani, were killed, 50 wounded. Their losses amounted to 7 dead.

Facts do not support the Talabani side's version of events. The fighting broke out when Talabanists fired their bazookas and killed Mulla Emin Barzani and all six of the emissaries who had come for talks. After the incident, Talabani's units quickly moved to the vicinity of Baz and Ta'l villages in Hakkari. KDP peshmergas from Iraq and anti-Talabani tribes in the area surrounded the Talabani force on the night of 31 May.

The battle lasted 2 days and was fought over a wide expanse of land. Talabani's force separated into three columns. One was under the command of Ali Askheri, the other under Sheik Hussein of the Yazidi sect, and the third under Dr Halid Said. When the battle ended, there were 100 dead on the Talabani side. About 80 of his soldiers escaped to Iraq and surrendered to the government, and 275 were taken prisoner. The rest--about 400 men--moved with haste along the River Habur [Khabur] and crossed into Iraq. They were rushing to Syria before the other side could strike again.

As to what happened next, Talabani, in a communique dated 1 July 1978, gave the following account of the battle's aftermath, "Our friends were planning to reach the Dihok [perhaps Dahuk] mountains as quickly as possible once they were finished with what they had to do (he means the 31 May battle). An armed unit under Ali Askheri proceeded towards Amediye ['Al Amediyah], while Halid Said and Sheik Hussein moved in the direction of Zaho [Zakhu]. Ali Askheri ran into Iraqi tanks and helicopters. Behind him, he had the Provisional Committee and men from the tribes of Oramar, Piroz, Dostki and Binyaniij."

End of Month-Long Adventure

Talabani forces, finding themselves in a very tight spot, reentered Turkey. They rapidly retreated in the direction of Uludere where, they knew, they

will find a large number of supporters, including Melle Yahya. As they were passing near Beytusseba, they took seven peasants as hostage to ensure their safe passage. As soon as the hostage situation was heard, the tribes in the region pooled their forces and surrounded Talabani's men. That is when the second battle on Turkish territory took place.

It began on 18 June and lasted 24 hours, at the end of which time Talabani's force disintegrated. Thirty men died on the battleground, and a group of survivors took to flight toward Syria, but they were captured. Over 270 men were taken prisoner, including the members of Talabani's KPU Central Committee and Politburo, and all of his military commanders.

Talabani claims that Turkey's military helicopters, planes and [ground?] units participated in the fighting, and that prisoners, upon the MIT's request, were turned over to the KDP. These allegations are not true. As usual, military units arrived on the scene long after the battles were over and saw nothing but dead people on the ground.

The adventure Talabani embarked on to establish control over the area within Turkey's national boundaries lasted a month and ended in a crushing defeat and took a heavy toll.

Eleven Syrian Citizens Under Arrest

It is apparent that Talabani's activities in Turkey which began in 1975 were part of a regionwide plan backed by the Soviets. His activities led to some of the fiercest battles of recent years and they took place on Turkish soil.

What happened after the battles and all those other incidents? Eleven pro-Talabani officers, all of them Syrian citizens, were captured wounded after the first battle. Some time later, Melle Yahya was placed under arrest. None of the individuals who have been active in the area since 1977, and who have smuggled into Turkey 447 Soviet-made rockets and have recruited mercenaries, have been seen or heard of again.

Talabani supporters and Shivanists have remained active in the east even after the 1978 battles. They were active in 1979 also. They have openly campaigned for alliance with the Soviets. They have taken part in many armed incidents.

The File Is Quietly Closed

One of the eleven Talabanist officers died in the hospital. Three separate court actions have been initiated against Midir Nuri, a Syrian citizen, and his associates. There were seven bodies on the ground when they were arrested. One of the charges against them was killing seven people. They were also charged with bringing arms into Turkey and possession of arms because a large number of weapons were discovered where they were arrested. In the third and final charge, they are accused of entering Turkey, coercing peasants and restricting their freedom.

During their trial, which was held in Tokat without any public fanfare, some of the Talibanist soldiers said that they saw some fighting and wondered what was going on, and that they crossed the border out of curiosity. The truth of the matter is there is no way that someone in Iraq can see the area where the fighting took place. The defense that some of the others used was, "We are Talibanists. We were on our way from Syria to Iraq when we got lost and by mistake entered Turkey. There were 800 of us and we were attacked by 2,000 men. We dispersed when they attacked us."

Their testimony and "insufficiency of evidence" led to the dismissal of the charges against the Talibanist soldiers. They were released on 14 February 1979. Their release, like their trial, took place without any public announcement. None of the men had a passport, they could have been rearrested and charged with violating the passport law. To avoid it, they were taken to a frontier crossing under gendarme guard and turned over to Syrian authorities. Thus, the file was quietly closed on some of the worst clashes of the recent years.

As for Melle Yahya Yildirim, his case is not over yet. The trial is continuing at the High Criminal Court of Keskin.

[25 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] How did Shivanists acquire arms in quantities unprecedented in Turkey? Who was the power behind the arms that are pouring into Turkey? How were the arms brought in?

The Soviet Union Is Arming Shivanists

The answers to these questions are very important because they reveal the identity of the power behind the provocations. When we say someone is arming the Shivanists, we are not talking of one or two handguns, we are talking of close to 10,000 Klashnikov rifles and 474 rockets powerful enough to destroy one-half of the Turkish army [as printed]. These arms were brought into Turkey in a short span of time in 1977 and 78.

Not only arms, but millions of liras were also brought in. One Talabani convoy brought over 1.35 million dinars (103 million liras). That alone should give our readers an idea about the scale of activities in the east.

The power behind the activities is the Soviet Union. The source of the arms and the money is this imperialist power which will stop at nothing to gain control over the region. How the Shivanists arm themselves and the routes that are used for secret arms shipments to the Shivanists leave no doubt about the identity of the power behind those activities.

A Truckful of Arms From Bulgaria

The primary route used for smuggling arms into Turkey crosses Bulgaria and reaches Turkey either by land or sea. Arms and ammunition are loaded on

TIR [International Transport Route] trucks in Bulgaria. The trucks take them into Turkey across the border, and then, all the way to the east.

In 1977, when the Talibanists began to arm themselves, a Bulgarian TIR truck entered Turkey by this route and unloaded its cargo near the Silvan County of Diyarbakir. It was an interesting trick. The TIR truck was ostensibly in an accident and overturned, and then, its cargo container was allegedly looted. The Bulgarian TIR truck left its overturned and "looted" cargo container at the scene of accident and returned home. People who live in the area were skeptical about the accident and the "looting." Shortly after the so-called incident, leading Shivanists in the region went into the business of selling arms.

The arms brought in by the Bulgarian truck were distributed in the area by Muhterem Bicimli, a Shivanist. Bicimli, who was later killed in a traffic accident, sold some of those weapons, instead of distributing them, and it is said that he used the money from the sales to buy himself two cars.

Another way arms are sent to Turkey from Bulgaria is by sea. Boats unload the arms somewhere along the coast between Antakya and Samandag. TIR trucks or tanker trucks, fitted with secret compartments, pick up the arms from where they are unloaded by boats, take them to Gaziantep, and then, to points east. Armsrunning TIR trucks carry forged "entry-exit" records which give them "transit" status and immunity from search. The TIR method is used to smuggle in a variety of items, but mostly arms.





How Arms From Syria Enter Turkey

Another route Talibanists use to bring in arms passes through Syria. Soviet arms arriving in Syria are brought into Turkey over land and across the border. Talibanists used that route many times in 1977 and 78 and took in a large amount of arms.

Arms arriving in Turkey across the Syrian-Turkish border reached to the Talibanists active in the Semdinli area of Hakkari by this route. The Turkish leg of the route starts in the mountainous area between Cizre and Silopi on the Syrian border, goes over the Cudi Mountains, by scaling one summit after another--Galememi, Altindag, Semur, and Sat--then, reaches Karacadag and finally Semdinli.

The trip is made by mounted convoys which are able to scale one steep mountain after another. Convoys of 5 to 10 armed men used this route numerous times in 1977 and 78 carrying weapons and money to the east. The route goes through several checkpoints manned by gendarmes, and yet none of the convoys carrying supplies to the Shivanists in the east was ever discovered.

TALABANICILARIN RUSYA'DAN GELEN SİLAHLARI NAKLETTİKLERİ YOL

- (1)  Talabanicilerin silah nakil yolu
- (2)  Talabani'ye silah getiren kafilenin pusuya düşürüldüğü yer
- (3)  Talabaninin kamp ve karargahı
- (4)  Talabani'nin etkili olduğu bölgeler



Yukardaki haritaya

Talabanicilerin 1977-1978 yılları boyunca Rusya'dan Suriye'ye gelen silahları naklettikleri yol işaretlenmiştir. Talabaniye silah getiren kafilə Nehri köyü civarında bir kere pusuya düşürüldü. 9 kişi öldü. Haritada ayrıca Talabani'nin Türkiye'deki kampları ve karargahı gösterilmiştir. Talabani "Gocore" yöresinde tutunamayınca önce Suriye oradan Irak'a geçti. 1978 başındaki hareketini "Soran" karargahından başlattı.

[Map from A'DINLIK of 25 June 1979; key is supplied on opposite page]

Route Used by Talabanists To Transport
Soviet-Supplied Arms

Key:

1. The arms transport route
[Words in upper case along the line: "Arms Shipment"]
2. Site of ambush on convoy taking arms to Talabani
3. Talabani's camp and headquarters
4. Talabani's sphere of influence

Arms shipped to Syria by the Soviet Union in 1977 and 78 were transported by Talabanists over the route marked in the map. A convoy carrying arms to Talabani was ambushed near the village of Nehri. Nine people died there. Talabani's camps in Turkey and his headquarters are also marked on the map. When it became impossible to stay in the "Gocore" area (5), Talabani moved to Syria, and then, to Iraq. His operation in early 1978 started out from his headquarters at "Soran."(6)

["Köy" or "köyü" in place names mean village]

Over 100 Million Liras for Shivanists

The incident we are about to relate is interesting, in that it illustrates the scale of operations to supply arms and money to Talibanists.

A convoy of nine men brought Talibanist supplies in the winter months of 1977. The convoy's load included weapons, ammunition and 1.35 million Syrian dinars--over 103 million Turkish liras in round figures.

A group of six people, led by Hassan Hoshnav, slipped into Turkey across the Syrian border some time in October. The group moved as far north as the snow cover on the ground permitted and proceeded in the direction of Samsatli. The convoy had two Shivanist guides. Several tribes, upon hearing of the group's presence in Turkey, set up a trap for it in the Gevar plains. Unaware of what the fate had in store for them, the men continued their journey and walked into an ambush on 13 October 1977. All seven of the Talibanists and their two Shivanist guides were killed during the gunbattle. When the assailants untied the convoy's load, they found a large amount of weapons and ammunition and also 1.35 million Syrian dinars. They buried the two Shivanists, took the arms and the money, and disappeared. Gendarmes, arriving on the scene long after the battle, found seven dead bodies, including the convoy leader Hoshnav's. The identity of the dead men could not be officially determined. The case was closed without any investigation.

Russian Rockets Hidden in Mardin Caves

Talibanists' efforts to arm were not limited to procuring Klashnikovs, handguns and ammunition, they were also after heavy arms. That is why, 447 Russian rockets were brought in. The rockets, hidden in caves in the vicinity of Mardin, provided Talibanists with a striking force strong enough to knock out one-half of the tanks the Turkish army had.

Talabani had bases in Syria, why did he have to bring the rockets into Turkey? What was he preparing to do with the Russian rockets?

Rockets are not the type of weapons a small guerrilla outfit or a Talibanist group could use in a clash with the KDP. The rockets were for a target which had tanks. Those rockets serve as evidence that Talabani was preparing for an operation on a wider scale which would be launched after the Kurdish movement in Turkey, Iraq and Iran is taken under control.

How were the rockets which, considering their quantity, could meet the needs of an army, slipped into Turkey? It would take four or five trailer trucks, or 60 to 70 animals to move them. How, by what route, and by whom were they brought in? So far, authorities have not offered any public explanation.

The Soviet-made rockets were brought into Turkey across the Syrian border. Allegedly, a captain assigned to the border area was heavily bribed and he is said to have bought a Ford Granada car with the money.

Military units, which were deployed at the Mardin area following Talabanist-Shivanist instigated incidents in Hakkari's Semdinli area, discovered the rockets in Mardin's caves after they were tipped about their presence. One of the officers in the group who made the discovery was the captain who had been bribed to turn his head the other way when the rockets were brought in. What is more bizarre about the whole episode is that this captain was praised for his part in the discovery.

Disclosure of Shivanists' efforts to arm themselves is necessary to the identification of the source of instigations in the east.

[26 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] Shivanists learned a valuable lesson from their experiences with the Talabanists. After the rockets episode, Shivanists almost immediately changed their tactics. Recruiting fighters by passing out money and arms was dramatically scaled down. They even tried to retrieve the arms they had distributed. They did not have much success though, because the weapons were distributed over a wide area. They could not find the recipients, and the ones they found refused to return the weapons. They could retrieve only a small number of the guns and rifles. The last batch they collected--five Kalshnikovs--in the Uludere area were brought to Diyarbakir. That was some time before 1 May.

Altered Their Tactics

Having learned their lesson, Shivanists began to conduct their recruiting operations in a more systematic manner. They concentrated on the youth and intelligentsia circles.

Shivanists Pursue Intelligentsia, Youths

Young people of the east, rebellious against pressure, influenced by nationalist ideologies on one hand and revolutionary ideas on the other, have become the most active sector of the region. Shivanists selected the youth sector as their primary target. To build for themselves a power base in the youth sector, they inflamed fundamentally nationalist ideas in the youths, but at the same time, stirred them up with "socialism" and "revolutionism." They exploited their revolutionary yearnings. Soon, the RDCA became the fastest rising and the most popular group in the youth sector.

Shivanists' other target was the intelligentsia. The ranks of the intelligentsia are very thin in the east and the primary interest of the eastern intelligentsia is politics. Shivanists moved close to teachers and government officials. The support they won among teachers helped them widen their circle among the youth. Meanwhile, they were putting their supporters in positions in state agencies. Through these people, they moved into the worker sector and labor unions where they propagated their ideas. In labor unions, they worked through administrators. They were also keen on gaining control of mass organizations. Once they took over a mass organization,

They used it as a propaganda vehicle. The power base they built in the youth and intelligentsia sectors was the major factor in their rapid growth. Shivanists, in a very short span of time, became the biggest group in the east, surpassing all others in influence, as well as size.

Relations With Agas

Relations with influential feudal powers were not ignored, but nurtured. Soon, many agas and shieks, who had earlier either united behind the KDP, or remained aloof, gradually shifted toward Shivanists. One of the major agas in Sirnak, for example, has begun to cooperate with them. Similar alliances are observed in other cities and counties also.

Land agas in the east exhibit a totally feudal character. Their hold on the peasants is reminiscent of the Middle Ages. In some areas--such as Diyarbakir, Mardin, Silopi, Cizre, Nusaybin, Kiziltepe and Urfa--an aga is a large landowner, while in areas where there is scant land to own and the peasants are very poor, an aga is a despot. In the latter case, an aga's power source is the family and the feudal structure. The aga takes everything the peasant has or owns. He is a parasite. An aga would fight with other agas, as well as the people, for the least significant advantage. A small dispute sometimes grows into a fierce battle and results in hostility between large groups of people, and all because of a couple of agas who want to protect their interests. The institution of aga in the east intimidates and oppresses the people, but worse than that, it turns the people against each other. The situation is so bad in the east that you cannot find a single person who does not have enemies. The groups in the east take advantage of these disputes and feuds in their quest for power and influence. And agas, to protect their interests and wealth, help overtly or secretly these power-seeking groups, thereby adding to the potential danger the divisions of the people present.

There is one other institution that the provocateurs in the east use to their advantage, it is the tribalism. Tribal and clannish relations are still very strong there. There are as many feuds and disputes among tribal leaders as there are among agas. Blood feuds almost never end. Shivanists, originally, had no influence at all among the tribes and the clans of the east. Lately, however, particularly in the Hakkari area, they have obtained the support of several tribes.

Shivanists gain access to the feudal powers of large landholders and tribal chieftains generally through the children of these people, a majority of whom are Shivanist.

The Source of the Danger

Through these avenues and methods, Shivanists rapidly expanded their sphere of influence in the east. The drive that began in 1978 has brought them today to the position of a very influential group in the east. However, the support they have among the region's people is limited to certain

social sectors. Workers, white-color workers and small shopkeepers of over 24 or 30 years of age, and peasants strongly resist Shivanist provocations. The group's power in the region stems from its hold on the youth and the intelligentsia--the region's politically active groups--their control over mass organizations, and the opportunities supplied to them by their supporters in government offices.

Shivanists are the most dangerous group in the east, but not because of the support they enjoy in certain social sectors. They are dangerous because, among all the groups active in the east, they are the most zealous advocates of cooperation with the Soviet Union. Their propaganda is aimed at persuading people to surrender their will to the Soviet Union. The 1978 Hakkari incidents demonstrated how easily the Soviets manipulate the Shivanists. The winds that the Soviets have stirred up in the east created the suitable climate for the Shivanists' rapid rise to an influential position, and there lies the greatest danger.

The youths and the intelligentsia who form the group's power base follow the Shivanists believing them to be "revolutionaries," and are yet unaware of the Soviet games being acted out in the east. Therefore, the people who constitute the Shivanists' power base are also their most vulnerable elements.

Latest Situation: Shivanists Split

Reports of a rift in the Shivanist ranks reached us as we were preparing these articles. The crack that appeared in the upper strata of the group was soon observed among the rank and file also. At the present, the entire organization is in turmoil. Shivanist leaders have taken off to points east in an attempt to find supporters for their side.

The controversy is not new. It has been going on since 1977. It centers on the question of what the group's attitude should be toward the pro-Moscow TCP and the PYA. In 1977, Shivanists were outspoken supporters of the Soviets. However, while one group called for an alliance with the TCP and the PYA, and another demanded a merger with the TCP, there was a third group which opposed both proposals and argued that the TCP was a social chauvinist and an alliance with it was out of the question. The pro-TCP and pro-Soviet central group prevailed, but the controversy did not die out, the dissidents continued to speak out their mind.

The pro-TCP group, having gained control of the organization, led it into an alliance with the TCP. Soon, Shivanists and TCP members were appearing every where in each other's company. The situation angered the dissidents. Finally, the argument rose to a new pitch. The opposition was led by a former administrative officer of the HDCA. The heated argument resulted in a split and then, in fights. As the dispute spread from the center (presumably in Istanbul) to the provinces, fights and armed clashes among the factions, reportedly, increased in frequency.

On 20 May, a meeting was held in Siverek between the Shivanist leaders who support the pro-Soviet TCP and the dissidents. The highlights of the meeting follows:

1. The opposition criticized the RDCA leadership for its position in favor of cooperation with the TCP and the PYA. The opposition said alliance with social chauvinist forces was out of the question.
2. The opposition criticized the RDCA's participation in the Havana meeting.
3. The opposition charged that RDCA leaders, in collusion with large landholders, denied support to peasants in the struggle to obtain land. The opposition further charged that the RDCA did not have a land program at all.
4. The opposition accused the leaders of failing to discuss the developments in Iran. As a consequence, they said, no position was taken in regards to the Iranian question.
5. Finally, "There is not a single clearly defined program or policy," the opposition said. "It is unclear what we support or reject. The DEVRIMCI DEMOCRATIK GENCLIK DERGISI prints a lot of pretentious words, but does little else."

The discussion on these points failed to resolve the differences. The opposition insisted a vote [presumably, on those five points] and it was held. The RDCA administrators found themselves in the minority when the vote was counted.

After the May meeting, the opposition went on its own and began to function independently. Shivanist leaders did not ease the pressure on the dissident group with hopes of avoiding a splintering in the provinces. They dispatched their men to the provinces to prevent would-be dissidents from speaking out. These measures, though, instead of suppressing dissent fueled the antagonistic feelings among rival groups and fights erupted with increasing frequency. Shivanists were so busy fighting among themselves that they did not have time to attack other groups.

Observers predict that the days ahead will witness a fiercer and more widespread power struggle among the Shivanists.

[Pictures of Apoists from AYDINLIK of 27 June 1979]



Zeki Budak
Known as the Old Man, he is responsible for the group's arms.
His crimes:
One wounding, one robbery, five bombings.

Hamil Yildirim
Known as the Darkie, he is from the Tuluk County of Tunceli. He is the Elazig region's responsible officer.
His crimes:
Five murders, two wounding, four robberies.

Ali Gunduz
One of the Apoist militants in Elazig.
His crimes:
One murder, one wounding, four robberies.

Riza Sarikaya
Known as the Anarchist, he is one of the administrators.
His crimes:
One murder, three robberies.

Aytekin Tugluk
His crime:
One murder.

Sanin Donmez
The responsible Apoist official in Eastern Anatolia. He is a student at the Hacettepe University [in Ankara].
His crime:
One murder.

[27 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] Apoists

Name : Apoists (National Liberation Army; NLA)
[UKO in the original for Ulusal Kurtulus Ordusu]

Origin: Formed by Abdullah Ocalan and friends following
their break with the Ankara Higher-Education
Association [AHEA] after 1974.

Pro-Apoist and Apoist-controlled groups: None

"If you print a word about us, we'll kill each and every one of you."

The threat--something you would expect to hear from a bunch of gangsters--was made by the members of a group known in the east as the "Apoists." Any run-of-the-mill band of gangsters would make a threat of this type, but not any band of gangsters would commit the type of crimes Apoists are guilty of. They are the most dangerous and sinister among the groups in the east. They instigate anarchy by committing murder and robbery, by firing on coffee-houses and by executing anyone who dares to quit the group. Apoists also have the dubious distinction of being the most hated group in the east.

The operations and ideas of this band of murderers are so antisocial that the prospect of a description of them appearing in print makes the group anxious enough to issue a threat.

A Man Named Apo

Apoists are named after the man who formed the group. It is a name given to the group by the public. It goes to show that they are a bunch of scoundrels without any political character whatsoever.

Apoists call themselves the National Liberation Army. Their communiques are signed "National Liberationists" or "Kurdish Revolutionaries." Officials in the east say that after 1978 the Apoists began preparations to form a political party, and in early 1979, adopted the name the "Kurdistan Labor Party."

Apoists emerged as a group under Abdullah (Apo) Ocalan who is still their leader. Apo was in the administrative board of the AHEA formed after 1974. Ocalan tried to gather around him the AHEA members from eastern provinces. His efforts strained his relations with the association's other administrators, and eventually, he was expelled from the AHEA.

The ouster of Apo and his followers from the AHEA was the beginning of the Apoists group which included Ali Haydar Kaytan from Pulur, a student in the Physical Sciences Faculty; Haki Karer from the Black Sea region, a student at the Science Faculty of the Ankara University, who has since died under mysterious circumstances, and Kemal Pir, currently under arrest in Urfa.

Attacks After 1977

Originally, nobody took the Apoists seriously. The mention of their name usually evoked a snicker. There were only a handful of them and the ideas they defended made no sense.

After the breakoff of relations with the AHEA, Apo toured the eastern provinces which netted him a supporter here and a sympathizer there. These new Apoists included Sahin Donmez, described as the responsible Apoist official in eastern Anatolia, who was recently arrested in Elazig; Hamili Yildirim, allegedly the responsible Apoist official in Elazig, and Metin Gungoze, a former TWPLA supporter who is described as one of the sinister characters in the group.

Among these three new Apoists, Sahin Donmez was once a critic of Apo, whom he more than once referred to as Kurdistan's Turkes [Alpaslan Turkes of the National Action Party]. His rapid transformation into a fiery Apoist is a mystery.

Apoists remained relatively quiet until 1977, but made up for those quiet times after 1977. Armed robberies and killings came in rapid fire. They frequently provoked clashes with other groups, and at one time worked as hit men in the service of large landholders and tribes.

The sudden change in 1977 in Apoists' behavior is attributed to the ties the group established with some elements in the MIT and the Counter guerrilla. According to some sources, certain forces bent on stirring up trouble in the east could not have found any other group better suited to their purpose than the Apoists. Testimony by former Apoists to the effects that the group includes MIT and Counter guerrilla agents who, in fact, run the organization, lends credence to the charges.

It is also said that Apo's wife Kesire from the town of Karakosan, whom he married in 1977, is the daughter of a man who is either an employee, or a contact of the MIT.

A Bunch of Good-for-Nothings

A majority of the individuals in the group are unemployed, good-for-nothing lumpen elements. When an occasional employed or professional person joins them, Apoists force him to quit his job. Then, they inculcate in him the necessity of using violence and immediately put a gun in his hand.

Apoists have a large weapons arsenal at their disposal, most of their rifles are Klashnikovs or Thompsons. Their attacks are carried out by 5- to 6-man teams who avoid using a permanent base, but move from one town to another.

Their activities are generally centered in the Urfa, Gaziantep, Elazig, Tunceli and Mares regions.

Apoists do not have a press organ, nor do they have a systemized set of ideas. Their propaganda activity consists of playing Apo's taped messages. Communiques issued in the wake of a clash with a rival group, or after they have killed someone, contain disoriented passages expressing their views.

Fueling Anarchy

The Apoist view can be summarized as follows:

The land where the Kurds are living is a colonized region. It was colonized by Turkish sovereign classes after 1945.

People must organize against Turkish colonists and set up an independent state. However, this goal cannot be attained without the Soviet Union's help. The Soviet Union's help is indispensable. Mao Zedong's "Three Worlds Theory" is "counterrevolutionary." It is tantamount to "collaboration with U.S. imperialism."

In the struggle against Turkish colonists, the primary mission is the elimination of traitors. Officials and employees of state agencies in the area where the Kurds are living are, without exception, colonists and traitors.

Among the colonists, the social chauvinist and counterrevolutionary "Turkish left" is the primary target, and the first step should be the elimination of the traitors in that movement. The most despicable traitor is someone who leaves the Apoist ranks, rejects Apoist views.

Armed Action Is Everything

As for the Apoist policy of action, the basic principle there can be summarized in one sentence: "Armed action is everything." They are totally against associations, parties and labor organizations. They never sit down and discuss ideas. "We avoid gathering in coffeehouses for debates," they say, "because the colonist state's police watches us all the time." That's what they say, but what they do is a different matter. Their members hardly ever leave coffeehouses.

Apo and the group's leading members inculcate in their men the idea of using aimless, senseless violence. Young, unemployed and confused elements are inducted into the group and immediately issued a weapon regardless of their ability to use it. The 4- to 5-man teams they form remain prepared to strike at any given moment.

The idea of using aimless violence appears very frequently in Apoist communiques. Sentences as "Lumpen individuals who attacked revolutionaries have been punished," and "The attack was interrupted and one of the attackers was killed at the scene of incident" appear quite often. What they are really saying is that they ambushed and killed the people who dared to oppose them, or that they fired on the rival group and killed one of their members.

Cut Out for Anarchy

Their ideas, their definition of a traitor, their resolve to eliminate everyone they see as a traitor, and especially the adoption of violence as the guiding principle of their operations give them the character of a gang rather than a political group. Furthermore, the relationship among the members of the gang gives them the character of a band of marauders. They are the perfect instruments that sinister forces would like to use to stir up turmoil in the east. The relations they have formed and the character of their leaders confirm that they are, in fact, used by such sinister forces.

'You're out, Turn in Your Gun'

There were four young men in the small room. They seemed absorbed in a lively discussion. Everyone else in Elazig's low-income district of Fevri Cakmak was asleep at that hour, but the four men did not seem to have sleep in their minds. Hours slipped by, they were still arguing. The one they called the Old Man repeated the decision for the other three. Looking straight at the one who was known as the Anarchist, "The center is not pleased with your work," he said. "You are not as active as you are expected to be." He told the Anarchist that he was dismissed from his position and asked him to turn in his weapons. Then, speaking to everyone in the room, he announced that the Darkie was named the new regional chief.

What had the Anarchist, who could not please the headquarters and was therefore being dismissed, done or failed to do? He was involved in the killing of someone named Halil Dinc in Elazig. He was one of the men who raided the irrigation facilities at Bingol, held the overseer and the watchman hostage, and robbed the construction supply depot. He had stolen dynamite, fuse and ignition material from a stone quarry at Elazig. He had robbed the Guven Hospital, a private clinic in Ankara, of 400,000 liras. Although these were only some of his feats, the headquarters was dissatisfied with him and did not think he had been as active as he should have been. The headquarters was not being fastidious because the Anarchist's activities are nothing compared to what others have done. It is indeed an active gang. Within a span of 18 months, the Apoists killed over 10 people, wounded six, carried out five armed robberies and bombed more than 10 places. The Darkie who replaced the Anarchist had a far better record. He had killed five people, including an 11-year-old girl, wounded two, and had four armed robberies to his credit.

The Anarchist was willing to step aside. He knew what would happen to him if he resisted. He also knew how his friends Celal Aydin, Bozan Aslan and Ali Yalacik had ended up. He was, however, reluctant to turn in his two guns. The Old Man insisted. The argument heated up.

The Gang Is Caught

While the four men continued to argue oblivious to their surroundings, security officers, who had been tipped about the meeting in the house, were quietly taking up position around the house. When they finally burst in,

they found, and took into custody, Zeki Budak, alias the Old Man, Ilhan Yildirim, Aytekin Tugluk and the Anarchist, Riza Sarikaya.

In the early hours of the following morning, acting on information supplied by the four men taken into custody the night before, security men raided another house and this time took three people into custody. One was Hamili Yildirim, the Darkie, who had just been assigned the new regional chief. Along with Hamili, his wife Ayten Yildirim and another woman, named Sakine Polat, were also placed into custody.

It was only the beginning of a series of raids. Nine more followed, netting the security officials 22 Apoists in all, among them Sahin Donmez, allegedly the Eastern Anatolia chief. With the arrests came the revelation of a long series of operations the Apoists had carried out. It all happened about a month and a half ago.

Who Are the Apoists?

If you were listening to the radio and television newscasts on 21 June, you may recall an item about the capture of 22 people. It said, in effect, the Elazig, Malatya, Bingol and Tunceli Martial Law Command arrested 22 people who had been involved in 12 murders, six woundings, five robberies and 10 bombings in Elazig. Many may not have been aware of the existence of the National Liberation Army until they heard about it in the martial law command's communique. In the east, though, the gang's name was a household word. They had been around since 1977. They called themselves UKO or Kurdistan Liberationists. After a series of killings, woundings, attacks, robberies and assassinations, the acronym UKO became a familiar word among the people of the east. Actually, the people of the east gave the UKO [NLA] men another name, they called them Apoists.

Who are the Apoists? They say they are revolutionaries. They think of themselves as the real revolutionaries, and of others as traitors, agents, collaborators with Turkish colonists, or social chauvinists. They believe they are the real Marxists, even Leninists. They claim they are waging an armed struggle. They say they are protecting the people of the east from colonists. They say they are fighting to set up a separate Kurdish state.

Murder in the Name of the Revolution

The Apoists claim to be fighting for "the revolution" and "to protect the people." If you ask the people who have witnessed their actions, the Apoists are a band of murderers. The testimony of 22 Apoists arrested in Elazig disclosed a series of operations which provide insight into the character of these people. The operations carried out by the Apoists in the Elazig area in the past 18 months are the following:

*In April 1979, during an armed clash with the People's Liberation group in Tunceli, they killed an 11-year-old girl and wounded the principal of the Vocational School. The operation was organized by Hamili Yildirim, the Elazig chief.

*On 17 July 1978, they sprayed a bakery with bullets and killed two people--Celal Akkaya and Mustafa Hase--and wounded two others--Fethi Gurcan and Mehmet Kaval. The operation was organized also by Hamili Yildirim.

*In 1978, in Elazig, an individual named Senayi Tan was killed by an Apoist, identified as Ali Riza Bozyel.

*On 19 July 1978, also in Elazig, Halil Dinc was killed by Riza Sarikaya, former Elazig chief of the Apoists, and Sam Dursun.

*On 15 September 1978, Apoists and People's Liberationists, in a joint operation, ambushed and killed a man, identified as Mustafa Korkmaz. Another person, Yusuf Sari, was wounded during the incident. Apoists had assigned Ilhan Yildirim to carry out the operation.

*In April 1979, in an armed clash with the People's Liberationists, they killed Museyin Sencar, a People's Liberation member.

*They were involved in numerous armed clashes with the People's Liberation group in Elazig and Tunceli.

*On 5 July 1977, two Apoists--Riza Sarikaya and Ali Gunduz--raided the irrigation facilities at the Bingol dam site, disarmed the construction supervisor and a watchman, and robbed the supplies depot.

*Riza Sarikaya teamed up with Hamili Yildirim and the two raided a stone quarry near the village of Zefran in Elazig and stole five packs of dynamite.

*The Riza Sarikaya-Hamili Yildirim duo teamed up with two other Apoists--Kemal Coskun and Dilever Yildirim--and robbed the Guven Hospital, a private clinic in Ankara, of 400,000 liras.

*In 1979, two Apoists--Ali Gunduz and Zeki Budak--wounded a watchman while attempting to rob a stone quarry in the vicinity of Harput in Elazig.

*Ali Gunduz and Hamili Yildirim made an unsuccessful attempt to rob the Agricultural Bank branch in Nazimiye in Tunceli.

*In 1979, Apoists robbed the Monopolies Storage Depot in the Ovacik County of Tunceli.

*In 1979, the Custodial Storage House in the Maden County of Elazig was robbed by the Apoists. The perpetrators were Hamili Yildirim and Ali Gunduz.

*Declaring that they are celebrating 1 May [Labor and Spring Holiday], they bombed five places in Elazig.

Those were only some of the operations the Apoists carried out in the Elazig and Tunceli area alone. What about their operations in other provinces? We will talk about them later in the course of this series. The list does not cover all the crimes they committed in the Elazig area either. There was one particular incident, where they killed one of their own after a dispute, that stands out among others. It was a murder committed with rarely paralleled barbarity.

[28 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] A group of security men began to dig at the marked spot. Soon, the head of a man, already in a state of decomposition, could be seen in the hole they were digging. When the loose earth was removed, it became clear that it was the body of a fully clothed young man. One of the most savage murders committed by the Apoist gang was uncovered with the discovery of the young man's body.

'Shoot Anyone Who Forsakes the Cause'

The young man was Celal Aydin who had joined the Apoists when he was attending the Economics Faculty in Istanbul. He quit school and went to Malatya. He and Elif Kartal, a nurse, rented a house under an assumed name. Celal Aydin carried out several operations in accordance with the instructions relayed to him. He was soon named the chief of operations in Malatya. He tried to recruit a force, but could find no more than 5 to 10 youths. Some time later, he quit the Apoist group and joined another, the Tekoshins.

At the time of Celal Aydin's departure, the Apoist group was in turmoil. A number of youths, having joined the group in the belief that it was a revolutionary group, had become disgusted with the type of activities the Apoists were carrying out and were leaving the group.

Apo instilled in his followers a deep distrust of anyone outside the group. They are the enemies, he told them, they are "traitors," "agents," "social chauvinists." To quit the group? That was the worst treachery because it meant "forsaking the cause."

When defections from the group increased, Apo tightened his control over the men. He called the defectors "agents," "turncoats," and swore revenge. Even intensified repression could not stop some from leaving the group. Meanwhile, there appeared in the group clear signs of an opposition to Apo. He was not, however, about to put up with it. He issued an order, "Kill the traitors!" The Apoists passed a resolution to execute the defectors and the dissenters. There was talk that several lists were drawn

How a 'Traitor' was Punished

The first execution was carried out at Antep. Two Apoists, who had voiced opposition to Apo, were killed. Bozan Aslan and Ali Yaylacik were ambushed and shot to death by a team dispatched to Antep specifically for that job.

Apo wanted to follow up those murders with a more impressive demonstration to put a real scare in the hearts of his followers. He ordered the execution of Celal Aydin who had quit the Apoists to join the Tekoshins. Apo assigned to the job Sahin Donmez, reportedly one of his key men in the east. Ali Gunduz and Aytekin Tugluk were selected to help Donmez. Apo laid out a plan which, in terms of savagery, may have its match in the annals of Nazi Germany. He sent Aytekin Tugluk to Malatya. Tugluk, following Apo's instructions, brought Celal Aydin to Elazig, and then, to the Karakocan County under the pretext of taking him to a meeting. At Karakocan, the other two Apoists joined them. Donmez told Aydin that he was their prisoner. Then, they took Aydin to a farm. On the way to the farm, they had Aydin carry the pickaxe and the spade which were to be used later to dig his grave. At the farm, Donmez informed Aydin that the Apoist court had sentenced him to death. He told him that he was found guilty of forming cliques, joining another group and turning his back to the cause. The punishment for such crimes was death. While Donmez was talking to the condemned man, Tugluk and Gunduz were digging the man's grave. The guns they were carrying and the digging that was going on convinced Aydin that the Apoists were serious. He asked for mercy and begged for another chance. Donmez ignored the pleas. Besides, he said, he did not have the authority to change the sentence, he had to be executed.

The three Apoists watched Aydin with an expressing approaching pleasure as he pleaded for his life. They called him a traitor and remarked that this was the fate awaiting all traitors. They brought Aydin to the edge of the hole they had dug and made him kneel. Gunduz fired a shot into the man's head. They did not bother with his clothes, but took his wristwatch before they kicked him into the grave and covered him with dirt. Later, they will tell all the other Apoists about the execution which, in fact, was a demonstration of utter bestiality, and brag that they had punished "another traitor."

About a month later, the murder was uncovered with the capture of Sahin Donmez and other Apoists. The information supplied by the captured men led the security officials to the farm and to Celal Aydin's decomposed body.

It was the latest in a series of incidents attesting to the sinister character of the men in the Apoist group.

Some Matters Still Unclear

The Apoists who were captured in Elazig after the proclamation of martial law had committed 12 murders. They had been involved in numerous incidents in which they acted as agents provocateurs. The question that inevitably comes to mind is why they had not been arrested earlier.

Sahin Donmez, the alleged ringleader, Memili Yildirim and Ali Gunduz played a major role in many attacks in Tunceli. One of those attacks took place in October 1977. At a meeting in the TUS-DCR [All Health Personnel Solidarity and Unity Association], Sahin Donmez acted as a spokesman of the Apoist group. A heated argument between the Apoists and the People's Liberationists followed the speech. Donmez walked out of the meeting, but soon returned with

three other Apoists, including Hamili Yildirim and Ali Gunduz, the men arrested in Elazig. The third one was Metin Gungore, another ringleader. Dunmez and company attempted to raid the meeting, but people intervened and the raid was averted. The Apoists did not give up. They went out and sprayed the building with bullets from their automatic weapons. The incident took place in daylight and in the center of the city. Dunmez and company subsequently carried out many more attacks and took part in countless robberies.

They were also the leading actors in the April 1979 clash that lasted one full week. The Apoists and the People's Liberationists went at each other in the center as well as the outlying sectors of the town. That is when Hamili Yildirim killed an 11-year-old girl. Be that as it may, no one touched them until martial law. After the declaration of martial law, officials, for some unexplained reason, decided to act upon a tip and raided a "secret" meeting. The raid led to the arrest of 22 Apoists. There are, however, still unclarified questions.

The arrests were announced to the public 1 1/2 months after the Elazig raid took place. The public disclosure was made in a regular statement [presumably by the Martial Law Command] in a matter-of-fact fashion, even though the arrests were a major breakthrough. The strange thing about the statement was that it did not identify the people under arrest. A statement prepared earlier by the security administration listing the names of the arrested people and detailing the incidents leading up to the arrests was not cleared for release [again, presumably, by the Martial Law Command]. Permission was denied also to the disclosure of the incident as a news item. It is difficult to explain all that secrecy as a matter of security.

Authorities claim that some of the people arrested in Elazig are the leaders of the group, but there are several people from the higher levels of the organization who are still in the area. These people were responsible for organizing the Apoists' operations from the beginning. One of them is Ali Riza Kaytan. He is from the Pulumer County of Tunceli and a student at the Political Sciences Faculty. Kaytan was the original organizer of the Apoist group in Tunceli. He is known for his devotion to Apo and is said to be in close contact with him in the east.

Another key member of the Apoists is Metin Gungore from the village of Maceri in Tunceli. Gungore was in a leadership position in the incidents that took place in full view of the public and no one had any doubt about Gungore's role. He was never arrested though. No one touched this ringleader. Each time he avoided the police, he had a fantastic story to tell about how he got away. Kaytan's and Gungore's involvement in Apoist activities was never a secret. It is impossible to assume that the authorities did not know about these men who operated in front of their noses, and yet not a single word was uttered by the officials about them, or their part in the numerous incidents in Elazig and Tunceli. Observers say they got the impression these people were being protected. They say, the investigation was dropped to avoid the disclosure of other incidents involving the Apoists.

Former Apoists and the dissidents within the group charge that the MIT and the Counter guerrilla people carry a lot of weight in the administration of the Apoist group. These sources believe that the group's activities are, in fact, directed by the MIT and the Counter guerrilla. The group is crawling with agents provocateurs, they say. That is one of the reasons why, they add, they quit the group, or joined the opposition. The secrecy that still surrounds the Elazig incidents lends credence to these charges.

[29 Jun 79, p 8]

[Text] A former Apoist--we'll call him H--related the following to a close friend of his:

"We were organized into small groups. The key group was the 'assassination team.' These people were instructed to carry out raids, ambushes, and beat up, threaten, or kill their victims. There was also a team to hang up wall posters, distribute communiques and write slogans on the walls. There was one more group whose job was to collect money. They visited certain people periodically and extorted money from them."

This was related by a young man who, for a period of time, took part in the Apoist operations in Urfa. He quit the group when he realized that what they were doing had nothing to do with revolutionism. This young man, whom we call H, says he was threatened repeatedly after he left the group. He adds that life in Urfa became impossible, he had to move away. He now lives in a large city.

Urfa is an Apoist stronghold. Apo himself is from the Halfeti County of Urfa. That is why, the Apoists selected Urfa as the site of their first organizational effort. They have been active in Milvan and Ceylanpinar since 1977. They organized attacks and their assassination teams killed a number of people. They, finally, declared Milvan "liberated zone." And yet, as it was in Elazig, in Urfa also no one touched the Apoists.

Suddenly the Guns Exploded

It was 17 December 1978. An Apoist's brother told a friend in Ceylanpinar, "Don't leave the house tonight. A large shipment of guns arrived. Something is bound to happen."

On the night of 18 December 1978, Kemal Ocalan, mayor of Ceylanpinar, visited a friend. Just as the mayor and his driver were stepping out from the friend's house, the guns exploded. The mayor threw himself on the ground and escaped the bullets, but his driver was not as fortunate. Celal Kilic, originally from Suruc, was badly wounded. The Apoist gang was on the move that night.

People carried the bleeding driver to the mayor's official car, but the car's tires had been shot out. The Apoists had thought of every detail. Finally, another car was found to take the wounded man to the hospital. It was too late, though, Celal Kilic, the driver, had already bled to death.

The assassination attempt happened at a turbulent time in Ceylanpınar. Workers at the State Breeding Farm had gone on strike to underscore their legitimate demands. A large number of military units and tanks had been deployed in Ceylanpınar. MIT agents were everywhere. A number of workers had been arrested, several homes and coffeehouses had been raided. A number of newspapers, in an attempt to deceive the people, were presenting the strike as a first step to a rebellion. At that point, the Apoists appeared on the scene.

Reinforced with men imported from other counties and provinces, the Apoists unleashed a series of attacks, promising to turn Ceylanpınar into "another Hilvan."

Their first victim was Zahir Demir, a young man who was ambushed at night and wounded. On 15 December 1978, a number of strangers appeared on the streets of Ceylanpınar. The Apoists' mobile teams had checked in. The attacks began almost immediately. On 18 December 1978, armed Apoists attacked a group of people in downtown Ceylanpınar. A climate of terror enveloped the town. On the same day, at night, an attempt was made on the Ceylanpınar mayor's life.

The mayor was opposed to what the Apoists were planning to do in his town. Mayor Ucalan was a popular mayor and he was influential in the town. That is why, the Apoists chose him as their target. When the gang met on the night of 15 December, they planned to assassinate four men. They put Mayor Kemal Ucalan's name at the top of their list.

The attempt on the mayor's life and the death of his driver created an angry public reaction. The Apoists immediately began a campaign to convince the public that "the fascists shot Celal." No one believed them because there were no fascists in Ceylanpınar. In fact, their campaign to shift the blame elsewhere produced exactly the opposite effect and attracted the public's attention to the Apoists. As the people of Ceylanpınar were preparing to ship the slain driver's body to his hometown of Suruc, the Apoists attacked the funeral procession.

The Truth About the Ceylanpınar Incident

The assassination attempt was planned by two Apoists in Ceylanpınar. They were the leaders of the Apoist group in the area. One of them was originally from Mardin and was working for the town's municipal administration. He was trying to recruit a force from among the people from Mardin. His method consisted of fueling the already existing friction among the Suruc, Mardin and Antep people living in Ceylanpınar. The Apoists were hoping to take over the municipal administration by killing the mayor, and then, running Ceylanpınar as they pleased. This man, who actually planned the attack, visited the mayor the day after the incident to inquire after his health. Ceylanpınar people describe this man as a person with a dark past and say that they are sure he is working with the MIT.

The second Apoist who was in on the preparation of the plan was a grocer. He was involved in numerous incidents in Ceylanpinar. This man was a Freedom Road member in 1975-76, but became an Apoist almost overnight. He was involved in gunrunning operations. The Ceylanpinar people believe he was working with the MIT.

The town of Ceylanpinar knows that the gunmen who tried to kill their mayor were Apoists. Even the deputies from Urfa, commenting on the incidents, said in Ankara that the attack was carried out by the Apoist gang. The attack occurred a year ago, and yet the two Apoists are still free and roaming the streets of Ceylanpinar. The file on the Ceylanpinar incidents has been shelved. In the meanwhile, in Ceylanpinar, a town within the borders of the Republic of Turkey, a mayor is trying to do his duties under a constant threat of death.

The Kemal Pir Incident

Another murder committed by the Apoists in Urfa is the killing of the Nationalist Action Party county chief. An Apoist, identified as Kemal Pir, was arrested after the incident. He was still carrying the murder weapon. Pir admitted responsibility in a number of other crimes in his statement to the security officials. Pir was a key member of the Apoist group. He had worked in the group since 1974. He was from the Black Sea region, but for some unknown reason he had joined the Apoists. He was a DEV-GENC [Revolutionary Youth Federation] sympathizer when he met Apo who, at that time, was looking for supporters in groups from Black Sea provinces. Kemal Pir and several more people from the Black Sea region joined Apo's group. Pir's personality is described as unstable and aggressive. He participated in many Apoist operations after 1974. He was arrested for murder before the martial law, but his case was treated as "an ordinary anarchic incident."

[30 June, 1 and 2 July installments are not translated. The installments in question relate the Apoists' association with eastern tribes, the feud between the Apoists and the People's Liberationists.]

[3 Jul 79, p 8]

[Excerpt] After the killing of Mahir Can*, the Apoists began to arm their supporters and fuel the antagonism toward the Liberationists ostensibly to avenge the death of their friend, but largely to keep the group together. In March, they sprayed a coffeehouse, wounding three people, one of them a People's Liberationist, but two others innocent bystanders. Since the declaration of martial law, however, neither the Apoists nor the People's Liberationists have been able to do anything. They can only seethe by themselves in their separate corners.

[*An Apoist killed in Gole, a town in the province of Kars, during a clash between the Apoists and the People's Liberationists. The incident is related in an untranslated section of 3 July installment.]

Many of the Idealists [members of the Nationalist Action Party-affiliated Idealist Hearths] in Kars joined the Apoists after the Nationalist Front collapsed. Three of those Idealists took part in many Apoist operations, but had to leave town in the face of a strong public reaction to those incidents. They are now in Erzurum where they have joined the ranks of active NAP [Nationalist Action Party] militants.

Meanwhile, the Apoists are working on creating friction between the Kurds on one side and the local tribes and the Azeris [short for Azerbaijanis] on the other. The Apoist group in Kars, though, is in the process of disintegration. The area people have grown weary of the frequent clashes between the Apoists and the People's Liberationists. That may be the major reason why the ranks of both groups are thinning. The People's Liberation group, for all practical purposes, has disbanded. Incidents ceased with the proclamation of martial law. However, the area people believe that clashes will start again unless the gangs of both groups are broken up.

They Tortured Their Own Friend

Another eastern province where the Apoists are active is Agri. There were no Apoists in Agri until January 1975 when a teacher from Agri, visiting Ankara, contacted Apo and Apo accompanied the teacher back to Dogu Beyazit, Agri. Apo toured Agri and Dogu Beyazit to recruit supporters among the youth. The fruits of his efforts were small Apoist groups that sprung up here and there. They were made up of adventurist youths who were in no way representatives of the area's people. These small groups remained inactive, however, until 1979.

The Liberation Road group was more influential than the Apoists in Agri. In 1979, the Apoists went into action and committed their first murder. They ambushed and killed the leader of the Liberation Road. Right after the incident, they issued a communique--as the Apoists in other areas do--and claimed responsibility in the murder. In April 1979, another prominent Liberation Road member was killed. The Apoists are said to have a hand in it also. Again in April 1979, an incident took place which demonstrates the vicious character of the Apoists.

An Apoist assigned to "a job" was apprehended by the police. The captured Apoist gave the police a long statement, and some time later, he was released. Soon after his release, he was captured again, this time by the Apoists. He was first questioned, and then, tortured. The interrogation took place in a house situated in a busy section of the town. People heard screams from the house and alerted the police. The police raided the house and took 7 to 8 people into custody.

[4 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] Kahramanmaraş [K.Maras], where clashes instigated by the NAP took the lives of hundreds of people, is another province familiar with Apoist operations.

The K. Maras episode exposed the NAP's true character and the public reacted vehemently to the NAP's role in the incidents. When authorities began to pick up NAP supporters, the party looked for a way to stop the arrests.

That is when the Apoists went into action. They committed three murders in as many days in Adiyaman, Pazarcik and Maras. The murders led to the proclamation of a curfew in Adiyaman and Pazarcik, thereby preparing the ground for the NAP to play the role of a victimized party and to protest the murder with a march. The Apoists were, in fact, helping the NAP members to evade the police by diverting the attention of authorities to other people who had nothing to do with the incidents at K. Maras.

Before we relate the incidents, we will take a look at the Apoists' activities and associations in K. Maras.

Despotic Papazlar and Bands of Marauding Apoists

The Apoists active in the K. Maras-Adiyaman region receive support from the despotic Papazlar family, who own large tracts of land in the area.

The Papazlar family's landholdings come to 20,000 donums. The family entered politics after 1975 and placed a large number of their men in the government offices in Pazarcik and K. Maras. At one time, they had the RPP's countywide organization's chairmanship in Pazarcik. Taking advantage of their position, they built up the RPP Youth Organization with no-good, lumpen elements. The struggle that the Pazarcik peasants were waging for land and freedom in 1975 alarmed the Papazlar. They got behind the well-to-do peasants in each village and secured their loyalty and service to the family, and through them, they spread the word that the Papazlar family was revolutionary.

Next, we see a close alliance between the Papazlar and the Apoists. The family and their lackeys campaigned for the Apoists, spreading Apoist propaganda and urging people to join the group. "I am fighting against racial discrimination within the RPP," claimed the head of the family. The RPP's county organization was manned with Apoists.

A Rifle Disappears

Five Apoists were arrested in September 1975. They had hired a cab in Gaziantep to bring them to Pazarcik. During the ride, they stopped the car near Bospinar, tied up the driver, who happened to be a man from Mardin, and left him in a ditch by the roadside. The Apoists were captured as they approached Pazarcik. They were carrying two handguns and an automatic rifle.

In the evening, several Papazlar members appeared at the police station and claimed that the jailed Apoists were their men. The handguns found on the Apoists were recorded in the arrest report, but there was no mention of the rifle, it simply disappeared. The arrested men, who were being sought for a murder in Urfa, were described in the records as "smugglers." A gas station attendant who witnessed the arrest near Pazarcik, confirms that the men had an automatic rifle.

The Flag-Draped Donkey and Provocations

The Apoists carried on with their divisive and provocative activities with the full backing of the powerful Papazlar family. They tried to divide the student body of the Pazarcik Lycee by declaring that the lycee was a "Kurdish school" and Turks were not allowed to attend it. In town, they tried to divide the townspeople by declaring one section of Pazarcik as "the Kurdish sector," and another as "the Turkish sector." There were daily attacks on one thing or another. Their principal opponent was a group which called itself the Revolutionary People's Road.

The Apoists took their separatist propaganda all the way to the villages of Pazarcik. In one of those villages, a ceremony was arranged one day by the peasants to mark the opening of their Village Development Cooperative. The governor [presumably, of Maras] was invited to attend the event. As the affair was about to get underway, the Apoists draped a Turkish flag over a donkey and loosed the animal among the crowd. Incensed peasants took the flag off the animal and hid it.

In another incident last year, the Apoists grabbed the Turkish flag from a child as the students of the village's primary school [presumably, the same Pazarcik village] were preparing to begin 23 April [The Children's Holiday] observations. The Apoists threw the flag on the ground and trampled it. They attacked the village teacher and the peasants who tried to stop them. The teacher and the peasants prepared a record of the incident to file formal charges, but the Apoists, saying they were sorry, pleaded with the peasants to drop the charges.

After the Kahramanmaras Incidents

During the clashes in K. Maras, the Papazlar family took refuge in the homes of revolutionaries in the Karacay village of Pazarcik to avoid the NAP people's attacks. They were treated as guests of the village, but soon after the incidents, the Papazlar people turned against their hosts and accused the "pro-AYDINLIK" people--as the NAP had done--of instigating violence.

When clashes broke out in K. Maras, many people, fleeing the massacre, took refuge in the YSE [presumably the building of the Road, Water and Electricity General Directorate]. The director of the YSE, Fevzi Onanc, was instrumental in the use of the facility as a refuge. Later, however, Onanc was taken into custody upon NAP people's baseless charges against him. The Papazlar family joined the NAP members and made some more fabricated charges against Onanc. They said that the YSE director had sent them word by Dr Cetin Diker, an avowed NAP supporter, asking for weapons.

After the K. Maras incidents, the Papazlar family, in collusion with the NAP, began a campaign to move the Alawi [Shiite Moslems in Turkey] and Kurdish citizens who had been attacked in Maras to Pazarcik and Narli. Promising to make the county of Pazarcik a province, they collected from them large amounts of money and urged a mass migration. The Apoists were by the side of the Papazlar throughout the K. Maras incidents.

The Apoist Operation To Rescue the NAP, Three Murders

In February, Mehmet Barak, a lycee student, was taken into custody for reasons still unclear. During his 15-day incarceration, Barak was said to have "sung like a bird." It was learned that Barak, who was from Adiyaman, had been instructed by the NAP to infiltrate the Apoist group. The Apoists went into action as soon as Barak was released by authorities. They committed three murders, one after the other. The NAP and several other sinister forces must have had an ulterior motive in planning these incidents. They must have hoped to divert the attention of the security forces from the NAP to the people and the revolutionary groups of K. Maras, in order to avoid the detection of the NAP's grave crimes in the K. Maras episode. The NAP and others could not have found a better ally than the Apoists to help them in their initiative.

The Adiyaman Murder

The chairman of the NAP's provincial organization in Adiyaman was killed on 10 March. The NAP organized a protest march in Adiyaman, but the climate in the town had become so tense that the governor's office refused a permit for the demonstration. Authorities declared a 3-day curfew in an effort to ease the tension. In the aftermath of the K. Maras incidents, playing the part of a victimized party was far better than anything the NAP could have hoped for.

The Pazarcik Murder

On 11 March, the Apoists went into action in Pazarcik. During the night, several Apoists rang the doorbell of Yekta Aslan, assistant principal of the Pazarcik Lycee. Aslan answered the bell and was killed instantly by a volley of shots from an automatic weapon. Aslan's wife was wounded.

Entrance and exit points of Pazarcik were blocked by authorities soon after the murder. An Apoist, named Ahmet Kilic, and two other men were captured. Yekta Aslan's wounded wife identified Kilic as one of the assailants. Kilic admitted involvement in the attack, describing his role as that of a lookout. Subsequently, six more Apoists were arrested. Meanwhile, NAP members, claiming the murdered assistant principal was one of their own, tried to stir up trouble in the county.

Two guns were confiscated as murder weapons. One was a 9mm handgun and the other an automatic rifle, equipped with a drum. The rifle had been given to the Apoists by the Papazlar. When the Papazlar's connection to the incident and the Apoists became public knowledge, the family left Pazarcik and stayed in Gaziantep for a period of time.

The developments were reported to the RPP's general headquarters. The central body closed up the Pazarcik county chapter. The Papazlar family failed to get any of their members elected in the next county elections, but no further investigation was conducted into the family's ties with the Apoists.

The K. Maras Murder

The day after the Pazarcik murder, that is, on 12 March, several Apoists hailed the cart of a lycee student, Atilla Artir, and told him to take them to the pine grove above the Yurukselim district. When they reached the area, the Apoists grabbed the young man and tried to drag him into the grove. Artir resisted, and finally, broke loose and ran. The Apoists ran after him, all the while showering him with bullets. Artir was wounded and fell down. The Apoists went over to where he was lying and with a 9mm gun shot him one more time through the mouth.

Having taken care of the lycee student, the three Apoists ran back to Yurukselim. They were shouting, "We will kill the fascists, we will take revenge," as they ran through the streets of Yurukselim. The Apoists, then, went to the Karamaras district. Many people who saw them there that evening thought they were acting suspicious.

Passport Discovered at Murder Scene

One incident related to the Artir murder is worth noting. One of the men who killed Artir dropped his passport at the murder scene. The man's name was Salman Koku. However, there were indications that the passport was left on the scene intentionally, rather than accidentally. The night of the murder, Salman Koku left K. Maras and went to the village of Cokyasar. Soon as he reached the village, he began to inquire among his relatives if they had watched the news on the TV that night, and whether his passport was found and his name mentioned. Koku later claimed that he had seen his passport drop on the ground.

The chief of security, in his statement, described the killing of Artir as an "ordinary police incident," but martial law officials were conducting an investigation of their own. Salman Koku, whose passport was found on the scene became the object of a widespread hunt. Cokyasar peasants finally found him and turned him over to authorities.

After Koku's arrest, the weapons used by the Apoists in the murder were discovered. More than 30 people were taken into custody. They included a number of Apoists, but also individuals whose association with Apoists consisted of a polite greeting in public. One of the Apoists in custody was Dervis Kan, chairman of the RPP's central chapter in the county.

'Is It a Crime To Kill Two Fascists?'

Yurukselim people were enraged by the murder. Other pseudoleft groups remained silent while the Apoists tried to pin the blame on the revolutionaries. Later, though, they acknowledged their responsibility in Artir's murder, but attempted to justify it by reminding people that the NAP had killed several hundred people at K. Maras. "Is it a crime to kill two fascists?" they said.

In essence, the Apoists rendered an invaluable service to the NAP. The people who had caused a bloodbath in K. Maras were given an opportunity to escape attention.

The Aborted Apoist Plot

A death list was found when the Apoists were arrested. After killing Atila Artir, they were planning to use his car for transportation in the execution of others on the death list. The names on the list were revealed in our articles "The Truth About the Kahramanmaraş Incidents." The Apoists had it figured out. They will kill the people, and afterwards, the NAP will charge that AYDINLIK published the names, and then, their people killed them. Thus, they reasoned, the NAP's role in the incidents will go undetected.

People placed under custody after Salmen Koku's arrest were subsequently released, with the exception of 16 Apoists. The official announcement about the murder was made on 4 April. There, the detained Apoists were identified as TPLP-F [Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front] members. The pro-NAP MERGİN carried the announcement, also identifying the men as TPLP-F members. The pro-NAP police officers in K. Maras, nonetheless, knew that it wasn't so.

The Latest Situation

Most of their men under arrest, the Apoist group is not half as active as it used to be in K. Maras. The chief of the Apoists in the area, Hüseyin Engizek, was not arrested, either during or after the incidents. The martial law command is reportedly looking for him, but he has dropped out of sight. Engizek is related to the Papazlar family. A member of the family, Asaf Kocdag, and another family member have reportedly asked the authorities to halt the search for Kocdag.

The Apoists, meanwhile, are trying to move some of their men from Adiyaman and Gaziantep to K. Maras. They were quoted as saying that the fight will start as soon as the martial law is lifted. The NAP is also known to have threatened that it will "eliminate the Alevis, to a man, when the martial law is over."

[5 Jul 77, p 8]

[Text] On 14 May, a group of Apoists arrived at the İsmet Paşa Lycee in Gaziantep and stationed themselves by the main door. When the school let out, they warned the students coming through the door, "We just killed someone. His body is at the mosque. Watch out, there may be trouble."

Who was killed? Why was he killed? What did it have to do with the several hundred students leaving school to go home? If trouble was expected, whose fault is it? Who is exposing the students to violence?

These and similar questions figured prominently in the discussions and thoughts of Gaziantep residents during the months of April and May this year.

There was a murder a day in Gaziantep during that period. Shops were shot at, coffeehouses were sprayed, gunshots rang out in one section or another every single day.

In April and May, the Apoists and the NAP commandos seemed to be trying to outdo each other. Everyday, either an Apoist or a commando would shoot someone, anyone. Stranger yet, there were obvious similarities in the way they operated, so much so that one got the impression they were taking turns on a daily basis.

Both gangs were satisfied with their achievements. There were daily disturbances, an air of terror had enveloped the city, people were afraid to go out, shopkeepers were too frightened to open their shops.

This deadly one-upmanship took the life of 11 people who were not actively involved in either the Apoist gang or the commando units.

How the Murders Began

The killings started with the murder of Salih Barlik, brother of the Woolen Textile Factory's owner.

The Barlik family, who own the textile plant, are reputedly NAP supporters. They had recently dismissed some workers from the plant. The Apoists, self-appointed defenders of the dismissed workers' rights, laid in wait near the plant, ambushed and killed Salih Barlik, a brother of the plant's owner Asim Barlik.

Several people were taken into custody after the incident, but reportedly they have nothing to do with the murder.

The Kilim Factory Raid

The commandos took their time before retaliating. On 10 May, a group of masked men entered a kilim [pileless carpet] workshop on the Hoscanci Street of the Cakmak district, and firing their automatics indiscriminately, they shot everyone in the shop. Ismail Pehlivan, Nuri Pehlivan and Ali Alkurt died on the scene. Vakkas Kara died later in the hospital. Three other people were wounded. Although four people, identified as Sait Erdogan, Halit Erdogan, Mehmet Ciftci and Bozan Ciftci, were captured, details of the incident, which shocked the town, were never discovered.

Things went from bad to worse after the kilim workshop incident. The two gangs went all out to surpass each other in the number of people they could kill.

Apoists Strike Back, Five Murders in Five Days

The day after the kilim workshop murders, Abidin Atilgan was killed at Karsiyaka by the Apoist gang.

The following day, a worker employed on the Gaziantep campus of the Middle East Technical University died under a volley of shots.

On the next day, 14 May, Mustafa Yigit, a worker, became the next victim of the Apoists. It was after the Yigit murder that the Apoists showed up in front of the Ismet Pasa Lycee, announced that they killed someone and warned the students about possible violence. It was an attempt to get the hundreds of lycee students involved in the incidents as if the students were also a party to the murders.

The killings did not end there. The chief of management at the Woolen Textiles Factory and another person, identified as Mehmet Gulu, lost their lives under Apoist fire on 16 May.

NAP Commandos Raid a Notions Shop

On 16 May, the last day of the Apoists' murder spree, NAP commandos went into action. They raided a notions shop. A man named Mehmet Ciledag was killed, three others wounded.

In the meanwhile, the Apoists had killed a former Apoist, for quitting the group and joining another, the People's Liberation. Aslan was shot on 30 April in the Karsiyaka district. Three innocent bystanders were wounded in the incident.

Are They Directed From a Single Source?

An atmosphere of terror shrouded Gaziantep. People were uneasy, shopkeepers were reluctant to open their shops. These gangs, whether they called themselves Apoists or commandos, acted as if they came out of the same mold, as if what they were doing was part of a master plan. The incidents created a strong impression that these sister gangs were receiving their instructions from a common source.

Murder of Ceylanpinar Mayor, 60,000-Lira Agreement

Seydo Kahraman, former Mayor of Ceylanpinar, was killed by a volley of gunfire as he sat in his car in the center of the town. He and two people with him died instantly. Members of the Kahraman family, who happened to be in the area, fired on the assailants, killing one of them. The assailants picked up their dead friend and fled in the direction of the Kasr village. A gendarmerie unit arrived on the scene about 15 to 20 minutes later.

The killers of Seydo Kahraman and his two friends were Apoists. The Apoists had been bragging of how they had liberated Hilvan and Suruc and had promised to add Ceylanpinar to the list of liberated towns. After Kahraman's murder, they proudly announced that they indeed were responsible for the former mayor's death.

Gendarme Commander's Remarks

An incident that followed the former mayor's murder makes this episode a very intriguing one indeed. People who were at the murder scene when the gendarme unit arrived heard the unit commander mutter, "The huns! Was that what we agreed on?" What was the agreement that the commander blurted out in anger? The Ceylanpinar people report that several days before the murder, a group of Apoists visited the commander. They gave him 60,000 liras, said they had a communique and wanted to distribute it. They asked the commander if he could please refrain from taking any action. Obviously, the commander did not know that they were planning to kill three people, instead of distributing a communique. By then, it was too late to do anything about it.

There were other signs that the Apoists were being protected in Ceylanpinar. It did not matter if they had weapons on them when they got arrested, they were released within 15 to 20 days anyhow. When Mustafa Gerzor, an Apoist, was arrested, he had with him a Kleshnikov. He was released 15 days later.

These were not isolated incidents, they happened regularly. In Ceylanpinar, people called the gendarme commander "the Apoist commander."

Apo Had Friends Rob Supermarkets, Ate the Best Food

A revolutionary who worked with the Apoists for a period of time and lived in close contact with Apo, but left the group after he realized that the Apoists were a band of scoundrels, provided some insight into the personality and lifestyle of Apo and his key men. Following are some excerpts from the former Apoist's testimony:

"For the Apoist group, Apo is the unquestionable leader for life. Anyone who expressed doubt about his ambiguous views can be sure to be labeled a traitor. People who opposed Apo were always isolated and in some cases condemned to death. In March 1976, when three Apoists opposed him, Apo occupied the house these three people were renting and maintaining out of their own pockets and declared, 'Our national liberation struggle will continue in this house.'"

Supermarket Robberies

"In private life, Apo was self-indulgent. He used to send off young members to supermarkets to steal food and beverages. He did that especially on weekends and holidays. The most luxurious items in the loot went to Apo. No one else could have the chocolate bars, jams, preserves, or the honey. Apo also commandeered the money his men received from their families. The breakfast alone that Apo and his three or four key men had cost 150 liras at the time."

Thought of Himself as Lenin

"Apo had a superiority complex. He used to say that everything began with him. Once he remarked, 'There are two kinds of leaders. One stays at home

and personally leads the struggle. The other stays abroad and leads the revolution. Ho Chi Minh, for example. Lenin, for example. I am in the second category.'

'Apo, who thought of himself as Lenin, stayed in Ankara and directed the operations from there.

'He used to say, 'We can launch the struggle when we find 500 men.' He always went after unemployed, aimless individuals. He did not bother with people who did not fall in that category. 'We need you,' he would tell the students, 'leave the school, go to Kurdistan.'"

In the past 8 days, we related several of the operations the Apoists conducted in various eastern provinces and counties. The Apoists undoubtedly had other activities. However, the ones we described should suffice to show the group for what it is--a band of scoundrels. The barrage of Apoist threats directed at our newspaper confirms the accuracy of our diagnosis of their character.

Here is the picture that emerges from the articles of the past week: An armed clash that erupts over several stolen chickens,* armed robberies, hit teams, large landholders' hired guns, occupation of cities, death sentences, executions, murders and more murders. . . .

These bandits we call the Apoists put Alawis against Sunnis, Kurds against Turks wherever they go; they derive their strength from large landholders and other agas; they will not let anyone say a disparaging word about Russia, and they single-mindedly pursue one objective, to create turmoil and terror in the east.

What the Apoists have done are not the kind of things a freewheeling student can accomplish with a couple of friends. There are indications that there are other forces behind the Apoists. Certain forces, unable to interfere directly to stir up trouble in the east, have been, and are still using the Apoist gang to achieve their goals. People of the east have had enough of the Apoists, however. They are taking a stand against the gang. In Pazarcik, the peasants hunted down an Apoist murder suspect and promptly turned him in to authorities when they found him. The Apoist gang is in the process of breaking up. Many of their members have realized that their leaders are dangerous enemies of revolutionism, rather than revolutionary; and having reached that realization, they are dropping out of the group despite the death threats. There will be many more defections from the gang.

The Apoists are an obstruction to peace and unity in the east. The people of the east want them eradicated. The people of the east are not interested in the arrest of basically innocent people who have been duped by Apo and his friends. They want to see a daring assault on the sinister forces which protect Apo and the like.

[*The incident is related in AYDINLIK of 2 July which is not translated.]

In the preparation of these articles, our main concern was the desperately needed peace and unity in the east--the so-called "sensitive area." We believe the Apoiists to be a major obstacle in the path of peace and unity. We are not planning to leave them alone.

[6 Jul 79, p 8]

[Excerpt] The Freedom Road (Roja Welat)

Name : Freedom Road

Origin: Formed after 1974 by a number of former TLP members and RDCA dissidents.

Pro-Freedom Road Press Organs:

OZGURLUK YOLU [Freedom Road], monthly, outlawed.

ROJA WELAT [The National Sun], fortnightly, outlawed.

Pro-Freedom Road Associations:

Revolutionary People's Cultural Associations [HPCA]

The Freedom Road [FR] group takes its name from the periodical it publishes. Among all the groups in the east, the FR ranks next to the Shivanists as the most zealous in adherence to the Moscow line.

Its publications are filled with accounts of how Moscow liberates oppressed nations. It claims that the Kurdish liberation can be realized only with the help of the East European nations and the Soviet Union, which the FR calls the socialist system.

The FR's loyalty to the Soviet line is total and enduring, but its relations with other pro-Moscow groups in Turkey have not been as consistent. It originally had good relations with the TLP, but later things cooled down between the two, the FR cultivated close ties with the TCP. Those cordial ties did not last either. Some time ago, after a series of charges and counter-charges, they broke up and the FR moved closer to the TSNP [Turkish Socialist Workers Party].

Recent developments in the Kurdish areas of Iraq, reorganization of the KDP under the name of the Provisional Committee and the increased activities of Talabani's Kurdistan Patriotic Union caught the FR's eye. It gave full support to Talabani, specifically to the staunchly pro-Moscow "Kurdistan Marxist Leninist Organization" in Talabani's KPU. During that period, the FR was a harsh critic of the KDP. Later, however, it toned down its criticism. Citing the KDP's emphasis of solidarity with the Soviet Union in its new position paper, "The New Strategy," the FR mused that the KDP was not after all overly reactionary and talked of joining forces with the party.

The FR, generally speaking, is not a very influential group in the east. Its persistent defense of the Soviet Union's revisionist attitudes and its attack on revolutionary ideas are its prominent characteristics.

Emergence

The monthly periodical OZGURLUK YOLU began publication in 1975. A number of people who had been members of the TLP prior to 1971, and several youths from the RDCA, who subsequently will break away from the association, flocked to the periodical. Two of the writers in the periodical, Kemal Burkay and Ihsan Aksoy, were former TLP members. Kemal Burkay ran for the senate in Tunceli as an independent candidate in the 1975 senate elections. The TLP, which was boycotting the elections, took issue with Burkay's candidacy. Burkay, then, resigned from the party.

In September 1977, another periodical, defending the OZGURLUK YOLU line, began to publish. It was the fortnightly ROJA WELAT. With the appearance of the ROJA WELAT, RPCA branches began to spring up in various eastern provinces and counties. Supporters of the OZGURLUK YOLU gathered under the roof of these associations.

The FR is not very strong in the east. Its supporters and sympathizers are generally in the youth and intelligentsia circles of Bingol, Diyarbakir and Van. FR supporters also carry some weight in the TOB-DER where they conduct activities under the name of the FR Group. The group supported the current administration [presumably the national government] in the latest elections.

The independent candidate Mehdi Zana's election as the mayor of Diyarbakir gave FR supporters some leverage in the Diyarbakir municipal administration. The ROJA WELAT wrote that the bread shortage caused by the strike of the bakery workers in Diyarbakir was eased with the help of RPCA youths. Later, a dispute over the use of the municipal government's facilities led to a division in the FR group.

Supports the Colonial Theory

As most other groups in the east, the FR also believes Turkey is a capitalist country, and claims that the area where the Kurds live has been colonized by Turkey.

OZGURLUK YOLU No 23 published an article by a Celal Aladag expounding this specific point. Following are highlights of the article which was entitled, "Why Kurdistan Remained Undeveloped?"

"No services were extended to the east during the Republic Era, nor was there an effort to develop the region. Instead, the region's economic resources were exploited. Similar practices are seen in Iran and Iraq. As capitalism developed in those three countries, the feudal structure in Kurdistan became more deeply entrenched. The chasm between Kurdistan with all its aspects and the rest of the nation deepened in all the three countries. Kurdistan became an object of exploitation for the sovereign national bourgeoisie, as well as imperialism."

The article goes on to charge that, with the coming of the multiple-party system, the Kurdish feudal forces compromised with the colonist government and, then, it says, Kurdish feudalists entered into a process of becoming bourgeois. Feudal elements completely broke away from the national movement [of the Kurds?], and developed, along with the commercial bourgeoisie, into a collaborationist and an adversary.

In the FR's view, the Kurdish bourgeoisie is collaborationist; it lacks the strength to become national or patriotic, only the Kurdish petty bourgeoisie can extensively participate in the national movement.

Loyal Soviet Defender

The FR's publications are replete with the defense of the Soviet Union and its revisionist theses. These publications always eulogize the Soviet Union's efforts to lead national minorities to freedom and well-being.

The FR joins the TCP, TLP and TSIP in giving full support to Soviet stances on the world situation, peace, detente and disarmament. "A worldwide detente is emerging," the FR says. "The international socialist system," the Soviet Union in particular, is progressing rapidly, and because of this rapid progress, it is able to extend more effective aid to national liberation struggles.

A Movement Independent of the Soviets Cannot Be Revolutionary

To oppose the Soviet Union is anti-Sovietism, the FR says. Animosity toward the Soviet Union leads national movements away from revolutionary precepts.

This is the criterion for revolutionism. A national movement is revolutionary insofar as it builds solidarity with the Soviet Union; in simpler terms, insofar as it is dependent on the Soviets. Under this definition, the mercenaries, known as the Katangese gendarmes who, under Soviet instigation, attacked Zaire, are full-fledged revolutionary forces.

Castro Is 'Determined Internationalist'

Dependence on the Soviets is the norm of revolutionism in national liberation movements, and the Soviet Union is the guardian angel of national liberation movements. On this premise, it is only natural that Cuba, which sends its soldiers anywhere the Soviet goal of hegemony requires and intervenes in any country the Soviets select, is indeed worthy of praise.

Castro, whose soldiers in Ethiopia carried out attacks on Eritreans waging a national liberation struggle, is "the Soviet Union's "resolute friend," an "uncompromising internationalist and a determined supporter of national liberation movements."

Archenemies: China and Mao

In its publications, the FR attacks the People's Republic of China and Mao's ideas as frequently as it praises the Soviet Union. The FR calls the

Chinese Communist Party counterrevolutionary and claims that China is not a socialist country. The FR's criticism is directed particularly at Mao Zedong's Three Worlds Theory and the Chinese Communist Party's assertion that national liberation movements must rely on their own strength.

The FR charges that China tries to show the Soviet Union as an imperialist aggressor and an enemy of national liberation movements. That is why, the FR reasons, China has advanced the theory that there is a third world against the two superpowers, or a world front against the two superpowers. It further claims that China, with its slogan of reliance on one's own strength, is hoping to isolate national liberation movements from their true friends.

Advice to Albania

The FR agrees with Albania in its criticism of China. Besides, the FR adds, that is what we have been saying for years. OZGURLUK YOLU, the periodical, devotes pages to Albania's attacks on China and applauds Tirana for having seen the light. Meanwhile, it gives Albania the following intriguing advice:

"The best thing for the Albanian people would be to develop good relations and expand the economic ties with socialist countries (here, the FR means relations with the Soviet Union and its satellites). In a country as small as Albania, success in efforts to build socialism depends on that."

Watching out for Soviet Interests

To sum up, the FR's views make it one of the two staunchly pro-Soviet groups in the east. It fans the flames of separatism by calling on the Kurds to stand up against colonialism. It lends support to the Soviet Union's subversive activities in the east by arguing that the Kurdish separatist movement must have the support of the Soviets.

[7 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] In May and June of last year, about 800 Talabaniists entered Turkey through Sardinli. It will be remembered that Talabaniists raided and looted villages and there were clashes when the area peasants and the KDP people rose up to stop them. The Talabaniist force was finally routed. The government, meanwhile, said nothing, did nothing.

The FR group closely monitored the developments. In fact, it had been following the events all the way from the beginning. It was harshly critical of the KDP for its long-time support of Talabani, but it kept quiet as long as the developments followed a favorable line. Nonetheless, Talabani's collaboration with the Shivanists in Turkey did not sit well with the FR.

When our newspaper reported that the Talabani force had infiltrated into Turkey and had been involved in clashes, the FR criticized us, charging us of trying to stir up trouble. It wasn't until early August, 2 months

after the incidents, that the FR publicly took a stand on the issue. The FR's views were spelled out initially in ROJA WELAT No 8, in an article with the heading, "The Causes of the Clash in Iraqi Kurdistan," and then, in the ROJA WELAT No 9 of 10 September, in an article entitled, "Release Ali Askheri and His Friends."

KDP May Become Pro-Moscow

The FR accuses [presumably in the said articles] the KDP Provisional Committee of surrendering the strings of the Kurdish people's liberation struggle to imperialism and to the Iranian reactionism, thereby preparing the setting for the 1975 defeat. It says there are many indications that the KDP Provisional Committee is in collusion with the most reactionary forces in the area, with Kurdish feudalists and the MIT.

The FR, nonetheless, disagrees with the Shivanist view that the Provisional Committee should not be considered one of the patriotic forces. The FR sees the KDP as a significant force made up of two factions, a "reactionary" leadership and a "progressive" opposition. And as an evidence to the existence of these two factions, it calls attention to the paper, "The New Strategy," a sort of self-criticism, issued by the KDP. The FR points out that the paper frequently talks of solidarity with the Soviet Union and East European nations, and predicts this trend will become even stronger.

What it all means is that the FR believes the KDP in time will opt for solidarity with the Soviets. Therefore, it reasons, the stand vis-a-vis the KDP should not be harsh, it is after all a party that can be won over. The FR uses "dependence on the Soviets" as the yardstick of progressiveness.

Full Support for Talabani

The FR has given its full support from the beginning to pro-Moscow trouble-maker Talabani and his KPU. The FR is particularly supportive of the Kurdistan Marxist Leninist Organization in the KPU.

'Shivanists Misled Talabani'

The FR severely criticizes the Shivanists, without mentioning them by name, for their role in Talabani's defeat at Sardinli.

It will be remembered that the Shivanists intentionally gave Talabanists inflated assessments of their strength and readiness in order to obtain large amounts of arms. They also told Talabani that his forces can go through Turkey without a hitch.

The FR holds the Shivanists responsible for the escalation of hostilities between the KDP and the Talabani forces. It accuses the Shivanist of urging Talabani to attack the KDP. It further accuses the Shivanist group of interfering into the affairs of the forces in the Iraqi Kurdistan, of misleading

Talabani by giving him exaggerated accounts of the Shivanist strength, and of keeping none of the words they had given. The FR concludes that the Shivanists are following an adventurist line.

The FR takes issue with the Shivanists' refusal to recognize the KDP as a patriotic force. The FR claims that the Shivanist attitude stems from an old bloodfeud, rather than from a serious concern; besides, it says, the Shivanists have always been anti-Barzani and anti-KDP. You will recall that Sait Kirmizitoprak, alias Shivan, whose name the group adopted, was killed by Barzani after 1971.

'We Do Not Want To Talk'

The ROJA WELAT article where the FR accuses the Shivanist for doublecrossing Talabani also has the following passage:

"Everything that happened is public knowledge by now, and we hope our readers will forgive us for not discussing the events in their detail. We feel a revolutionary responsibility in this matter and we do not want to give an excuse to the people in question to make a scene."

The way we interpret this passage is that the FR has knowledge of certain unknown aspects of the Shivanist-Talabani relationship, but it is reluctant to reveal what it knows. If some aspects of this relationship are against our people's interests, then, why is the FR insisting on keeping them a secret? The FR's attitude on this matter gives rise to mistrust about its approach to the Shivanist-Talabani association.

A desire to get in the good graces of Talabani appears to be the real reason for the FR-Shivanist argument. Seeing that the FR does not have much strength, Talabani tilted towards the Shivanists and established relations with them. When Talabani forces entered Turkey, FR supporters had to contend themselves with their role of mere observers of the goings-on. Essentially, the staunchly pro-Soviet FR has an ulterior motive in its criticism of the Shivanists, and that is to show Talabani that the FR is a true friend and to move to centerstage in the relations with Talabani. Meanwhile, the FR proposes that the KDP and Talabani agree on the question of reliance on the Soviets and unite.

Other Kurdish Currents

The FR claims to be the representative of the right road in the east, and downgrades the significance of other groups which, it charges, protects the interests of the Kurdish bourgeoisie and large landholders. The FR says there are only these two lines in the Kurdish national movement, and these two lines are locked in a struggle with each other.

Dispute With TCP

Why doesn't the FR, which gives full support to all Soviet views, merge with the pro-Moscow TCP, despite the latter's calls for unity?

The gist of the argument between the FR and the TCP is the single organization issue. The FR says that the TCP does not support principled alliance and solidarity and looks at the Kurdish question as a matter of ethnic minority. The TCP insists on uniting in a single organization, but the FR believes the conditions are not suitable to a merger within a single organization.

In addition to the argument on these points, the FR and the TCP recently entered into a polemic in the pages of their respective press organs. It is said that the FR's stand in the TOB-DEK, where it supported the pro-TSMP and opposed the pro-TCP elements, was a factor in the recent polemic. There are also reports that FR leaders sat down with TCP people to negotiate a distribution of power, but the FR failed to have the TCP concede to what it really wanted. That, reportedly, was also a factor in the bitter polemic.

Commenting on this matter, Ahmet Saydan, a member of the TCP Politburo, said there were reports that certain people in the Freedom Road group were preparing to form pseudocommunist parties and that these parties would be serving imperialism.

More Attacks Directed at TWPP

DEV-GENC [Revolutionary Youth Federation], Liberation and several other movements are "gauchist," according to the FR. They are not revolutionary, the FR says, and consequently, a merger of forces with them is out of the question.

The FR, nonetheless, saves its harshest criticism for our newspaper and for the TWPP [Turkish Worker-Peasant Party]. The subversive activities of the pro-Moscow groups in the east are, in the FR's words, "The Kurdish people's struggle for freedom," and our newspaper's disclosure of the facts about those activities is, also in the words of the FR, "an attack on the struggle for freedom." The FR claims that our newspaper is misrepresenting the facts when it talks of the Kurdish issue or the rights of the Kurds. Our newspaper's exposure of the Soviet Union's real intentions angers the FR which accuses us of fabricating baseless reports about the Soviets. As to our exposure of U.S. imperialism, the FR says we are doing it "to hide" our true face.

The FR was not pleased at all about the protest aimed at the visit of the Soviet ships. The article in OZGURLUK YOLU also claimed that "the friction between Turkey and Greece on account of the Cyprus and Aegean issues is driving the Turkish bourgeoisie into relationships with socialist nations." The FR concedes that the dispute with Greece plays into the hands of the Soviet Union. The article in question follows an anti-Greek line.

Partition of the Group

A rift appeared in the FR early this year. The disagreement among the members over the use of the Diyarbakir municipal administration's facilities developed into a serious controversy, which eventually divided the group into two factions. One was the headquarters group--the central group, as the FR people refer to it, and the other was the dissident group. The central group is based in Diyarbakir, the dissidents in Agri.

What the disagreement was about and what the views upheld by either side were are not clear.

[8 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] Hizgari (Komal)

In Istanbul last March, Mursel Delen, manager of the Van Student Hostel [hostel for students from the province of Van], was killed. In the days following the Delen incident, a number of communiques were distributed. Although they were all signed "Hizgari Supporters," they were issued by two rival groups, which charged each other with "sectarianism" and "provocations."

The Hizgari [Liberation] group had only recently separated into two factions. The fierce dispute between the two factions led to the Delen incident.

Not Influential

The Rizgari group derives its name from the periodical RIZGARI which has been appearing since 21 March 1976. It contains articles both in Turkish and Kurdish. The group of people who support the ideas expounded by the periodical--that is, the Rizgari group--used to be TLP members before 12 March. They quit the TLP and joined the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths [RECH] which, you may recall, was founded in 1969 by a number of revolutionaries from eastern provinces who were once TLP members.

After 1974, the Rizgari group moved to the Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Associations [RDCA], but failed to exert any influence among the membership. Finally, when they could not agree with other eastern groups on a joint formation of a mass organization, the Rizgari people left the RDCA to form an association of their own. They formed the Anticolonialist Democratic Cultural Association--ASK-DEM, for short--and later opened several branches in various provinces in the east. The goal of the association was to organize Kurdish youths and to help the Kurdish people in their "anticolonialist" national democratic struggle.

The Rizgari group is also known as the Komalists. It comes from the name of a publishing house--the Komal--which adheres to the line followed by the periodical RIZGARI.

The Rizgari group has been active since 1974, but they have scant influence in the east. Observers say the Rizgaris either follow a middle-of-the-road line in many basic issues, or do not take a stand at all, and that may be the reason for their very limited influence.

RIZGARI Advocates Colonial Theory

According to the RIZGARI, Turkey is not a semicolonial, semifeudal country, but "a capitalist country dependent on imperialism." The Kurdish areas of Turkey have been colonized by the Turkish sovereign classes. The Turkish state is colonialist, so are the Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian states. The Kurdish areas of those countries are the colonies of the respective state.

'An International Colony'

What distinguished the Rîzgari from all other eastern groups advocating the colonial theory is that the Rîzgari believe Kurdistan is "an international colony."

The Kurds were part of the state structure in the Ottoman Era, they say, but they enjoyed autonomy on their land. However, the Kurds gradually lost their privileged status after the imperialist colonialist state was established. Imperialists apportioned Kurdistan among themselves because the Kurdish lands in the Middle East contained rich underground resources, primarily oil.

That is why, the Rîzgari say, Kurdistan is "an international colony." The periodical refers to the Kurdish problem as "the key issue of the revolutionary struggle in the Middle East."

'Lausanne Is an Imperialist Treaty'

According to the RÎZGARÎ, the Turkish National Liberation War was a Turkish-Greek battle and a continuation of the war among imperialists to apportion the land among themselves. The Turkish National Liberation War, the RÎZGARÎ claims, was prolonged by Britain in order to solve its imperialist problems. Oppressed nations went at each other's throat in that war, the periodical says. The Kemalists, it continues, projecting an anti-imperialist image, adopted as a principle reaching an agreement with imperialists under more favorable conditions.

The RÎZGARÎ observes that the Kurds who took part in the liberation war were feudal reactionaries.

The Lausanne Treaty is an imperialist pact, according to the RÎZGARÎ. Under the treaty, it says, Kurdistan became the colony of four countries.

The Target: Turkish Colonialism and Institutions

Capitalist relations, the RÎZGARÎ writes, are advancing towards the establishment of a hegemony in the Kurdish sector. The periodical refers to the part of Turkey where Kurds live as the northern Kurdistan and declares that the inauguration of an "anticolonialist, anti-imperialist and antifeudal revolution era" is on the agenda.

The major dispute, the RÎZGARÎ says, is between Turkish colonists and their collaborators in Kurdistan on one side and the Kurdish people on the other. The target in that struggle, the periodical continues, is Turkish colonialism and its institutions.

To sum up, the RÎZGARÎ advocates a separatist policy in the east.

Independent Political Organization

The RIZGARI proposes the establishment of a independent political organization by Kurdish revolutionaries. Only through such an organization, the periodical says, will the struggle be able to develop in the proper direction.

The first advocate of socialist ideas in the east was the RECH, according to the periodical. All the Kurdish movements which periodically developed during and after the Ottoman Era were essentially "progressive and democratic."

U.S., EEC and Japanese Imperialism

The RIZGARI says in the post World War II era, the United States emerged as the major representative of the imperialist system and the United States remains in that position even now. The United States, which disguised the EEC in a lamb's clothing, has an impressive military and technological power. The EEC, U.S. and Japanese imperialists are locked in a fierce military and technological race to establish an economic and political world hegemony.

The Soviets Abandoning Proletarian Dictatorship

The RIZGARI considers the Soviet Union a socialist country, but observes that, under the Soviet Communist Party, bureaucracy has become prevalent in the land. The RIZGARI sees bureaucracy as the major factor in the decline of the proletarian dictatorship in the Soviet Union.

Meanwhile, it says, China is abandoning "dialectical materialism."

China's exposure and rejection of the Soviet Union's hegemonic policies are "disputes in the socialist world," according to the RIZGARI. The periodical warns against becoming a party to such high-level arguments and disputes. It will lead the struggle into defeat and hurt the international solidarity, it says, and refuses to take a position on the matter.

Metropole Country's Revolutionary Movement

The movements outside the ones in the east are referred to in the RIZGARI as the "Turkish left," "the metropole country's revolutionary movement," or "the oppressor nation's revolutionary movement." The Turkish left, the RIZGARI says, has followed a Turkish nationalist line since the liberation war and has been the lackey of sovereign classes. There have been some favorable developments in the situation, the periodical admits, but insists that not much has changed. The RIZGARI sees the Turkish left as "a force which should be cultivated as an ally in the anticolonialist struggle."

The RIZGARI describes the FR as a "creation of opportunism, a reformist movement which favors compromise," but offers no clear criticism of any of the other movements in the east.

KDP and Talebani

The RIZGARI takes a compromising stand on the dispute involving the FR, the KDP Provisional Committee and the pro-Moscow Talebani, and last year's clashes near Sendinli.

The KDP leadership, the RIZGARI says, is a blend of bourgeois nationalism and feudalism. Generally speaking, the periodical says, the KDP has a mass party mentality. The effectiveness of its leaders stems from their coercive tactics, as well as personal prestige. At the root of everything that is, or has gone wrong, the periodical sees "right" mistakes.

The KDP Provisional Committee, formed after the 1975 defeat, perpetuates the earlier character of the party, and is able to remain alive with the help of Iran, according to RIZGARI.

The periodical's name for the Talebani-led KPU is the National Union, which it characterizes as "subjectively socialist, objectively petty bourgeois." It says, the leaders of the National Union confuse Marxism with petty bourgeois socialism and have no principles or policies. The organization has established pragmatic, but insecure relations with Syria, RIZGARI says and concedes that its membership also includes proletarian revolutionaries.

On the continuing clashes between the two organizations [KDP Provisional Committee and the KPU], RIZGARI says it is a bloodfeud, an effort to destroy each other's cadre, and warns that these clashes serve to no other purpose than supplying advantages to colonialists and imperialists.

RIZGARI refuses to take sides in the feud, but offers a solution. It proposes that the Marxist-Leninists in the National Union should free themselves from the petty bourgeois mentality and set up a proletarian revolutionary leadership, and then, form an alliance with the Provisional Committee by uniting on common demands. RIZGARI, in fact, is calling on the Marxist-Leninist elements in the National Union to take over the organization and get together with the KDP Provisional Committee.

Rizgari Group Breaks up

RIZGARI abstains from making a policy statement on the struggle between the two superpowers to establish hegemony in the Middle East. It is yet to assess the developments and the forces in northern Iraq from the perspective of the two superpowers.

These questions, however, were central to the arguments that resulted in the breakup of the Rizgari group 3 or 4 months ago. According to reports, the specific question in the dispute was the assessment of Talebani and the Soviet Union. Rejection of Mao's ideas was another major bone of contention, according to these reports. The breakup of the Rizgari just about erased what little influence the group had in the east.

[9 Jul 79, p 9]

[text] Ala Rizgari (Red Liberation)

The dispute in the Rizgari group came to a head last March and the dissidents formally left the organization. They adopted the name Ala Rizgari and joined the ever-growing list of groups active in the east.

Reports indicate that the dispute in the Rizgari group centered on the assessment of Talebani and the Soviet Union, and also the rejection of Mao's ideas. The group, which later came to be known as the Ala Rizgari, argued a more pro-Talebani and pro-Moscow thesis and insisted that Talebani was "subjectively, a socialist."

Another bone of contention was reportedly the "anti-Maoist principle" which, in the lingo of the pro-Moscow elements, means taking a stand against revolutionaries. These elements stubbornly tried to impose this principle on others in matters involving united action and formation of alliances. Reports say that RIZGARI rejected the adoption of such a stipulation for united action, but the Ala Rizgari group agreed to it.

Heavy Traffic

As we mentioned earlier, the dispute in the Rizgari group became so bitter and fierce that armed clashes were unavoidable, and during one of those clashes, Mursel Delen, manager of the Van Student Hostel, was killed. When the group split into two, the Rizgari kept the periodical and the publishing house, but both factions launched a brisk campaign to encourage defections from the other side. Reports say that "the traffic became very heavy" in areas where Rizgari supporters live. Their propaganda campaign netted the Ala Rizgari people the ASK-DEK. ASK-DEK members outside the Bitlis and Tatvan areas joined the Ala Rizgari.

Still Another Division

There were reports that the Ala Rizgari group was preparing to publish a periodical of their own, which was to carry the group's name, but the periodical never materialized because, last month, the Ala Rizgari group broke into two.

People who live in the Ala Rizgari areas say that they suspected something was afoot when they observed prominent members of the group paying frequent visits to the homes of the members. The latest split is said to be the outcome of still another disagreement on "the anti-Mao principle." One of the factions, which calls itself the "Opposition," was more enthusiastic than the others in its defense of the pro-Moscow line.

These successive divisions left the Rizgari and the Ala Rizgari groups with a membership limited to the circle of friends around a leader.

The Ala Birgeri group's inability to disassociate itself from pro-Moscow views and middle-of-the-road attitudes, and its readiness to compromise on issues brought it to its present status, and in the meanwhile, played into the hands of pro-Moscow elements.

[9 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] Five-Sectionists

The Five-Sectionists, perhaps the group with the catchiest name, emerged in 1976. It was formed by Ali Riza Koser and friends after they left the People's Liberation, also in 1976. The group initially had considerable following around Tunceli and Palu, but the death of its prominent members dealt it a heavy blow from which it could not recover. It has since disbanded.

'Kurds Have Been Divided Into Five Sections'

The name Five-Sectionists comes from the group's contention that Kurds and Kurdistan have been partitioned, and then colonized, by the Soviet Union, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey. Consequently, Kurds will be free only when these five sections of Kurdistan are liberated from the domination of the colonialist states.

The Five-Sectionists believe that ethnic groups should organize separately. They call the Soviet Union an imperialist country. The target of their struggle in Turkey, they say, is the colonialist forces and imperialists.

Death of Ali Riza Koser

The incident where Ali Riza Koser, the founder of the group, was killed was related earlier in our "The Unknown Left" series.* He was killed by several individuals who are now in the DEV-SOL [Revolutionary Left] group. It happened early in 1978. Ali Akgun, also known as Ali the Gavrur [infidel], a character who had gained considerable notoriety as a provocateur, teamed up with two of his pals to disrupt a rally in Elazig. Akgun and friends opened fire on the crowd, Ali Riza Koser tried to stop them and calm the crowd. Some time later, Akgun and company ambushed and killed Ali Riza Koser. Akgun was involved in many other criminal activities, but so far nothing has been done about him.

After the Elazig incident, the Five-Sectionists issued a communique condemning the killing and restating their views. Signed "Denge Kurdistan" [The Voice of Kurdistan], the communique asserted that Kurdistan has been partitioned by imperialism, social imperialism and colonialist countries dominated by those forces. The Five-Sectionists said in their communique that Ali Riza Koser had devoted his life to the Kurdistan revolution and had battled against imperialism, socialimperialism, colonialism and the local lackeys of these forces, opportunism, revisionism and all types of deviation. The communique claimed that provocateurs bought out by reactionary nuclei killed Koser to stop the expanding national liberation struggle of Kurdistan.

*Published by the JPRS under the title, "Factions of the Turkish Left,"
Translations on Western Europe No 1433, JPRS 73683, 14 June 1979]

Clash With Apoists

Some time after the Koser incident, a bloody clash occurred in Gaziantep between the Five-Sectionists and the Apoists, and resulted in two deaths.

Following a disagreement with the Apoist group, the Five-Sectionists killed Hakki Kareli, an Apoist. The Apoist group retaliated by a killing a prominent Five-Sectionist in Iskenderun, a young man identified only as Aleaddin.

The Apoist-Five-Sectionist feud continued with each side accusing the other of provocations and collaboration with the MIT and issuing communiques replete with such charges.

The clashes further weakened the Five-Sectionists' already declining influence, and finally, the group disbanded. A number of its members returned to the People's Liberation.

[9 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] Tekoshinists

The Liberation group's supporters in eastern provinces broke away from the group late last year and formed an organization of their own, which they called the Tekoshin[Struggle].

The Liberation was the only faction outside the eastern groups which supported the contention that the Kurdish areas in the east are Turkey's colonies. However, the Liberation believed that the struggle should be conducted jointly and there should be a common organization.

The breakaway group, Tekoshinists, disagreed with the Liberation on the latter point. The Tekoshinists said groups should organize separately, and they argued for a more active struggle.

The Tekoshinist influence in the east is almost nonexistent. Their presence goes unnoticed. They have about 20 members in all in the Tunceli area.

[10 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] The Turkish KDP

"Kiyade" and "Mulla" are two of the names the people in the east use when they refer to this most frequently talked about group among many currently active in the east. Another of its names is the "Barzanists." Formally, it is called the KDP, short for the Kurdistan Democratic Party. "Kiyade" means commander and comes from the phrase "the KDP Provisional Command," which is what the people who succeeded Barzani to the KDP leadership called themselves. "Mulla" naturally is Mulla Mustapha Barzani.

Emergence of the Turkish KDP

The KDP is essentially an Iraqi party, but it has also organized in Iran, Syria and Turkey. Next to the Iraqi KDP, the Iranian organization is the most active and influential among the four. The Syrian branch has not been able to organize or function effectively, primarily because of the Syrian Ba'thist pressure and its collaboration with the Talabanists. As to the Turkish KDP, the efforts to organize in Turkey date as far back as 1950's.

The Iraqi KDP says, "Each party is independent of others and is free to select strategies and programs compatible with the conditions under which it must function and wage its struggle." (The New Strategy of the Iraqi KDP, p 161) The party, nonetheless, adds, "Solidarity on the international plane necessitates consultation and coordination among these organizations. Steps have been taken to set up a Coordination Council to ensure solidarity among the organizations." (The New Strategy of the Iraqi KDP, p 161) Such steps were, in fact, taken soon after the KDP was formed. Representatives from Iran, Iraq and Turkey got together in August 1944 and signed what was referred to as the Three Borders Agreement, providing for reciprocal assistance among the three organizations.

The Iraqi KDP's involvement in a long and fierce struggle in Iraq elevated it to a very influential position among all the organizations. The effect and the role of the struggle in Iraq and the Iraqi KDP on the developments in Turkey are undisputable. Actually, in Turkey or elsewhere, the initials KDP are primarily associated with the Iraqi party. Since the Turkish KDP has so far directed its activities exclusively at the objective of supporting the struggle in Iraq, it has not gained an existence separate from the Iraqi organization and its struggle. For that reason, a review of the events in Iraq and the emergence of the Iraqi KDP will be helpful in bringing clarity to the formation and functions of the Turkish KDP.

The Iraqi KDP

The Iraqi KDP has a 33-year history. It was established on 16 August 1946, but its rise to an influential position and its retention of the position as the "single" organization began in 1958 with Barzani's assumption of the party leadership.

Barzani's struggle has a history even longer than the KDP's, it goes back to 1930's. Barzani's source of power was his tribe, the Barzans, one of the largest, and his religious authority in the tribe. The Barzan family waged a struggle even in the Ottoman era, and then, against the British colonialism, which won them the leadership position in the eyes of a number of tribes, as well as their own tribe's. Barzani's older brother 'Abd as-Salam led an uprising in the Ottoman years and was hanged for it in 1914. Another brother, Shaik Ahmad, who replaced 'Abd as-Salam, spent many years in Ottoman prisons. Barzani's name was initially heard in the 1931 Barzani movement against British colonialism. He was exiled to An Nasiriyah, and then to Sulaymaniyah, for his role in that movement.

In 1943, Barzani escaped from Sulaymaniyah and returned to the Barzan area to launch another movement. That was followed in 1945 with an uprising on a larger scale which was quashed by the British Royal Air Force. Barzani suffered heavy losses, and then, withdrew to Mahabad in Iran where he founded a Kurdish republic. The British organized a series of attacks on the young republic. Barzani and his men played a vital role in the defense of the republic against those attacks. He was given the rank of general and his name was heard worldwide. Those were the years when the KDP was formed.

With the collapse of the Mahabad Republic, Barzani returned to Iraq. He gathered 500 men and, traveling across Iraqi and Turkish territories, went to the Soviet Union.

After the July 1958 coup in Iraq, Barzani returned home, took over the leadership of the KDP and gathered all his forces around him.

Barzani's and the KDP's names, henceforth, became synonymous, and the KDP came to be the most influential organization among the Kurds.

What Does the KDP Say?

The Iraqi KDP declared that its struggle will remain within Iraqi borders and its goal will be autonomy for the Iraqi Kurdistan (KDP Program, Article 3).

The KDP also announced that it supports "the struggles which the Kurdish tribes living in other parts of Kurdistan may undertake to regain their national rights." The party stressed that "the Kurds are fighting for self-determination," (KDP Program, Article 23).

The KDP described itself as "a democratic and revolutionary vanguard party, representing the interests of workers, peasants, wage-earners, artisans and the revolutionary intelligentsia," (KDP Program, Article 2).

Barzani's return to Iraq revitalized the KDP which, taking advantage of the freedom of action Iraq was enjoying during that period, organized quickly and widely. Kurds of various classes flocked to the party.

Even though the KDP described itself in its program as a democratic, revolutionary organization representing people of all classes, the feudal authority of Barzani and other tribal chieftains in the organization was unquestionably felt. The KDP, in essence, was born of an alliance among several tribes, its source of strength was the tribes, the Barzan tribe in particular. The weight of the feudal forces was felt from the beginning.

With the awakening of the Kurdish people, the KDP began to attract an increasing number of supporters from all classes, especially the intelligentsia. Soon after the members of the intelligentsia joined the party, they began to question the authority of the tribal forces. Jalal Talabani, even though he himself was a tribal chieftain, charged that Barzani was a feudal lord and organized an opposition. In the fourth congress of the KDP in 1959, Talabani was elected to the party's politburo where he soon became a dominant figure. The fierce power struggle between Barzani and Talabani continued unabated until 1964 when Talabani either left or was ejected from the KDP. Talabani, then, joined the Iraqi army in its drive against the Barzani forces. At the present, Talabani is totally dependent on Soviet support.

The feudal and nationalistic character of the KDP leadership made the Kurdish question appear as a mere matter of "national rights," or "a struggle for autonomy at any price." The Iraqi government was the only visible target of the struggle, imperialism did not even enter the picture. The KDP presented itself as the representative of the working class, but it did not offer a program against imperialism, large landholders, or feudalism. On the contrary, the party compromised with those forces.

In Barzani's view, there were two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. These superpowers were immersed in a power struggle and had no time to worry about smaller nations which got crushed between them. These two superpowers were to blame for all the calamities which befell the Kurds.

That may have been his belief, but it did not stop him from seeking the aid of one or the other superpower to sustain the struggle in Iraq. The Soviets were trying to develop their ties with the Iraqi Ba'athists, consequently, in 1960, Barzani returned from his Moscow trip empty-handed. He turned to the United States and took the initiative to secure "U.S. aid." He reasoned that, with Iraq expanding its relations with the Soviets, the United States will have to support the Kurds, and in time, he was able to get the United States to help him. He was right up to that point, but the U.S. aid did not lead him to victory as he thought it would. The struggle ended in a bitter defeat.

Founding of the Turkish KDP

There was no organizational activity of any significance in Turkey in late 1940's. When the Mahabad Republic was formed in Iran, several leading Kurdish personalities in Turkey contacted the Iranian-based KDP which, then, was called "The Komala" [Committee]. The contacts were conducted by Mulla Ghasi Vahab, on behalf of the Kurds in Turkey. As a result of these contacts,

several initiatives were taken to form a KDP in Turkey also, but the collapse of the Mahabad Republic interrupted the preparatory activities.

Preparation resumed in early 1950's. Sait Elci and several other members of the intelligentsia took the initial step to form a KDP. Faik Bucak, a leader of the Bucak tribe of Siverek, was named the first secretary general of the party. Later, Bucak will be killed and Sait Elci will replace him.

Conditions in Turkey limited the scope of the movement. The KDP could not for a long time expand beyond the Kurdish intelligentsia and a small group of youths. Tribal chieftains and religious leaders were not, at that time, interested in it. The 1959 arrests and the ensuing trial where 49 people received prison sentences brought the movement to a standstill for an extended period of time.

The Turkish KDP's growth and expansion will come in 1960's and Barzani's armed struggle in Iraq will play a key role in that growth.

[11 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] Barzani's return to Iraq revitalized the KDP and it began to increase its strength. In 1960, the party presented its program to the Iraqi president. The president rejected the Kurdish demand of "autonomy" which the KDP had designated as the "major goal" of its program. The Kurds and the KDP vehemently protested President Kassem's stand.

Struggle in Iraq, Its Effect in Turkey

Relations between the KDP and the Iraqi government deteriorated in the wake of the president's rejection of the Kurdish demand for autonomy. The government closed down 14 of the KDP's branches, arrested the members and fired Kurdish government employees and military officers.

In November 1960, Barzani traveled to Moscow to talk to Khrushchev's people to secure Soviet assistance. Moscow was, then, getting ready to move into Iraq to take the place of British and American imperialists whose status in the country had become very shaky. Under the circumstances, it wasn't surprising that Barzani did not find Moscow very responsive to his plight. Following this unproductive Moscow trip, Barzani left his Baghdad villa, his private car, renounced the monthly salary General Kassem had assigned to him and, in January 1961, retreated to the mountains in the Barzan region.

It was 8 months after Barzani's retreat to the mountains that the first clash occurred between the Kurds and the Iraqi government forces. It was 11 September 1961. The Iraqi Air Force, then, launched a massive air attack on the region. After several years of fighting, Barzani and his peshmergas, now in control of a large section of the Iraqi Kurdistan, proclaimed the formation of an autonomous administration. The year was 1964.

The Iraqi government announced that a new constitution will be written and it will guarantee the Kurds their rights. The government also said that it will issue a general amnesty for political prisoners. Barzani, then, agreed to a ceasefire until 1966.

Barzani's acceptance of a ceasefire added fuel to the simmering Barzani-Talabani feud in the party.

The fighting in Iraq popularized the KDP and Barzani in Turkey, and parallel to that, the Turkish KDP's activities increased. Arms and funds were sent to Iraq to support the struggle. Later on, Kurdish youths from Turkey crossed into Iraq, fought by the side of the Kurds and then returned. The number of [Turkish] peshmergas drawing monthly pay from the Iraqi KDP increased as fighting continued. When these young Kurds returned home and related their experiences in Iraq, the KDP's name spread among the masses. The relations with the Iraqi KDP became even closer when the ceasefire in Iraq ended and the clashes resumed.

Sait Kirmizitoprak's Activities, RECH

Meanwhile, a new name began to be heard in addition to that of Sait Elci, the secretary general of the Turkish KDP. It was Sait Kirmizitoprak. That's when the two Sait's, who eventually will cause each other's death, got together. Sait Kirmizitoprak, who had adopted the alias "Shivan," was far more active in the organization than his namesake. Consequently, he soon became an influential figure.

In 1969, a number of youths from eastern provinces left the TLP and the Intellectuals Clubs and formed a new organization, which they called the Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths [RECH]. It was not long before the hearths had local chapters in nearly every city and county in the east. The RECH membership included advocates of a variety of ideas, but nearly all of its members supported the struggle in Iraq, nationalist precepts and the KDP.

Sait Kirmizitoprak had a following in the RECH also. That's the group which will later leave the KDP, adopt Kirmizitoprak's alias and become the Shivanists. Some of the people who were around Kirmizitoprak in the RECH and the KDP are now the administrators of the Shivanist group.

The events of those years were the presursor of the rift that will appear in the party and shake it down to its roots.

During those years of struggle in Turkey, Sait Elci and Sait Kirmizitoprak were arrested several times. Kirmizitoprak went to Canada for a while. When abroad, he contacted the Iraqi KDP and other Kurdish organizations in Europe. He made several trips from Canada to Iran and Iraq. When abroad, he maintained his relations in Turkey through several individuals at home.

KDP's Growth

As the KDP's size and influence expanded, it attracted feudal elements also. Some of the sheiks and large landholders openly supported the KDP. Meanwhile, religious leaders--mullas and seyids [descendants of Prophet Mohammed]--impressed with the struggle Barzani was waging, talked about the events in Iraq wherever they went. In religious training schools, mullas devoted class-time to the struggle in Iraq.

The Turkish KDP's major goal was to provide adequate support to the struggle in Iraq. It was not involved in any "separatist" campaign. Its struggle in Turkey entailed organizing resistance against pressure and pushing its democratic demands.

However, it was during this period also that a reaction to feudalism and the pressure from large landholders began to take shape among the youth.

The east's reaction to large landholders gained momentum around 1964. The democratic struggle of the 1960's also impacted the east. The struggle launched by the TLP touched a responsive chord in the east. When it began the struggle, the TLP was the party of all revolutionaries, but by 1968, political considerations had driven it into compromises with large landholders. It ceased to struggle against coercion in eastern areas and adopted the "interregional imbalance" approach to the eastern question. That was the time when Barzani's struggle in Iraq was at its peak. The people's disillusionment with the TLP and the fierce struggle in Iraq intensified the nationalistic character of the movement which had begun to gather momentum. The KDP's compromise with large landholders stymied the growth of the democratic movement at the grassroots level. Nonetheless, there were young people in the RECH calling for a struggle against large landholders. Sait Kirmizitoprak set out to get these youths ousted from the RECH and he succeeded. With those youths gone, the RECH assumed a totally nationalistic character.

The Soviet Union's support of the Iraqi government, and the Iraqi government's attack on the Kurds with Soviet-supplied aircraft and bombs stirred up anti-Soviet feelings in both the KDP and the RECH. No one in those organizations raised a voice in support of the Soviets, but at the same time, neither organization took a clear stand for or against the struggle initiated in 1968 by Turkish revolutionaries against the revisionist clique in the Soviet Union.

Barzani-Talabani Dispute Did Not Touch Turkish KDP

Meanwhile, the 1964 ceasefire in Iraq was broken and the clashes erupted again in 1966. Talabani broke off with the KDP and his forces joined the Iraqi army in its attacks on Barzani. The Iraqi KDP responded by formally ousting Talabani from the party.

Talabani's separation from the KDP had no effect on the Turkish KDP which, along with the RECH, continued to support Barzani. To everyone who was on Barzani's side, Talabani was a "cahsh," a betrayer of the nation. It will

be remembered from our earlier articles that the Shivanists, who are now allied with the Talabaniists, and Sait Kirmizitoprak, who gave the group its name, were, then, KDP supporters and they, too, considered Talabani a traitor.

The fighting in Iraq, which resumed in 1966, stopped once more on 11 March 1970 when the Ba'thist government agreed to grant autonomy to Kurdistan. The Iraqi government will comply with the agreement until March 1974, thereby giving Iraq a chance to enjoy 4 years of peace. Meanwhile, up north, Turkey will come to the threshold of the 12 March era.

The policy of pressure and terror that the [Turkish] government implemented in the east beginning in 1968 reached an extreme plane after 12 March. The RECH, along with many other organizations in Turkey, was closed down and its members placed under arrest. Countless peasants and small shopkeepers in the east were put on trial by the martial law administration. Activities of the groups in the east came to a halt until 1974.

The Barzani-Talabani dispute had no effect on the Turkish KDP, but the rivalry that began about that time between Sait Elci and Sait Kirmizitoprak demolished the party's unity.

[12 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] With the proclamation of martial law in Turkey in 1972, the then secretary general of the Turkish KDP, Sait Elci, fled to Iraq. Meanwhile, [security forces] were conducting a hunt for Sait Kirmizitoprak who also had fled to Iraq. The dispute between the two Sait's resulted in Kirmizitoprak having Elci and his friend Mehmet Bage killed, upon which Barzani had Kirmizitoprak executed by a firing squad.

Turkish KDP Breaks Into Two

The series of events left the Turkish KDP leaderless and also polarized the membership as Elci and Kirmizitoprak supporters. After 12 March, the relations between the two groups grew even worse. Finally, under the leadership of a pro-Kirmizitoprak individual, who had fled to East Germany in the wake of 12 March, Kirmizitoprak supporters broke away from the Turkish KDP.

The breakaway group adopted Kirmizitoprak's alias as the name of their new organization and was henceforth known as the Shivanists, while the others continued their activities as the Turkish KDP.

The 1974 Battle and the Iraqi KDP

Meanwhile, in Iraq, the Baghdad government, in violation of the 1970 agreement, placed restrictions on the autonomy of the Kurds, upon which clashes started all over again.

This time, however, the situation was different from the earlier times. The United States, whose interests had suffered a setback after the government coup in Iraq, was helping the Kurds, hoping to reestablish its hold on the oil region. The Shah of Iran had been instrumental in the establishment of the ties between the United States and the Kurds. The U.S. aid was being channeled to Barzani through Iran.

The Iraqi KDP later explained, "Barzani's collaboration with Iran and the United States had become a key strategic factor," as the clashes broke out in 1974. "Everything depended on that cooperation." (The New Strategy of the Iraqi KDP, p 106)

Barzani had thrown his lot in with U.S. imperialism.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union had made its way into Iraq after the coup and was expanding its cooperation with the Ba'athist regime. The Soviets incited the Arabs against the Kurds. A long drawn-out fighting in the country was in Russia's interest. The insecure Iraqi government was gradually becoming more dependant on Russia and the military ties between the two countries were growing closer.

At the close of the sixties, the struggle in Iraq was no longer an Iraqi-Kurdish clash alone, by then it had become a phase of the Soviet-U.S. struggle to dominate the region.

The purpose of the U.S. aid to Barzani was not any different from the Soviet motive in helping the Ba'athist government. The Iraqi KDP later evaluated the situation as follows: "The United States wanted neither a decisive victory, nor a clear defeat in the Kurdish war. Washington preferred a prolonged war which would wear down the Ba'athist regime. That is why, its assistance to the Kurds was kept at a level which would keep the Kurds from buckling under." (The New Strategy of the Iraqi KDP, p 106)

This was the picture when the war between Barzani and the Iraqi government resumed in 1974.

Fierce fighting continued until early 1975. On 6 March 1975, Iran and Iraq signed an agreement, upon which the U.S. aid that reached Barzani via Iran came to a halt. Barzani, who had thrown his lot in with the United States, suffered a bitter defeat. He left Iraq and went to Iran, and then, to the United States. He withdrew from politics. He died recently in the United States.

The KDP Provisional Committee

The 1975 defeat of Barzani was a turning point in the life of Turkish groups, as well as the Iraqi Kurds.

The Iraqi KDP disbanded after the defeat. However, in November 1975, Barzani's sons, Mas'oud and Idris, formed the Provisional Command and tried to

rebuild the party organization. Barzani's sons also took steps to establish contacts with Kurdish organizations abroad.

The movement in Iraq, however, had suffered a serious blow. Many peshmergas, with weapons in hand, took refuge in Iran. While some 8,000 to 10,000 peshmergas crossed to Iran, a smaller number sought refuge in Turkey. The Turkish government, though, returned them to Iraq. Most were killed, and some were arrested. To sum up, when Barzani's sons began the reorganizational effort, the Iraqi KDP, in terms of physical strength, was not what it used to be.



(SHEYLO) MARGARET KELDANI



LEYLA KASIM

[Pictures from AYDINLIK, 13 July 1979, p 6]

CAPTION:

[Left] Margaret Keldani, known as Sheylo, was a prominent Kurdish soldier. Keldani, a Catholic, is said to have commanded a Kurdish guerrilla unit in northern Iraq.

[Right] Leyla Kasim, a female peshmerga who died in the 1974 war, is fondly remembered by the Kurds.

following a year of preparatory work, the KDP Provisional Command convened a conference. The meetings which were held from 11 to 15 August [1976] were in the nature of a general party convention. The KDP's new leadership submitted to the conference a report which included a critical review of the struggle, a self-criticism and a statement of views. The report was discussed and then adopted by the conference. It was, then, published, also in Turkish, under the title of "The New Strategy of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq."

The KDP's New Strategy

The report condemned Barzani's cooperation with the United States and claimed that this cooperation "played a direct role in the collapse of the September uprising."

On the Soviet role in the events, the report observed that "the Soviet Union relied on 'Arab cards' alone in its Middle East policy." Consequently, the report said, "the Soviet support remained limited."

During the days when the Kurds were bombed with Soviet-supplied aircraft, the KDP's anger at the Soviet Union was expressed in unmistakable terms. However, the report submitted to the conference by the Provisional Command, while angrily condemning the United States, used a restrained language in its comments on the Soviets.

The following passage, analyzing the 1975 defeat, is a clear illustration of this attitude:

"The major contributing factor in the Soviet indignation and in Moscow's subsequent support of the Ba'athists was the Kurdish cooperation with the United States."

In other words, according to the Provisional Command, the Soviet Union, angry about the Kurdish-U.S. collaboration, became angry and took a stand against the Kurds.

The Provisional Command, then, goes on to emphasize the importance of an "alliance within a national front between Kurdistan parties and progressive, democratic parties which will support the national and democratic rights of the Kurds on their land," and concludes that "the progressive national struggle is bringing us and those parties together."

These are the highlights of the KDP's new strategy.

After the conference accepted the report, the Iraqi KDP declared the resumption of its armed struggle against the Baghdad government. The KDP's strength in the Iraqi Kurdistan was eroding rapidly. The Iraqi government was evacuating the villages along the border and moving the residents down south. Then, the border area was mined and security measures tightened. Under the

circumstances, the KDP had no choice but to disband its peshmerga units and lower the scale of its military operations to occasional raids carried out by peshmergas who got together now and then.

Effect of 1975 Defeat on Turkey

The KDP's 1975 defeat gave Talabani the chance he had been waiting for. He secured the assistance of the Soviets in Syria and launched a campaign to discredit Barrani as "a feudal lord and pro-American." Simultaneous to his activities in Iraq, he launched his operations in Turkey.

Meanwhile, in the Turkish KDP, a heated debate was underway on the 1975 defeat in Iraq. The controversy will eventually divide the party.



[Picture from AYDINLIK, 12 July 1979, p 8]

CAPTION:

A school in northern Iraq bombed by the Soviet-backed Iraqi government with Soviet-supplied Mig airplanes.

[13 Jul 79, p 8]

[Excerpt] The 12 March episode, Sait Elci's death, and then, the emergence of the Shivanist, threw the Turkish KDP into confusion. In 1974, the party began a comeback. A provisional committee was set up and former ties renewed.

Barzani's decisive defeat had an impact on the groups in Turkey. It touched off a heated argument in the KDP and led to the departure of still another group of people from the party. The group took the name of the Kurdistan National Liberationist --KNL.

Despite the in-party disputes and fragmentation, the KDP is still the most widespread and popular organization in the east. The public sympathy toward the struggle in Iraq, and the compromises KDP leaders have made with locally influential feudal personalities help the party to retain its status. The KDP's influence is more discernable in border areas and in peasant and small shopkeeper circles.

The Turkish KDP recently began to issue a mimeographed periodical--XEBAT [Struggle]--which so far has had 12 issues. The periodical is a landmark in the Turkish KDP's history because the party, for the first time ever, revealed in the periodical its views on Turkey.

Turkish KDP's Views

In the first issue of the XEBAT, an editorial entitled, "As We Begin Publication," the KDP said that in the World War I, British, German, French and Italian imperialists attempted to partition the Middle East, but several Mideastern nations, among them the Kurds, put up a resistance.

The article goes on to say that the imperialists retreated in the face of this heroic stand, but did not abandon their goal. They signed several treaties, divided Kurdistan into four sections and established their sovereignty on all four sections by installing in each a puppet government. The XEBAT adds, "Turkish colonialist forces continue their occupation even today." The article claims that national and democratic rights are denied, economic resources usurped and people are held under heavy pressure.

The XEBAT article asserts that despite these tactics, a wave of national awakening and awareness is spreading to all corners of the region, but it also concedes that this consciousness-raising process penetrated the masses only recently, and consequently, there is still uncertainty and disorganization. Then, the editorial explains that the purpose in issuing a periodical was to develop a theory consistent with the subjective conditions in the region, as well as historic facts.

The U.S., Soviet Stands

Conspicuously absent in the XEBAT editorial is the party's views on the United States and the Soviet Union. There is no comment on that question,

even though, at the time, it was a widely debated topic within the party. The periodical turned to that topic later when, following the 1975 defeat in Iraq, the question of the United States and the Soviet Union became a major theme in the discussions in the party. The XEBAT strongly condemned the United States, but it also tried to justify Barzani's cooperation with Washington. "Stranded on an island surrounded by sharks, Barzani could not have been expected to make an issue of the name of the boat that would open for him the portals of life," was the periodical's explanation. Did the cooperation with the United States open the portals of life to Barzani? The 1975 defeat answers the question.

The KDP's Basic Weakness

This perspective used by the KDP demonstrates the key weakness the party has had from the beginning. The weakness is its stand on imperialism. Barzani repeatedly avoided taking a decisive stand on imperialism. His attempts to develop relations with the United States date back to 1961. In the meanwhile, however, Barzani also abstained from taking a clear stand against the Soviet Union, even though the Soviets were urging the Iraqi Ba'thists against the Kurds. The Iraqi KDP counted on the rivalry between the two superpowers to provide it with a chance to expand its struggle. Granted that the war in Iraq became another battleground where the superpowers challenged each other, but the battle did not end in a KDP victory.

The KDP today is facing conditions very similar to 1975's, the only difference is that the Soviet Union has replaced the United States. Today, everyone condemns U.S. imperialism, but the fact of the matter is today the real threat is the Soviet Union. In the past, Moscow had the Kurds slaughtered, today it is wearing the disguise of "the Kurdish liberator." Today, the most important thing is what is being said and done about that threat. Condemning U.S. imperialism years after the events is senseless, unless it helps to keep everyone alert against the current threat.

Division in the Turkish KDP

What the party's Soviet stand should be has been discussed at great length in the KDP, but interestingly enough neither the Iraqi nor the Turkish KDP display in their publications an appropriate awareness of the Soviet threat. The discussions in the Turkish KDP split the party. One group, which calls itself the Kurdistan National Liberationists, began to speak out for closer cooperation with the Soviet Union.

[14 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] Kurdistan National Liberationists

Following the 1975 defeat in Iraq, some of the Turkish KDP members began to speak out for cooperation with the Soviet Union. These people, who later will adopt the name "Kurdistan National Liberationists," attacked the Iraqi KDP's policy of cooperation with the United States, but found nothing objectionable in calling for development of cooperation with the Soviet Union.

According to the Kurdistan National Liberationists [KNL], the Iraqi KDP's leadership was patriotic and democratic until 1972. This leadership, they said, played a major role in the insertion of progressive demands in the party by-laws and program. None of the demands were realized, however, because the leadership shifted to the right and revised the demands until they became worthless. Despite these negative developments, the KNL argued, the Kurds achieved victory by winning the support of "the socialist system," that is, the Soviet Union and other East European countries, "the international working class and the national liberation wars."

KNL's Arm Shipments

As the argument in the party ranks raged on, the party leadership decided to call a congress. During the congress, the KNL took control of the party's administrative body. According to the KDP people, the KNL faction, ignoring the party by-laws, brought to the congress a number of youths and membership applicants who are ineligible to vote. Following their successful coup, the KNL immediately went to work to develop its ties with the Iraqi KDP and began shipping arms to Iraq. Meanwhile, they spread the news of the shipments and ensured that everyone heard about how they were helping the Iraqi KDP.

To win support for their group, they said former administrators of the Turkish KDP were "passive," "do-nothing" people, but now the party was the only organization supporting "our brothers in Iraq" fighting with all their might. They coined extremist slogans, "Long Live Our Armed Struggle," "Our Liberation Will Come Through Arms," to cite a few, aimed specifically at youthful elements. The mask of "socialism" they put on, and their extremist policies favoring armed struggle, won them support among the intelligentsia and the youth, but also in the unemployed, aimless circles in several border towns. They gradually became aggressive. One of their prominent members, for example, had an engineer shot in Mardin when the man refused to become a party to corrupt practices.

In Nusaybin, the KNL teamed up with the Independents of the RDCA and the Freedom Road group, and set out to clear the town of revolutionaries. They organized attacks on the Nusaybin Lycee and on targets in various parts of the town. A 10-year-old girl was hurt in one of those attacks.

KDP-KNL Breakup

As soon as the KNL faction took over the administration of the party, it began to purge the organization of former KDP leaders. There was a period, though, when the two groups got together again and decided to divide the Central Committee membership between the two factions. It was not a 50-50 arrangement, the KNL outnumbered the others. As to the Political Bureau, it was under full KNL command. Naturally, the arrangement did not last long.

It was discovered that the Political Bureau had taken decisions without first clearing them with the Central Committee. Meanwhile, it was spreading unfounded reports that the Iraqi KDP had officially recognized the KNL. That was the last straw, the two groups broke up for good. Thus, since 1974 when the Shivanist group had left, the Turkish KDP splintered again. KDP members formed a new administrative committee and retained the name Turkish KDP. Meanwhile, the KNL claimed that their faction was the legitimate representative of the Turkish KDP. Therefore, they said, henceforth, the party should be known as the KNL.

The interesting thing about the two breakups is that in both instances the splinter group was pro-Soviet. In the first instance, the Shivanist group which left the party developed into a staunch Soviet supporter. In the last instance, the KNL was a strong advocate of cooperation between the Turkish KDP and the Soviet Union.

Charges, Countercharges

The KDP issued a communique right after the breakup, accusing the KNL of "divisionism and cliquism," but there was no mention of the major factor in the breakup, namely, the disagreement over the pro-Soviet policy.

On this past Nauruz [Persian New Year's Day], the KNL arranged a demonstration, designed to serve as an act of self-assertion. During the holiday observations at the Misir Plains of Erzurum, KNL members raised their placards and made speeches. KDP members present at the gathering also addressed the crowd and declared that they did not recognize the KNL as a legitimate organization and publicly accused the group of "divisionism and cliquism."

After it broke away from the party, the KNL won the support of some KDP sympathizers in the intelligentsia and youth circles. The KNL has a measure of success in several towns near the southeastern border. There have been a number of defections to the KNL from the Shivanist group also.

Talabani Stand Softened

When the Talabani forces entered Turkey and clashes broke out last May and June near Semdinli, the KNL spoke out against Talabani but did not participate in the fighting. The KNL used to call Talabani "a traitor," but recently the group's opposition to Talabani appeared to soften.

A Mysterious Assassination

On one of those days when the KDP-KNL dispute was growing in intensity, a popular resident of Silopi and his son were assassinated. Ramazan Hasimoglu was an influential man, as well as popular, and he was known as a KDP supporter. His son was a member of the Denge Kawa group. Hasimoglu's family and friends insist it was a politically motivated murder. After the incident, seven associations issued statements, describing the murder as "still another conspiracy by the dark forces." Who are those dark forces? Did the KNL plot the assassination? It was never resolved.

KNL's Views

The KNL says it supports the armed struggle in Iraq which the Iraqi KDP has launched again. It explains that "imperialism and colonialism are the targets of the southern Kurdistan movement," and claims that the movement "has also contributed to the waves of the international workers movement." The group charges that Talabani has intensified his preparations to challenge the Iraqi KDP, and calls Talabani "a traitor."

To obtain the [Iraqi] Provisional Committee's endorsement means a great deal to the KNL. That is why, every communique and propaganda material prepared by the group contains a statement to the effect that the KNL is the staunchest supporter of the movement in Iraq. With statements of that nature, the KNL hopes to win the Provisional Committee's endorsement, and at the same time, endear itself in the eyes of the KDP supporters in the region.

In its effort to win acceptance by the Iraqi KDP, the KNL asserts that both the Iraqi KDP and the KNL rely on the "international working class." This is, in fact, a term coined by Moscow and refers to the global revisionist force.

KDP Is Close to Moscow

To recruit support for their pro-Soviet policies, KNL members describe the Iraqi KDP as a party which works in close cooperation with the Soviets. It is true that the Iraqi KDP has not taken a hostile stand against Moscow. Moreover, several members of the Provisional Committee publicly advocate cooperation with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, the party has not reached a decision, nor taken a step, in Moscow's direction. Moscow's backing of Talabani against the KDP had a chilling effect in the party. Be that as it may, the party is yet to take a public stand for or against the Soviets, and that serves the KNL's interest.

The Driving Force of the Revolution: The Soviet Union

The KNL also claims that Kurdistan is "under occupation and has been colonized." The group describes itself as socialist. "Long Live Independence, Democracy, Socialism and Our Struggle for Unity" is one of its slogans.

KNL members frequently talk of using Marxism-Leninism as their guide. However, when they talk of "socialism" or "Marxism-Leninism," they, in fact, mean nationalism and dependence on the Soviet Union, instead of the other superpower, the United States. In their view, "the driving force" behind the revolution is "the socialist system."

The Turkish KDP does not agree with the KNL's views, but neither does it challenge the KNL on the basic point in their dispute, namely, the issue of "cooperation with the Soviets."

Some of the slogans used by the KNL are as follows:

"Down With Imperialism, Colonialism, Feudalism;" "Down With Fascism, Chauvinism, Social Chauvinism;" "Long Live Independence, Democracy, Socialism and Our Struggle for Unity;" "Biji Tekoshin, Shoresherie Kurdistan," [in Kurdish; translation not given]; "Long Live Our Armed Struggle," and "Our Liberation Will Come Through Arms."

[15 Jul 79, p 8]

[Excerpt] Kawa

The word "Kawa" became familiar last summer when several mass-circulation dailies claimed that the Kawa group was the creation of the SAVAK, the Iranian secret service, and was working together with the Turkish Worker-Peasant Liberation Army [TWPLA]. According to those newspapers, Kawa was the group behind several assassination attempts. Later, the same dailies will report that the Kawa-SAVAK collaboration was off.

Most of the allegations were baseless. First of all, there were two Kawa's, not one. The original group had broken into two. One faction, which included only a small number of the original membership, still went under the name of Kawa. The second faction, which a majority of the original members joined, adopted the name Denge Kawa. Several Denge Kawa supporters, in their statements to our newspaper, rejected the charges in the newspapers, called them baseless and said that their struggle against Soviet subversion made them a target for such accusations.

The allegations about the Kawa group appeared in the press following an incident where a Kawa supporter was arrested carrying a rifle stolen from the army. Publication of the allegations by mass-circulation dailies was also interpreted as an attempt to divert public attention from the activities of pro-Moscow Talabani whose latest escapade was the attack on the villages around Semdinli, and to disrupt Turkish-Iranian relations.

How Did Kawa Emerge?

Kawa, actually, is the name of a legendary hero. According to this Kurdish legend, Kawa led a rebellion against Dekak [Zahhak], a cruel sultan. Kawa entered the sultan's palace and crushed the sultan's head with his club, thereby putting an end to his reign of terror.

The group, which adopted the legendary blacksmith's name, appeared in 1976. At the time, most youths in the east were members of the RDCA. The RDCA was not an ideologically homogenous association. Soon after its formation, arguments on current issues became a daily occurrence in the RDCA. A potentially divisive issue had to do with the Soviet Union and its worldwide activities.

Division in Kawa

A group of youths in the Istanbul and Ankara chapters of the RDCA argued that the Soviet Union is a socialimperialist country. The group clustered around the recently founded Kawa Publishing House and, henceforth, came to be known as Kawaists.

Later, when all the RDCA branches were closed down, and remained closed for a period of time, the Kawaists' ties to the association were severed for good.

Supporters of the Kawa group, where the common bond seemed to be the rejection of the Soviet Union as a socialimperialist country, usually flocked around local associations [not specified which], and a loosely structured federation was created among the widely dispersed groups.

In 1977, a vigorous debate on Mao Zedong's Three Worlds Theory that erupted in the group seemed to threaten the Kawa's unity, and it did break up the group. Kawaists who opposed the Three Worlds Theory kept the Kawa Publishing House and continued to use the name Kawa. They began to publish a monthly periodical under the same name. The supporters of the theory retaliated by publishing their own periodical, DENG KAWA, but the periodical which was expected to be issued twice a month has had a single issue so far.

The Kawa faction, which had a very small membership, was nonetheless influential around Tunceli, Malatya and Van. However, in time, its members began to switch to either the TWPP or the Denge Kawa, stripping the group of whatever influence it had in the east.

The Denge Kawa faction, the larger of the two, is still influential in certain counties of Mardin, Urfa and Diyarbakir. However, it also lost many of its members to the TWPP.

[16 Jul 79, p 8]

[Text] Rejectionist Kawa

The Kawa members who opposed the Three Worlds Theory were originally called the "Rejectionists." Later, when the original group broke up and the Rejectionists kept the Kawa publishing house, the group formally adopted the name Kawa, or Kawaists.

It was a small group to start out with and it gradually got smaller, in size and influence alike. It had no influence to speak of outside the Tunceli, Malatya and Elazig area. It mostly attracted aimless, rootless elements, and before long, it shifted to an aggressive line.

Views

The Rejectionists do not have a clearly defined policy or line. They do display a consistency, nonetheless, in their opposition to the Three Worlds Theory, Mao Zedong and the People's Republic of China. Revolutionaries who defend the Three Worlds Theory and resist the Soviet Union's subversive activities in the east are the major targets of the Rejectionists' physical attacks.

Their basic policy is expressed in the oft-repeated slogan: "Unite Under Enver Hoxha's Red Flag." Strangely enough though their opponent in the fights they frequently become involved in is either the Revolutionary People's Road [RPR] or other pro-Enver Hoxha groups.

Again the 'Colonial Theory

The Rejectionists, or the Kawa, adheres to the colonial theory as all other groups in the east do. It says the Kurdish region is "a colony, a semifeudal country under foreign domination." Its major task, according to the group, is "liberation of the land from the colonialist pressure."

The archenemy is the colonialists, the Kawa says. Imperialism and social-imperialism are also enemies because colonialism relies on those forces. The heaviest pressure on the Kurds comes from the colonialists, that is, from the Turkish sovereign classes. Therefore, the Kawa continues, we advocate separatism, the struggle against imperialism is a secondary issue.

Barzani, Talabani and Others

The Kawa describes Talabani, the Shivanists--Talabani's extension in Turkey--and the Freedom Road as "Russian patented" groups. These groups are trying to frustrate the Kurdish national movement. If they cannot stop it, they will try to surrender us to Russia, the Kawa warns.

For the Kawa, Barzani was a representative of the feudal-bourgeois class. He could not trust his own people, the group says, and that is why he wanted to develop relations with the United States.

These are what the group says, but in its written pronouncements and in practice, its targets are generally the supporters of the Three Worlds Theory and revolutionaries fighting against Russian subversion in the area. The Kawa sees them as part of the imperialist forces. The Kawa's attacks on revolutionaries are actually manifestations of a frustration in the face of defections to the opposition. Many Kawaists, having reached the realization that the group is, in fact, helping Soviet subversion by following a separatist line, left the group and joined either the TWPP or the Dange Kawa. When the periodical KAWA, in its second issue, attacked Mao Zedong's ideas, for example, a large number of people walked out and joined the TWPP.

Grew Aggressive

The Kawa group did not fare well after the breakup. Its separatist line became more rigid and it shifted towards adventurism. To protect its existence, it became aggressive and began to arm itself.

Its name appeared in the news in association with arrests for possession of arms. In June of last year, a leading Kawaist was arrested in Istanbul when three automatic rifles, stolen from the army, were found in his car. As a matter of fact, that was the incident that led to the allegations in several leading dailies.

Manager Arrested

This year also, the group's name came up in still another stolen arms incident. Several armed Kawaists commandeered a car in Mus. Their plan was to

steal weapons from the State Breeding Farm in Mus, but they were surrounded by the security forces just as they were about to move in. There was an exchange of fire, and then, the Kawaists were arrested, one of them seriously wounded. The wounded Kawaist was the executive manager of the periodical KAWA, Museyin Sen. Sen later died in the hospital.

It is said that Museyin Sen was not in reality a leading administrator in the Kawa, but was being used as a front by the actual leaders who prefer to remain away from the public eye. That's why, it is said, they send out younger elements to carry out the plans.

The relations within the group, which is mostly made up of lumpen individuals, are far from being revolutionary. A young female supporter of the Kawa was coerced into becoming engaged to a prominent Kawaist just because "the central body" had decided it should be so.

They Placed a Hood Over His Head and Beat Him

Frequent defections from the group prompted the group leaders into taking severe measures to discourage further defections. An incident at the 1 May district in Istanbul illustrates the type of measures that were taken.

A number of Kawaists showed up in front of a revolutionary former member's house and called the man outside. Mehmet Alkas, father of five, was grabbed by the Kawaists as soon as he stepped out. The Kawaists covered Alkas's head with a sack and began to beat him. Then, he was told to move out of the 1 May district. Otherwise, the Kawaists said, they would kill him.

A similar incident took place in Malatya where H. Aslan Argun, who had recently dropped out of the group, was beaten by the Kawaists so severely that he was, by doctor's orders, excused from work for 10 days.

The Kawaists have threatened to "physically eliminate" anyone who leaves the group.

Torture at the Mountain

The Rejectionist Kawa group frequently becomes involved in clashes with other pseudoleft groups. A major clash took place between the Kawa and RPR groups in mid-1978 in Tunceli.

Several groups in Tunceli organized a rally to observe the 1 May holiday. A Kawaist showed up at the rally with his automatic rifle, but security measures at the rally site were so strict that the Kawaist had to leave his rifle at a RPR sympathizer's home, but other RPR members removed the rifle from the house. Then, several Kawaists kidnapped the two RPR sympathizers who lived in that house. These two young men were taken to a mountain top and tortured. The Kawaists fired at the young men's feet, held their heads under water until the youths confessed that the weapon was taken from the

house by RPR people. The Kawaists sent word to the RPR that they would kill the two youths if the weapon is not returned. Finally, the Revolutionary Road group intervened, the rifle was returned and the youths rescued.

The incident would have ended there if the RPR had not felt humiliated and sworn revenge. The clash that followed lasted several days. At one point, RPR people cornered a Kawaist near a garage. Guns were fired. The only casualty was a 15-year-old bystander caught in the crossfire.

The Latest Situation

The Rejectionist Kawa group has no influence or activity outside of local operations we have reviewed. They issue a communique once in a while and repeat their claim that they are the leaders of the "expanding national struggle in Kurdistan." Meanwhile, defections from the group continue.

A Former Kawaist Talks

A revolutionary, who joined the Kawaists, but left after a short time, told AYDINLIK about his impressions of the group. The following is an excerpt from his account.

"I was a member of the Kawa group for a short period of time. We and another small group issued a statement rejecting the Three Worlds Theory, but we were not told anything about the discussions [presumably, between the two groups]. All that the leaders would tell us was that the theory was rejected by the majority. Then, through a series of bureaucratic maneuvers, the leaders seized the Kawa Publishing House and issued a pamphlet attacking the Three Worlds Theory."

"The Kawaists mostly talk, they make a lot of noise. They can't agree on anything. They have never achieved unity. They are good at exploiting the revolutionary feelings of the young people in eastern regions. They are afraid to enter into a discussion with TWPP supporters. The leaders banned contacting, let alone holding discussions with, TWPP supporters. If a Kawaist is seen talking to a TWPP supporter, he is warned and threatened."

"Democracy is an unknown word in the Kawa group. They threaten defectors, they attack them. I was also astounded to see that the group is led by incompetent, unemployed individuals. The group has nothing in common with the real people. It is going out of existence."

[17 Jul 79, p 8]

[Excerpt] Denge Kawa

When the Kawa group broke up in 1977, a majority of the original membership sided with the faction that supported the Three Worlds Theory. This faction later began to publish a periodical, DENG KAWA (The Voice of Kawa), and came to be known by the name of its periodical.

The group is active in several counties of Siirt, Urfa, Mardin and Diyarbakir. The group's major characteristic is its support of a number of basically contradictory ideas, which deprives the group of a clearly defined political objective.

'Ireland of the East'

When the Denge Kawaists emerged in the RDCA in 1976, they supported, and still support, the "colonial theory" advanced by the pro-Moscow Freedom Road and the influential Shivanist faction of the RDCA.

The Denge Kawa calls Turkey a semicolonialized country, but insists that the Kurdish region is Turkey's colony. According to the Denge Kawa, the land of the Kurds were partitioned by four colonialist countries. This is a colonialized land in the Third World, they say. In that respect, the Kawa says, our region is very similar to Eritrea and Ireland. In fact, the Kawa calls the Kurdish region "Ireland of the east."

The Denge Kawa believes that the most reactionary ideology in Turkey--the one that is responsible for poisoning the country's political life--is the racist chauvinism. This ideology derives its strength from big Turkish bourgeoisie and large landholders--extensions of imperialism--and the bureaucratic-military forces. A large sector, from Turkish liberals to the so-called national democrats, is under the influence of this ideology. Pro-Moscow groups, by the nature of their class, are also affected by this official ideology, but because these groups essentially defend the interests of socialimperialists, they are able to hide behind a demagogy relevant to the conditions of the day.

Tasks for Today

The Denge Kawa talks of "organizing the Kurdish national liberation movement against colonialists," and calls it its basic task for today. Its second task, it says, is "to support the intensifying struggle of the Third World countries and peoples against the two superpowers."

The Denge Kawaists say they basically support the separatist struggle against Turkey, which they consider a Third World nation. But in the meanwhile, they also talk of a unity in the Third World against the two superpowers. This inconsistency in their basic beliefs is the source of the vagueness in all their other ideas and actions.

The Denge Kawa has never clearly defined its "basic enemy," that is, a target at which the struggle should be directed. It once said, "The archenemy is the colonialist forces and national traitors." Some time later, it changed it into "imperialism, socialimperialism, colonialist powers and national traitors." Finally, it became, "colonialist powers, imperialism, socialimperialism and national traitors." Dumping these forces together, and occasionally changing the order in which they should be dumped together make no sense, and furthermore, rob the Denge Kawaists of political clarity and stability. Their struggle is largely directed at Turkish sovereign classes, and that is why, they lose sight of the Soviet subversion in their area. In most cases, the dividing line between the Denge Kawa and the pro-Moscow elements disappears.

The vagueness of the group's policies has been a major source of discontent among the membership. Some of the revolutionaries left the Denge Kawa when they became aware of realities. Now, they are members of the TWPP.

Two Proletarian Parties

The Denge Kawa believes that the Turkish and Kurdish proletariat should organize separately. They have to, they say, because the revolutionary movement developed in different ways in Turkish and Kurdish regions. They also say they are working on becoming the most relevant representative of the proletariat and the people of the Kurdish region.

Thus, the Denge Kawa becomes an advocate of "two proletarian parties under a single state," an idea unheard of in Marxism.

On Other Movements

The Talabaniist group, the Denge Kawa says, is a revisionist base trying to infiltrate nationalist ranks. The group criticized the Talabani force for entering Turkey and causing the clashes near Sardinli, and called Talabani a Russian collaborator.

The Freedom Road and the Shivanists are the lackeys of socialimperialism, the Denge Kawa says. Another description it uses for them is "socialfascist groups." The Denge Kawa also accuses those groups of following a policy that serves Russia's aspirations on Turkey. As for the Apoists, it says, it is "a provocative organization of the sinister forces."

The Apoists and pro-Moscow groups have launched attacks on the Denge Kawa group.

The Denge Kawa carefully avoided making statements about Barzani. It refers to Barzani as "generally a nationalist," giving the impression that the group is planning to take advantage of the pro-Barzani feelings in the area. Recent statements describing Barzani as "a national hero" lend credence to our interpretation.

[Final installment of 18 July 1979, entitled "General Conclusions," is not translated.]

GUIDE TO ABBREVIATIONS

English abbr.	Expansion in English	Expansion in Turkish	Turkish abbr.
AMEA	Ankara Higher-Education Association	Ankara Yüksek Ogretim Dernegi	AYOD
Ala Rîzgari	Ala Rîzgari [Red Liberation]	Ala Rîzgari [Kızıl Kurtulus]	Ala Rîzgari
Apocists	Followers of Abdullah "Apo" Ocalan [Also known under the following names] National Liberation Army National Liberationists Kurdistan Revolutionaries Kurdistan Labor Party	Apoculer Ulusal Kurtulus Ordusu Ulusal Kurtuluscular Kurdistanli Devrimciler Kurdistan Isci Partisi	Apoculer UKO KIP
ASK-DER	Anti-colonialist Democratic Cultural Association	Anti-Somurgeci [ar, Somurgecilige Karsi] Demokratik Kultur Dernegi	ASK-DER
Denge Kava	Denge Kava [The Voice of Kava]	Denge Kava [Kava'nin Sesi]	Denge Kava
DEV-GENC	Turkish Revolutionary Youth Confederation	Turkiye Devrimci Genclik Konfederasyonu	DEV-GENC
DISK	Revolutionary Labor Unions Confederation	Devrimci Isci Sendikeleri Konfederasyonu	DISK
Five-Sectionists	Five-Sectionists	Bes-Parcacilar	Bes-Parcacilar
FR	Freedom Road [Also called Roja Welat--The National Sun]	Ozgurluk Yolu [Roja Welat--Yurt Gunesi]	Bes-Parcacilar
Intellectual Clubs	Intellectual Clubs	Fikir Kuluplari	
Iraqi KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq	Irak Kurdistan Demokrat Partisi	Irak KDP
JP	Justice Party [of Turkey]	[Türkiye] Adalet Partisi	AP
Kava	Kava [-ists]	Kava [or, Kawa], Kavacilar	Kava
KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party [of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, or Syria]	[Türkiye, Irak, İran, or Suriye] Kurdistan Demokrat Partisi	KDP

Kiyade	[See Turkish KDP]	
KLP	[See Apoists]	
KMLÖ	Kurdistan Marxist-Leninist Organization	KMLÖ
KNL	Kurdistan Nation Liberation [-ists]	KUK
Komal [-ists]	[See Rizgeri]	
KPO	Kurdistan Peasants' Organization	KKO
KPU	Kurdistan Patriotic Union	KYB
K SM	Kurdistan Socialist Movement	KSH
Kurdistan Revolutionaries	[See Apoists]	
Liberation	Liberation [-ists]	
MIT	National Intelligence Organization [of Turkey]	MIT
Mulla	[See Turkish KDP]	
NAP	Nationalist Action Party [of Turkey]	MHP
National Liberationists	[See Apoists]	
NLA	[See Apoists]	
PL	People's Liberation [-ists]	
PYA	Progressive Youths' Association	IGD
RDCA	Revolutionary Democratic Cultural Associations	DDKD
RDT	Revolutionary Democratic Teachers	DDO
RDWA	Revolutionary Democratic Women's Association	DDKD
	Kurdistan Marxist-Leninist Orgut	
	Kurdistan Ulusal Kurtulus [-cular]	
	Kurdistan Koylu Orgutu	
	Kurdistan Yurtseverler Birligi	
	Kurdistan Soesyalist Hareketi	
	Kurtulus [-cular]	
	[Turkiye] Milli Istihberat Teskilati	
	[Turkiye] Milliyetci Hareket Partisi	
	Halkin Kurtulusu [or, Halkin Kurtulusculari]	
	Ilerici Genclik Dernegi	
	Devrimci Demokrat Kultur Dernekleri	
	Devrimci Demokrat Ogretmenler	
	Devrimci Demokrat Kadınlar Dernegi	

English abbr.	Expansion in English	Expansion in Turkish	Turkish abbr.
RECH	Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths	Devrimci Dogu Kultur Ocaklari	DDKO
Red Liberation	[See Ale Rizgari]		
Rejectionists	[See next entry]	Redciler	
Rejectionist Kawa	Rejectionist Kawa	Redci Kava	
Rizgari	Rizgari [Liberation] Rizgarists [Also known as Komel, or Komelists, after the Komel Publishing House]	Rizgari [Kurtulus] Rizgariciler Komel [-ciler]	Rizgari Komel
Roje Welat	[See Freedom Road]		
RPCA	Revolutionary People's Cultural Associations	Devrimci Halk Kultur Dernekleri	DHKD
RPP	Republican People's Party [of Turkey]	[Turkiye] Cumhuriyetci Halk Partisi	CHP
RPR	Revolutionary People's Road	Devrimci Halkin Yolu	DHY
Shivanists	Followers of Sait "Shivan" Kirmizitoprak	Sivanciler	Sivanciler
Strugglers	[See Tekoshin]	Mucadeleciler	
Talebanists	Followers of Jalal Talebani	Talebaniciler	Talebaniciler
TCP	Turkish Communist Party	Turkiye Komunist Partisi	TKP
Tekoshin	Tekoshin [-ists] [Struggle]	Tekosin [-ciler] Mucadele	Tekosin
TLP	Turkish Labor Party	Turkiye Isci Partisi	TIP
TOB-DER	Turkish Teachers' Unity and Solidarity Association	Turkiye Ogretmenler Birlesme ve Dayanisma Dernegi	TOB-DER

7244	TPLP-F	Turkish People's Liberation Party-Front	Turkiye Halk Kurtulus Partisi-Cephesi	THKP-C
C50: 4907	TSWP	Turkish Socialist Workers Party	Turkiye Sosyalist Isci Partisi	TSIP
	Turkish KDP	Kurdistan Democratic Party of Turkey	Turkiye Kurdistan Demokrat Partisi	Turkiye KDP
		[Also known by the following names]		
		Kiyade [Commander]	Kiyade [Komutan]	
		Mulla [after Mulla Mustapha Barzani]	Molla	
	TWPLA	Turkish Worker-Peasant Liberation Army	Turkiye Isci-Koylu Kurtulus Ordusu	YIKKO
	TWPP	Turkish Worker-Peasant Party	Turkiye Isci-Koylu Partisi	YIKP
	UKOists	Apoists [Initials of National Liberation Army]	UKO'cular	

[The] Voice
of Kawa

END
109

END OF

FICHE

DATE FILMED

29 OCT 79

WB